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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE - VENUE - SECTION 1391 (c)
APPLIES SOLELY TO CORPORATE DEFENDANTS AND DOES NOT GEN-
ERALLY REDEFINE THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT OF CORPORATE RESI-
DENCE FOR VENUE PURPOSES.
American Cyanamid Co. v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc. (1974)
American Cyanamid Co. (Cyanamid), a Maine corporation, brought
this diversity action in! the United States District Court for the District of
New Jersey, the judicial district in which it maintained its principal offices
and was doing business, against Hammond Lead Products, Inc., an Indiana
corporation, and Mitchener, an Indiana resident.'
Filing a motion pursuant to rule 12(b) (3),2 the defendants argued
that the complaint should have been dismissed for improper venue under
the general venue provisions of section 1391 (a).3 The district court denied
the motion but authorized an interlocutory appeal to determine the pro-
priety of the denial.4 On appeal, the plaintiff argued that corporate venue
provision, section 1391 (c),r was a general redefinition of corporate resi-
dence for venue purposes which had revised the traditional concept that a
corporation only resided in the place of incorporation.6 As a result of
section 1391 (c), the plaintiff reasoned, New Jersey was a proper forum
for trial under section 1391 (a).7 Disagreeing with the plaintiff, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's order and remanded
1. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hammond Lead Prods., Inc., 495 F.2d 1183 (3d
Cir. 1974). Cyanamid alleged that Hammond Lead Products and Mitchener had
engaged in unfair competition in that Mitchener, a former employee, had breached his
fiduciary and contractual duty by divulging, inter alia, Cyanamid's production secrets
to Hammond Lead Products, his new employer. The complaint demanded injunctive
and compensatory relief for the alleged acts. Id. at 1184.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (3).
3. 495 F.2d at 1184. Section 1391(a) provides:
A civil action wherein jurisdiction is founded only on diversity of citizenship
may, except as otherwise provided by law, be brought only in the judicial district
where all plaintiffs or all defendants reside, or in which the claim arose.
28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970).
4. 495 F.2d at 1184. The appeal was made pursuant to federal statute. See 28
U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970).
5. For the text of section 1391(c), see text accompanying note 14 infra.
6. 495 F.2d at 1185.
7. Id.
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with instructions to dismiss the complaint,5 holding that section 1391 (c)
redefined only the residence of corporate defendants for venue purposes. 9
American Cyanamid Co. v. Hammond Lead Products, Inc., 495 F.2d 1183
(3d Cir. 1974).
In 1948, Congress attempted to remedy previous difficulties with
corporate venue'0 in the federal courts by revising the venue laws." The
revision produced a new general venue statute, section 1391(a),'12 which
continued the use of residence as a foundation for venue in diversity ac-
tions;13 and also a statute relating to corporate venue, section 1391 (c),
which read:
A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is in-
corporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such
judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation
for venue purposes.'
4
8. Id. at 1187.
9. Id.
10. These difficulties stemmed from the traditional concept, established by the
Supreme Court of the United States in a long line of cases, that corporate residence
for venue purposes was restricted to the state of incorporation. See, e.g., Suttle v.
Reich Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163 (1948); Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co., 145 U.S.
444 (1892). This idea was based upon the theory that corporations were nonmigra-
tory. That is, although corporate activities could expand to many jurisdictions, theo-
retically, the corporation had to "dwell in the place of its creation." Bank of Augusta
v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 588 (1839).
As modern corporations evolved, the rule of nonmigration greatly restricted
the number of diversity actions brought against corporations in the federal courts.
Although state legislatures passed laws in order to subject corporations to the juris-
diction of local courts, federal venue law was not similarly revised. As a result, cor-
porations were often insulated from suit in the federal courts in the states where they
incurred liabilities. See 1 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 0.142, at 1491 (2d rev.
ed. 1974).
In 1939, the Supreme Court circumvented this venue problem by holding that
a corporation waived any objection to improper venue in the federal courts of any
state where, as a prerequisite to gaining a license to do business, it appointed an agent
for the service of process. Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 308 U.S. 165
(1939). See Comment, The Corporate Plaintiff and Venue Under Section 1391(c)
of the Judicial Code, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 112, 115 (1960). However, under Neirbo,
the corporation still did not become a resident of the licensing state. Suttle v. Reich
Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163, 167-68 (1948).
11. For the legislative history of the 1948 revision, see Hearings on H.R. 1609
and 2055 Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 29 (1947); H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, A127-33 (1947).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1970). For the present text of this statute, see note 3
supra. As originally enacted, in 1948, section 1391 (a) did not include the venue option
"where the claim arose," which was added by Act of November 2, 1966, Pub. L. No.
89-714, § 1, 80 Stat. 1111, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1391(a) (1964).
13. The predecessor to section 1391 (a) had provided for venue where one de-
fendant resided and where another could be found. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 231,
§ 50, 36 Stat. 1101. In contrast, section 1391(a) required that all defendants (or all
plaintiffs) be residents of the judicial district in which suit was filed. See note 3 supra.
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970). The statute has never been amended.
1974-1975]
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This section's first clause merely stated those judicial districts where
a corporation could be sued, but the nebulous language of its second clause
- "and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such
corporation for venue purposes"15 - caused a problem of interpretation 0
because it was unclear whether Congress had intended to redefine the tradi-
tional concept which restricted corporate residence for venue purposes
17
to the place of incorporation, so that a corporation might sue or be sued
in any of the districts enumerated in the first clause.
The first federal court to consider the question decided that section
1391(c) offered an expanded definition of corporate residence which ap-
plied to a corporation as either plaintiff or defendant.' 8  Other district
judges agreed, reasoning that the first clause covered defendant corpora-
tions, and thus, the second clause would be redundant unless it referred to
plaintiff corporations. 9 However, other district courts interpreted section
1391 (c) differently, reasoning that Congress would have used more precise
language if it had intended to overrule completely the traditional concept
which restricted corporate residence to the place of incorporation.2 0
15. Id. For the full text of section 1391 (c), see text accompanying note 14
supra.
16. Soon after the revision was proposed, one commentator wrote that the statute
would effectively amend the traditional concept of corporate residence for venue
purposes. See Note, The Proposed Revision of the Federal Judicial Code, 60 HARV.
L. REV. 424, 435 (1947). Apparently, this author did not foresee the interpretive
problem caused by the phrase "such corporation" in the second clause. See text accom-
panying notes 40-43 infra.
17. Generally, when a statute is ambiguous, congressional intent can be ascer-
tained from an examination of its legislative history. Unfortunately, the legislative
record of section 1391(c) contains no direct reference to the statutory language, and
thus the interpretation problem was exacerbated. See Comment, supra note 10, at 116.
18. Freiday v. Cowdin, 83 F. Supp. 516 (S.D.N.Y.), appeal dismissed, 177 F.2d
1020 (2d Cir. 1949).
19. E.g., A.P. Green Refractories Co. v. Peerless Boiler & Eng'r Co., 303 F.
Supp. 275 (E.D. Mo. 1969); Hadden v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., 105 F. Supp.
530 (N.D. Ohio 1952). Cf. Southern Paperbd. Corp. v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 649
(S.D.N.Y. 1955).
In Southern Paperboard, the court considered the application of section
1391(c) to actions concerning the recovery of taxes under section 1402(a), which
required that venue be laid in the residence of the plaintiff. 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a)
(1952), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1970). The court reasoned that the tax
recovery statute had to be read in light of the expanded definition of corporate resi-
dence contained in section 1391(c), and thus allowed the corporation to file the action
outside the place of its incorporation. 127 F. Supp. at 650-51. Contra Albright &
Friel, Inc. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 607, 608 (E.D. Pa. 1956).
Congress has since amended section 1402(a) so as to allow a corporation to
file where it has its principal office or principal place of business. Act of Sept. 2, 1958,
Pub. L. No. 85-920, 72 Stat. 1770, amending 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1952) (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1402(a) (1970)).
20. E.g., Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co. v. Davenport, 94 F. Supp. 83, 85 (S.D.
Iowa 1950).
It should be noted that the textwriters have also debated the proper interpre-
tation of the statute. E.g., 1 J. MOORE, supra note 10, at 1503; C. WRIGHT, LAW OF
THE FEDERAL COURTS § 42, at 155-56 (2d ed. 1970). See 495 F.2d at 1185 n.5.
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At the circuit court level, the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits all
rejected the liberal interpretation of section 1391(c) upon the grounds
that this construction was syntactically unnatural and without support in
the legislative history.21
Therefore, when the instant appeal was taken, the Third Circuit had
to decide whether to follow this unbroken line of circuit court authority
or be the first to construe the statute broadly to include corporate plaintiffs. 22
At the outset, the court reasoned that since the District of New Jersey
was neither the district where all the defendants resided, nor where the
claim had arisen, only one venue option remained to validate the suit in
a New Jersey federal court under section 1391 (a): the district where
Cyanamid, the plaintiff, resided. 23 Thus, since Cyanamid had been incor-
porated in Maine, the court said the complaint had to be dismissed unless
Cyanamid were correct in contending that section 139 1(c) had generally
expanded the definition of corporate residence for venue purposes. 24
Cyanamid first argued that the second clause of section 1391 (c) evinced
the congressional intention to redefine the traditional concept of corporate
residence by legislatively overruling the long line of judicial authority25
which had restricted corporate residence to the state of incorporation. 26
In short, Cyanamid contended that section 1391 (c)'s second clause made
venue for corporate plaintiffs proper in the districts wherein they could be
sued under the first clause.27
Rejecting this redefinition argument, the instant court agreed that
Congress had expanded the concept of corporate residence to create proper
venue in actions brought against corporations, but disagreed that the statute
also made a similar change regarding corporate plaintiffs. 28 The court was
convinced by its syntactical analysis that section 1391 (c) only applied to
corporate defendants. 29 According to the court, the term "such corpora-
tion"3° in the second clause referred to the one described in the first clause. 31
21. Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426 F.2d 629, 630-32 (2d Cir. 1970);
Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434, 437-38 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 813 (1962), noted in 48 VA. L. REV. 968 (1962). In a short opinion, the
Fifth Circuit adopted the reasoning of Veatch. Carter-Beveridge Drilling Co. v.
Hughes, 323 F.2d 417 (5th Cir. 1963) (per curiam).
22. A substantial number of the district court decisions were subsequently over-
ruled by the circuit court opinions contained in note 21 supra. See 495 F.2d at
1185 n.4. However, some of the district court opinions have not yet been overruled.
See, e.g., A.P. Green Refractories Co. v. Peerless Boiler & Engr Co., 303 F. Supp. 275(E.D. Mo. 1969); Hadden v. Barrow, Wade, Guthrie & Co., 105 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.
Ohio 1952).
23. 495 F.2d at 1184. See note 3 supra.
24. 495 F.2d at 1185.
25. See note 10 supra.
26. 495 F.2d at 1185.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970). For the text of this statute, see text accom-
panying note 14 supra.
31. 495 F.2d at 1186.
1974-1975]
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Since the court reasoned that the corporation in the first clause was a de-
fendant only, it concluded that "such corporation" in the second clause
similarly referred solely to a defendant.32 Furthermore, the court rejected
the idea that Congress had completely overruled the long line of authority
restricting corporate residence to the state of inoorporation,33 especially
when the reviser's note which followed the disputed section made no refer-
ence to the traditional concept of corporate residence.34 In view of this
legislative silence, the court was constrained to follow a fundamental rule
of statutory construction and not infer a change where none was clearly
expressed. 35
Cyanamid's second argument was that, despite the lack of supporting
legislative history, the second clause had to be applied to corporate plaintiffs
in order to avoid redundancy in section 1391 (c).36 The court responded
that the second clause was not necessarily redundant under its interpreta-
tion restricting section 1391 (c) to corporate defendants, since the language
of the second clause was designed to be used to define the residence of a
defendant corporation in connection with certain special venue statutes.37
In support of this reasoning, the court observed that this was the Supreme
Court's application of the clause in Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez.38 The court
reasoned that the second clause might have been formulated for the addi-
tional purpose of alleviating a joinder problem previously confronted by
the Supreme Court in Suttle v. Reich Brothers Construction Co. 39
32. Id. at 1186, quoting Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434, 438 (4th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 813 (1962).
33. 495 F.2d at 1186. The court stated that its examination of the legislative
history and the writings of the revisers of the pre-1948 Judicial Code failed to support
Cyanamid's argument. Id. See note 11 supra. The revisers' writings are listed in the
court's opinion. 495 F.2d at 1186 n.7.
34. 495 F.2d at 1186. The court stated that the revisers' notes purported to
identify all changes in existing law. Id., citing H. REP. No. 308, supra note 11, at 7.
The note following section 1391 (c) provides:
In subsection (c), references to defendants "found" within a district or
voluntarily appearing were omitted. The use of the word "found" made section 111
of title 28, U.S.C., 1940 ed. ambiguous. The argument that an action could be
brought in the district where one defendant resided and a non-resident was
"found," was rejected in Camp v. Gress (citation omitted). However, this am-
biguity will be obviated in the future by the omission of such reference.
H. REP. No. 308, supra note 11, at A127, quoted in 495 F.2d at 1186 n.9.
35. 495 F.2d at 1186, quoting Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187,
198 (1912).
36. 495 F.2d at 1186.
37. Id. at 1187.
38. Id., citing Pure Oil Co. v. Suarez, 384 U.S. 202 (1966). See notes 51-54
and accompanying text in!ra.
39. 495 F.2d at 1187, citing Suttle v. Reich Bros. Constr. Co., 333 U.S. 163 (1947).
The Cyanamid Court characterized the Suttle problem in the following manner:
There, a Mississippi resident brought suit in the Eastern District of Louisiana
against a partnership whose members resided in the Western District, and a
Texas corporation which had qualified to do business in Louisiana. Then, as
now under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1392(a), the applicable venue rule was that in a suit
against two or more "defendants residing in different districts in the same State,"
venue was proper in either district. Although the Eastern District would have
[VOL. 20
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An examination of the language of section 1391 (c) seems to support
the statutory interpretations of both the court and Cyanamid. The statute
begins by stating that a corporation may be sued in certain judicial districts
and concludes that each of the districts "shall be regarded as the residence
of such corporation for venue purposes." 40  The key term is "such cor-
poration," which clearly refers to the corporation mentioned in the first
clause, i.e. one that may be sued. However, the relationship between the
term, "such corporation" and the antecedent phrase "[a] corporation may
be sued" 41 can be defined in two distinct ways: One might adopt the
Cyanamid court's position that since the first clause describes a corpora-
tion that is sued and not one that sues, the second clause should be similarly
construed. 42
Contrariwise one might argue as Cyanamid apparently did that the
term "such corporation" refers not to a corporation that is in fact sued,
but rather to one that can be sued, and since all corporations are able to be
sued, "such corporation" includes all corporations. 43
been a proper venue district under the Neirbo rule in a suit against the Texas
Corporation alone, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that venue was improperly
laid under these facts. The Court emphasized, as noted earlier, that Neirbo had
not changed the Suttle definition of corporate residence. (See note 10 supra.)
Therefore, since the Texas corporation technically "resided" only in Texas, the
predecessor to § 1392(a) could not be employed to make the Western District
partnership suable in the Eastern District of Louisiana.
495 F.2d at 1187 (emphasis supplied by the court).
However, if section 1391 (c) had been available to the Mississippi resident, the
Texas corporation would have been considered a resident of Louisiana having qualified
to do business there. Hence, venue would have been proper in either district.
Cyanamid also made two other arguments which the court briefly addressed.
First, Cyanamid argued that the Supreme Court had supported a liberal interpreta-
tion in both Pure Oil and Denver R.R. v. Railroad Trainmen, 387 U.S. 556 (1967).
The Cyanamid court replied that these cases had dealt only with venue for defendants,
and their references to section 1391(c) had to be read in that context. 495 F.2d at
1187 n.10.
Second, the court found no merit in Cyanamid's policy arguments because
its interpretation of the language had already precluded Cyanamid's statutory con-
struction. Id.
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970). For the text of section 1391(c), see text
accompanying note 14 supra.
41. Id. The word "such" is generally used by legislatures as a demonstrative
adjective in order to restrict the meaning of a subsequent clause to something previ-
ously identified. See Note, Federal Venue and the Corporate Plaintiff, 37 IND. L.J.
363, 371 (1962). It has been suggested, however, that this use is grammatically in-
correct and responsible for problems of interpretation. Id.
42. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
43. Although the court did not detail Cyanamid's syntactical analysis, it is sub-
mitted that the redefinition argument was based upon the analysis as stated, which
has been used in the past. See Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434, 438 (4th
Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 813 (1962); 1 W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 80, at 388 (Wright ed. 1960) ; 1 J. MOORE, supra note 10,
at 1501-02; C. WRIGHT, supra note 20.
1974-1975]
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However, while a bare textual analysis supports Cyanamid's construc-
tion,44 it appears to be contrary to the legislative history. In reaching its
conclusion that the statute applied to corporate defendants only, the Third
Circuit relied upon the legislative record, which revealed that all necessary
changes in existing law were described in the notes following each section
of the 1948 revision.45 Since the note following section 1391 (c) 46 did not
reveal that the statute was designed to completely redefine corporate resi-
dence, the court apparently believed that it had to adopt the interpretation
which would have the least effect upon existing law.4 7 Since Cyanamid's
construction would have entailed a complete rejection of the traditional
concept and thus a substantial change, the court's interpretation appears
to be the more reasonable in light of the legislative record. 48
Unfortunately, the legislative history was of little help to the court
in its analysis of Cyanamid's redundancy argument 49 and, consequently, it
would appear that the court's two explanations for the enactment of the
second clause5 ° were merely conjectural and inconsistent with its reliance
upon the legislative record in rejecting Cyanamid's first contention. How-
ever, in light of Pure Oil, the Third Circuit's analysis of Cyanamid's re-
dundancy argument may not be challenged simply because the legislative
record fails to support the court. In Pure Oil, the Supreme Court reasoned
that the second clause revealed the congressional intention that section
1391 (c) be a definition of residence for corporate defendants 5' and as such,
be applicable to most special venue statutes using the defendant's residence
as a venue option.52 The Supreme Court recognized that the legislative
44. See Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426 F.2d 629, 630 (2d Cir. 1970).
Therefore, the court's contention that syntactical analysis alone disposed of Cyanamid's
contention appears quite misleading. See 495 F.2d at 1186.
45. See note 33 supra. The legislative record also reveals that the revisers sought
to avoid changes in existing law. See Hearings on H.R. 1600 and 2055, supra note 11,
at 24.
46. See note 34 supra.
47. In effect, the Cyanamid court construed section 1391 (c) as a legislative re-
finement of the corporate venue exception articulated by the Supreme Court in Neirbo
Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939). See note 10 supra. The
statute has previously been viewed in this manner. See Bethell & Friday, The Federal
Judicial Code of 1948, 3 ARK. L. REV. 146, 149 (1949). Under this interpretation,
section 1391 (c) was designed to eliminate any necessity for finding the Neirbo waiver
and to allow suit where a corporation was doing business without a license granted by
the state. Id.
48. 76 HARV. L. REV. 641, 644 (1963). However, it has been suggested that the
legislative history is inconclusive and reveals only that section 1391(c) provoked no
congressional debate. See Note, supra note 41, at 371; Note, Federal Venue &
the Corporate Plaintiff: Judicial Code Section 1391(c), 28 IND. L.J. 256, 260 (1953).
49. 495 F.2d at 1187.
50. See notes 38 & 39 and accompanying text supra.
51. 384 U.S. at 205.
52. Id. The Pure Oil Court distinguished an earlier decision, Fourco Glass Co.
v. Transmirra Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957), which had denied a similar application of
section 1391 (c) to the venue provision for patent infringement actions, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b) (1952), 384 U.S. at 206-07. The Pure Oil Court reasoned that venue inpatent infringement actions had long been restricted by Congress and that the Fourco
Court had been reluctant to expand such venue by applying section 1391 (c) without
[VOL. 20
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history was silent as to the purpose of the second clause53 but nevertheless
concluded, that its interpretation was consistent with the general language
of the statute and its liberalizing purpose of rendering corporations amen-
able to suit in the federal courts of the states in which they were incurring
liabilities.5 4
Although the Pure Oil rationale cannot fill the void in the legislative
record, it precludes any contention that the second clause is meaningless
unless its refers to corporate plaintiffs. 55 Thus, Cyanamid's second argu-
ment was justifiably rejected on the strength of Pure Oil alone, regardless
of the joinder argument's validity.116
The decision in Cyanamid represents the fourth time that a federal
court of appeals has rejected the contention that section 1391 (c) completely
redefined the traditional concept of corporate residence for venue purposes. 57
In view of the instant decision, it is unlikely that a circuit court will deviate
from this line and adopt the liberal interpretation in the future.
a clear indication in the legislative record that Congress intended this application.
Id. Furthermore, the Court reasoned that since section 1,100(b) had been reenacted in
1948 without change, Congress intended that it be unaffected by section 1391(c), a
product of the same revision. Id. Upon this distinguishing basis the Pure Oil Court
justified its application of section 1391(c) to the statute which it was considering,
the venue provision of the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1964). 384 U.S. at 206-07.
53. 384 U.S. at 204.
54. Id. at 204-05.
55. Although the instant court effectively disposed of Cyanamid's redundancy
argument, it is submitted that there is a more reasonable explanation of the purpose
of the second clause: It may have been intended to reconcile the first clause of section
1391(c) with section 1391(a). In 1948, section 1391(a) only allowed suit in either the
residence of the plaintiff or of the defendant. See notes 3 & 12 supra. If only the first
clause of section 1391 (c) had been enacted, it would have allowed suit in districts other
than those traditionally regarded as corporate residences, and therefore the second
.clause may have been designed to insure that all of the listed places were regarded as
residences, thereby eliminating this basic inconsistency. See United Merchants &
Mfrs. v. United States, 123 F. Supp. 435, 438 (M.D. Ga. 1954) (dictum) ; Comment,
supra note 10, at 116; 51 MIcH. L. REv. 440, 442 (1953).
56. In the instant case, the Third Circuit concluded that the joinder argument
was less easily made than that regarding the special venue statutes. 495 F.2d at 1187.
Although the court did not reveal the reasoning upon which this conclusion was based,
it may have expressed this reservation because, unlike the special venue argument,
there was no Supreme Court decision which could be cited as specifically including the
joinder analysis within the purpose of the statute, and thus the joinder argument
could be questioned as being mere speculation. Cf. Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman,
426 F.2d 629, 631 (2d Cir. 1970). However, it is submitted that the court's
analysis of Suttle can be justified by the Pure Oil rationale. See text accompanying
notes 51-54 supra. As the court demonstrated in the instant case, the plain language
of the second clause eliminates the joinder problem which had occurred in Suttle. See
note 39 supra. Furthermore, if the statute had had the liberalizing purpose articulated
by the Pure Oil Court, the elimination of joinder difficulties was certainly necessary
to render corporations more amenable to suit.
57. Actually, the instant decision is a compendium of the earlier circuit court
decisions. See note 21 supra. The court adopted the syntactical analysis and Suttle
argument presented by Judge Sobeloff in Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch, 301 F.2d 434,
438 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 813 (1962). The Pure Oil rationale was
first applied in Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426 F.2d 629, 632 (2d Cir. 1970).
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Prior to 1966, this prediction would have been unwise. The Fourth
Circuit's decision in Robert E. Lee & Co. v. Veatch,8 the first to construe
the statute against corporate plaintiffs, was severely criticized by one com-
mentator who argued that this conservative interpretation would, under
certain facts, preclude suit in the most convenient forum.59 However, this
criticism was made prior to the addition of "where the claim arose" as a
venue option under section 1391 (a).60 Hence, as a result of that amendment,
a circuit court no longer needs to remedy the statutory omission with a
liberal interpretation of the statute, in order to provide the best forum for
trial.61
In view of the formidable line of authority for the limited construction,
the dispute concerning the proper interpretation of section 1391(c) is
nearing an end. However, a judicially final resolution of the debate cannot
be achieved unless the Supreme Court considers the question.6 2
James A. Swetz
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE - FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e) - DISTRICT
COURT APPROVAL OF A CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT TO WHICH MORE
THAN TWENTY PERCENT OF THE CLASS PLAINTIFFS OBJECT DOES
NOT CONSTITUTE AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. (1974)
Three women formerly employed at the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Com-
pany's Creighton plant instituted a class action in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania on behalf of women pres-
ently or formerly employed at the plant, alleging that defendants Pittsburgh
Plate Glass (PPG) and the United Glass and Ceramic Workers (the
Union) engaged in sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
58. 301 F.2d 434 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 813 (1962).
59. Note, supra note 48, at 644. In Veatch, a South Carolina corporation and aGeorgia corporation doing business in South Carolina sued a partnership, whose
members resided in Missouri, in a federal court in South Carolina, where the claim
arose. 301 F.2d at 435. As a result of the Veatch court's restrictive interpretation
of section 1391(c), the Georgia corporation was denied access to the federal courtsin S6uth Carolina and had to either sue in a state court or go to Missouri. See
Note, supra note 48, at 644.
60. See note 12 supra.
61. Cf. Manchester Modes, Inc. v. Schuman, 426 F.2d 629, 633 n.6 (2d Cir.
1970).
62. The Supreme Court has recognized the problem posed by section 1391(c).
Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 156-57 n.20 (1967).
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Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). 1 Plaintiffs based their allegation upon the
fact that an agreement between PPG and the Union, which terminated the
employment rights of employees laid off from work at the Creighton plant
for more than 5 years, affected the rights of 452 women, but no men.
2
The district court found that the 452 women whose rights were terminated
by the agreement comprised a proper class for maintenance of a class action
pursuant to both rules 23(b) (2) and 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.3 Trial proceeded until agreement upon settlement was
reached.4 After class members 5 were notified of the terms of the proposed
settlement and were given an opportunity to object, the district court,
pursuant to rule 23(e), 6 approved the settlement.7 Eighty-two plaintiffs
1. Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 59 F.R.D. 616 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
Plaintiffs' claim arose under sections 703(a) and 703(c) of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (c) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1974). Section
703(a) prohibits discrimination by an employer in hiring, compensation, terms, con-
ditions or privileges of employment, and segregation or classification of employees
based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-(2) (a). Section
703(c) prohibits labor organizations from discriminating against its members upon
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Id. § 2000e-(2) (c).
2. 59 F.R.D. at 617. See Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799, 801
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 900 (1974). Sex discrimination charges filed with
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) had resulted not in a
final determination, but in a "right-to-sue" letter's being issued to complainants.
494 F.2d at 801.
3. 59 F.R.D. at 616. Rule 23(b) provides in pertinent part:
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of sub-
division (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds gener-
ally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2), (3).
4. 59 F.R.D. at 617. The settlement agreement required, in part, that a fund
of $931,724 be divided among class members in proportion to the number of months
each class member had worked at the Creighton plant. Id.
5. Some of the 452 women comprising the initially defined class requested ex-
clusion pursuant to rule 23(c) (2), and the final class had 371 members. Id. at 616.
Rule 23(c) (2) provides in pertinent part that "the court will exclude [a member]
from the class if he so requests by a specified date .... " FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (2) (A).
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(e). The rule provides:
A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of
the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all
members of the class in such manner as the court directs.
Id.
7. 59 F.R.D. at 618. The district court determined that the settlement was a
fair, reasonable, and adequate compromise of plaintiffs' claim in view of the plead-
ings, interrogatories and the answers thereto, pretrial stipulations, evidence and
testimony adduced both at trial and at the settlement hearing, briefs submitted by the
parties, and uncertainties and risks of future litigation. Id. at 617.
1974-1975]
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objected to the terms of the agreement and appealed,8 contending, inter alia,
that the district court had abused its discretion in approving the settlement
and that class representatives could not bind class members who objected
to the settlement.9 The Third Circuit- affirmed, holding that although the
settlement granted plaintiffs only a small percentage of backpay, and more
than 20 percent of the class plaintiffs objected to the terms, the district
court had not abused its discretion in approving the settlement. The court
further held that the settlement was binding upon the objecting plaintiffs.
Bryan v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 494 F.2d 799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 900 (1974).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have, since their promulgation
in 1937, prohibited the dismissal or compromise of a class action without
court approval. 10 Such court approval, which has a res judicata effect upon
2ll members of the class," was intended to protect the interests of nonparty
class members1 2 and assure fairness to all class members as well as to
prevent class action suits from being used as a device for unjust enrich-
ment.13 The decision whether or not to approve a proposed settlement as
8. 494 F.2d at 801. All class members had had a right to appear at a hearing to
state objections to the proposed settlement. 59 F.R.D. at 617. Failure to appear and
object bars appeal of the court's decision approving the settlement and dismissing
the action. 7A C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1797,
at 232-33 (1972) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. The right of nonparty
class members to appeal a compromise approval was recognized at least as early as
1942. Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 778
(1944). See 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 23.80, at 1557 (2d ed. 1969) [herein-
after cited as MOORE].
9. 494 F.2d at 801, 803. Plaintiffs also argued that even if there had been no
abuse of discretion, the class should have been divided into two subclasses as authorized
by rule 23(c) (4) (B). Id. at 804. See note 19 infra.
10. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e). For the complete text of rule 23(e), see note 6 supra.
See generally 3B MOORE, supra note 8, 11 23.80, at 1501-02.
11. Rule 23(c) (3) provides:
The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision
(b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and
describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in
an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not
favorable to the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the
notice provided in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested
exclusion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c) (3). See 3B MOORE, supra note 8, 1 23.80, at 1502; Dole, The
Settlement of Class Actions for Damages, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 971, 976-77 (1971).
There is no res judicata effect upon those who have requested exclusion. FED. R. Civ.
P. 23(c) (3).
12. See 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1797, at 226 & n.27. Nonparty
class members are also protected by the mandate of rule 23(a), which makes fair
ana adequate representation a prerequisite to maintaining a class action, by the notice
requirement of rule 23(e), and by the subsequent "fairness hearing" which is usually
granted by the court in order to allow nonparty class members to voice objections to
a proposed settlement. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(d) (2), (4). See also Dole, supra
note 11, at 981.
13. Prior to the enactment of the rule requiring court approval of class action
settlements, a plaintiff could bring a class action and negotiate a settlement for an
amount exceeding his damages in return for his abandonment of the suit. Levy, Class
[VOL. 20.
11
Editors: Federal Jursidiction and Procedure
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
fair and reasonable is within the sound discretion of the court1 4 and will be
reversed only when an abuse of that discretion has been clearly shown. 15
While the absence of any opposition to the settlement is a significant
factor which the court may consider when approving or disapproving a
class action settlement,'16 before Bryan only one district court, in Amal-
gamated Meat Cutters Local 340 v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,17 had been faced
with determining the fairness of a settlement when a significant portion of
the class members opposed its terms. The Amalgamated court rejected the
proposed settlement, in part because slightly more than 25 percent of the
class members felt the compromise was grossly unfair.18 However, the
court did not discuss the weight it gave this factor.
In Bryan, appellants primarily claimed that the district court had
abused its discretion in approving the settlement and dismissing the com-
plaint with prejudice. 19 To support this claim, they advanced a two-
Action Settlement Techniques and Procedures, 19 PRAc. LAW., Dec., 1973, at 69.
See also 3B MOORE, supra note 8, ff 23.80, at 1551-55.
14. Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769, 774 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S.
912 (1971) ; Cohen v. Young, 127 F.2d 721, 725-26 (6th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 778 (1944) ; West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 740 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
15. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1085 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971).
16. Hartford Hosp. v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 52 F.R.D. 131, 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
For a discussion of other factors courts have found relevant, see 7A WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 8, § 1797, at 230-31.
17. 52 F.R.D. 373 (D. Kan. 1971). The case arose as a result of a complaint
filed with the EEOC by the union and three employee members on behalf of all
female employees in certain job classifications at a meatpacking and meathandling
department. The Amalgamated court characterized the plaintiffs' claim as alleging
a discriminatory differential in pay for the same type of work, in violation of section
706(e) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970). 52 F.R.D.
at 374.
This characterization is confusing because section 706(e) is procedural; the dis-
criminatory practice would appear to be in violation of section 703(a) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970), as amended (Supp. IIn, 1974).
18. 52 F.R.D. at 374, 376. Twenty-two of the eighty-five class members objected,
several upon the grounds that the gross settlement amount did not compensate overtime
for which they would have been paid at the rate of 1% times the regular hourly wage.
Id. at 374-75. In rejecting the settlement, the court considered the class members' objec-
tions and the fact that plaintiffs' counsel was subject to a potential conflict of interest
since he represented both the union and the class members. The court also observed that
the determinations of fact and law in the case were not as complex as the proponents
of the settlement believed. Id. at 375-76.
In addition, the court specifically noted that the group of objecting class mem-
bers included one of the named plaintiffs, but did not discuss the significance of this
fact. Id. at 374. It could be argued that the court should consider the fact that the
group opposing the settlement includes one or more named plaintiffs, since they have
been actively involved in the litigation and have more at stake than unnamed class
members who make a relatively small contribution to the conduct of the suit.
19. 494 F.2d at 801. Appellants argued in the alternative that in the absence of
an abuse of discretion, the class should have been divided into two subclasses: the
more senior class members, interested, according to appellants, only in securing back-
pay; and those, like appellants, desiring reinstatement as well. Id. at 804. The court
1974-1975]
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pronged argument: 1) that the strength of the merits of their case made it
an abuse of discretion to approve the settlement as fair and reasonable, 20
and 2) that such approval was arbitrary because more than 20 percent of
the plaintiffs objected to the terms of the settlement.21
The Third Circuit, in disposing of appellants' argument based upon
the merits of the case, agreed with appellants that, after the presentation
of their evidence, 22 a prima facie claim of sex discrimination had been
established.23 Thus, if the trial had continued, the burden of proof would
have shifted, requiring defendants to justify their discriminatory con-
duct. 24 However, the court determined that appellees' asserted "busi-
ness purpose" 25 of securing a work force of balanced age, coupled with
their allegations indicating a questionable discriminatory effect, could po-
tentially meet this burden. 2  Similarly, PPG's claim of a "bona fide occu-
pational qualification," an exception to the sex discrimination prohibitions
rejected this argument, distinguishing the instant case from Air Line Stewards &
Stewardesses Ass'n v. American Airlines, Inc., 490 F.2d 636 (7th Cir. 1973).
In Air Line Stewards, the original class consisted of two subgroups: first,
presently employed stewardesses who sought prospective relief; and second, steward-
esses whose employment had been terminated because they had become pregnant, and
who sought reinstatement. When the claims of the first subgroup became moot
because of a collective bargaining agreement, their interests became antagonistic to
those of the formerly-employed stewardesses. Therefore, the court divided the class
into two subclasses, using the subgroup Lines. Id. at 638-43. See also 494 F.2d at 804.
In the instant case, all members of the class as originally defined sought the
same relief until some members objected to the settlement. Id. at 804. However, while
their interests then became antagonistic to those of the class, the court refused to
accept appellants' presumption that the senior members of the class sought only back-
pay and hence constituted a clearly defined subclass such as had existed in Air Line
Stewards. Id.
20. 494 F.2d at 801.
21. Id. at 803. Plaintiffs' principal objection to the terms of the settlement was
that they would thereby receive only a small portion of their requests for backpay.
Id. at 802.
22. The parties had agreed upon the settlement after the plaintiffs had presented
their case. 59 F.R.D. at 617.
23. 494 F.2d at 801. Plaintiffs showed a past discriminatory practice and an
action having an immediate discriminatory impact upon employment rights. Id. See
note 28 infra.
24. 494 F.2d at 802, citing Muniz v. Beto, 434 F.2d 697, 700 (5th Cir. 1970).
25. The judicially created "business purpose" or "business necessity" doctrine
can be used to justify employment practices which are inherently discriminatory when
the practice fosters safety and efficiency and is essential to achieving these goals.
Rock v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 473 F.2d 1344, 1349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
933 (1973) ; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971).
26. 494 F.2d at 802. Defendants asserted that although the seniority cutoff
agreement between PPG and the Union initially terminated only the employment
rights of women, at a later date it also terminated the rights of men, and that con-
tinued adherence to the agreement would eventually result in the extinction of the
employment rights of more men than women. In the court's view, these allegations
indicated that the challenged conduct was not inherently discriminatory. Id.
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of Title VII,2 7 provided a potentially sufficient defense to appellants'
contentions. 28
Considering the strength of these defenses, the fact that plaintiffs made
no attempt to substantiate their claim for backpay,29 and the discretionary
nature of an award of backpay,30 the court found it highly unlikely that
plaintiffs could have recovered. Moreover, the court noted plaintiffs' suit
appeared to be barred by their failure to file charges with the Equal Employ-
"ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) within the statutorily prescribed
time period.31 Despite this probable foreclosure of plaintiffs' suit, it is
submitted that, because the district court did consider the merits,32 and
because one criterion for determining the fairness of a settlement requires
an assessment of the probable outcome of the litigation, 8 a fortiori it appears
27. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970), as amended (Supp., 1974). This exception
permits an employer to escape being found in violation of Title VII if he sustains
the burden of proving that he had a belief, supported by facts, that all or substantially
all women would be unable to perform the duties of the job safely and efficiently.
Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). It has
been held that an employer has discretion within which he, in good faith, may determine
that a sex qualification is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of his
particular business. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 272 F. Supp. 332, 360-61 (S.D.
Ind. 1967), aff'd in part, reVd in part on other grounds, 416 F2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969).
As the instant court noted, PPG claimed that unlike men, most women would
be incapable of the required repetitive lifting of heavy loads of glass. 494 F.2d at
802 n.2. This claim apparently would have brought defendants' conduct within the
"bona fide occupational qualification" exception, and thus appears to have been capable
of defeating plaintiffs' claims upon the merits. See id. at: 802.
28. 494 F.2d at 802. PPG advanced this occupational qualification argument in
response to appellants' contention that the seniority cutoff agreement was discriminatory
in view of PPG's established system of classifying jobs along sexual lines. Id. During
a business upswing, PPG had filled "male only" jobs by recalling men from layoff
and by hiring new male employees. No women were recalled from lay-off, though
some women had had greater job seniority than recalled men. This classification system
was abandoned in 1973, pursuant to a conciliation agreement reached after complaints
were filed with the EEOC. Id. at 800-01.
29. Id. at 802.
30. Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that if the court finds
an intentional unlawful employment practice in violation of the Act, it may "order
such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include . . . reinstatement
or hiring of employees, with or without back pay .... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1974) (emphasis added). See Kober v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 480 F.2d 240, 247-50 (3d Cir. 1973), noted in 19 VILL. L. REv. 353 (1973).
While the Fourth and Seventh Circuits are inclined to grant backpay, the Fifth, Sixth,
and Ninth generally do not. In Kober, the Third Circuit adopted the latter view.
480 F.2d at 247.
31. 494 F.2d at 802. At the time of the suit, the time limit for filing such charges
was 90 days from the occurrence of the alleged unlawful practice. Act of July 2, 1964,
Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 259. The present time limit is 180 (lays. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1974). See, e.g., Mickel v.
South Carolina State Employ. Serv., 377 F.2d 239, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1967).
32. 59 F.R.D. at 617-18.
33. West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d 1079, 1085 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971) ; 7A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1797, at 230-31.
"The basic test for fairness involves weighing the probability and consequences of
success on the merits against the terms of the settlement." Dole, supra note 11, at 981.
See note 49 infra. 14
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that the Bryan court could find no abuse of discretion in the district court's
determination that the merits favored the defendants.
With regard to the argument that district court approval of the settle-
ment was improper because more than 20 percent of the class plaintiffs
objected, 34 the Third Circuit stated that although the proportion of the
class opposed to the settlement was one factor to consider, it was not deter-
minative of the fairness of such an agreement.3 5 After noting that the
drafters of rule 23 included no requirement that a settlement be disapproved
if a certain proportion of the class oppose it,3 6 the court considered appel-
lants' specific contentions.
Appellants asserted that the number of objectors, coupled with the
fact that the right to be free from discrimination is personal, made the
settlement's approval an abuse of the court's discretion 37 because the court
should not force class members to abandon personal - as opposed to
joint - rights without a judicial decision upon the merits.38 However, the
court recognized this as an attempt to resurrect previous rule 23 concepts
and to classify the class action as "spurious," with the result that the
judgment would bind only parties to the suit.3 9 The court rejected this
attempt by pointing *out the well-accepted fact that the present rule 23
abandons any categorization of class actions according to the nature of
the rights involved.40
To further support their claim, appellants, and the EEOC as anicus
curiae, drew a parallel between a private class action pursuant to Title VII
and actions prosecuted thereunder by the Attorney General. 41 When the
Attorney General brings suit under Title VII, that action cannot bind
discriminatees as either res judicata or collateral estoppel because they are
neither parties to the suit nor in privity with the Attorney General.42
Appellants argued by analogy that in a Title VII suit, class representatives
function as "private attorneys general," and their action, like that brought
34. 494 F.2d at 803.
35. Id. Cf. 7A WRIGIT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1797, at 230.
36. 494 F.2d at 803.
37. Id. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
38. 494 F.2d at 803.
39. Id. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23, Advisory Comm. Notes, 39 F.R.D. 98-99 (1966).
Before the 1966 amendments to the Federal Rules, class actions were categorized as
"true," "hybrid," and "spurious." "True" class actions involved joint, common, or
secondary rights; the "hybrid" category involved "several" rights related to specific
property; and the "spurious" category involved "several" rights affected by a common
question and related to common relief. Rule 23 was intended to discard such distinc-
tions. Id.
40. 494 F.2d at 803. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 335 (1970) ; 3B MOORE,
supra note 8, f" 23.80, at 1501-03. The court stated that any impropriety in court
approval of a settlement must spring from the nature of specific rights asserted by the
class, not of personal rights in general. 494 F.2d at 803.
41. 494 F.2d at 803. Sections 706(e) and 707 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
empower the Attorney General to intervene in or bring suit for a violation of Title VII.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(e), -(6)(e) (1970), as amended (Supp. III, 1974).
42. Williamson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 468 F.2d 1201, 1203-04 (2d Cir. 1972).
[VOL. 20
15
Editors: Federal Jursidiction and Procedure
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
'THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
by the Attorney General, should not bind dissenting plaintiffs. 43 The court
rejected this contention on the grounds that, first, the district court, not the
class representatives, binds the dissenting class members by its final deter-
mination that the settlement is fair and reasonable; and second, by its
nature, a class action seeks to redress wrongs only to the particular indi-
viduals in the class, and therefore it differs from a suit brought by the
Attorney General or by private attorneys general to protect public rights.44
Although the court's conclusion appears valid, its statement that the
class representatives do not bind dissenting members evidences an apparent
misunderstanding of appellants' argument. Appellants simply attempted to
analogize the effect of an action brought by class representatives function-
ing as private attorneys general to that of an action brought by the Attorney
General; the court's answer failed to deal with this contention. Despite
the inadequacy of the court's first ground for rejecting appellants' analogy,
the distinction between public and private suits seems to provide sufficient
justification for rejecting appellants' argument. The inherent differences
between private class action suits and suits by the Attorney Genera 4 5
support the court's determination that "[i]t does not seem anomalous to
allow a court-approved class settlement, but not a suit by the Attorney
General, to compromise a discriminatee's Title VII claim."'46 Moreover,
the recognition that private class actions are usually concerned with com-
pensation for damages from past or existing conduct, while public interest
suits are concerned with achieving broad public goals to be implemented
by future conduct, provides added support for the court's conclusion.
Therefore, it seems as though the court rightly refused to disapprove
the settlement solely because a significant number of class members ob-
jected. Indeed, had the court accepted appellants' argument instead of
making the settlement binding upon all class members, it would have
created the anomalous situation wherein a class member, who initially had
had the opportunity to "opt out", 47 could choose to remain in the class
until settlement and then, if not satisfied with its terms, could litigate his
or her claim separately. This result would contravene one of the principal
purposes of class action litigation - the prevention of multiple actions
involving common questions. 4s
43. 494 F.2d at 803.
44. Id.
45. Id. The court stated:
The Attorney General's prosecution of a suit is governed by desire [sic] to achieve
broad public goals and the need to harmonize public policies that may be in con-
flict; practical considerations, such as where limited resources can be concentrated
most effectively, may dictate conduct of a suit inimical to the immediate interests
of the discriminatee, who presumably seeks full satisfaction of his individual claim
regardless of the effect on other cases.
Id. The court also noted that class members had the opportunity to opt out of the
suit. Id. See note 5 supra.
46. 494 F.2d at 803.
47. See note 5 supra.
48. 7 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 8, § 1751, at 509.
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The Third Circuit's analysis of appellants' "abuse of discretion" claim,
viewed as a whole, seems clearly to validate the district court's approval of
the settlement.40 In light of the uncertainty of plaintiffs' success had the
trial gone to conclusion, and considering their failure to advance con-
vincingly an argument that the percentage of the class objecting was a
determinative factor to be considered by the district court, it appears that
the appellate court could not have intervened because there had been no
showing that the trial court clearly had abused its discretion. Since the
phrase "abuse of discretion" is not subject to exact definition, 50 the Bryan
court's decision on this issue seems insulated from adverse criticism. 51
The instant opinion may simply be an example of the difficulty pre-
sented by claiming on appeal that a district court's approval of a settlement
49. As one court has stated:
Whether to approve the compromise involves an exercise of discretion. The
Court is responsible for the protection of the many class members whose interests
are involved but who do not appear in the action. Approval should be given if the
settlement offered is fair, reasonable, and adequate. These terms are general and
cannot be measured scientifically.
The most important factor is the strength of the case for plaintiffs on the
merits, balanced against the amount offered in settlement. This factor is some-
times referred to as the likelihood of success. The Supreme Court directs the
judge to reach "an intelligent and objective opinion of the probabilities of ultimate
success should the claim be litigated" and to "form an educated estimate of the
complexity, expense, and likely duration of such litigation, * * * and all other
factors relevant to a full and fair assessment of the wisdom of the proposed com-
promise." The Supreme Court then emphasizes: "Basic to this process in every
instance, of course, is the need to compare the terms of the compromise with the
likely rewards of litigation."
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 740-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd,
440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971), quoting Protective Comm.
for Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414,
424-25 (1968).
50. As the Sixth Circuit has stated:
There is no exact measure of what constitutes abuse of discretion. It is more
than the substitution of the judgment of one tribunal for that of another. Judicial
discretion is governed by the situation and circumstances affecting each individual
case. "Even where an appellate court has power to review the exercise of such
discretion, the inquiry is confined to whether such situation and circumstances
clearly show an abuse of discretion, that is, arbitrary action not justifiable in view
of such situation and circumstances."
NLRB v. Guernsey-Muskingum Elec. Co-op., Inc., 285 F.2d 8, 11 (6th Cir. 1960),
quoting Hartford-Empire Co. v. Obear-Nester Glass Co., 95 F.2d 414, 417 (8th
Cir. 1938).
51. -Appellants also challenged the sufficiency of the district court's statement of
reasons for approving the settlement. The Bryan court summarily dismissed this con-
tention by noting that requiring a more comprehensive statement than that appearing
in the district court's opinion would be tantamount to mandating a determination of
the merits thus virtually eliminating settlements. 494 F.2d at 804.
The dilemma of a court ruling upon the reasonableness of a settlement was
articulated by the Second Circuit:
[I]n reviewing the compromise, this court need not and should not reach any dis-
positive conclusions on the admittedly unsettled legal issues which the case raises,
yet at the same time we are apparently required to attempt to arrive at some
evaluation of the points of law on which the settlement is based.
West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co.. 440 F.2d 1079, 1086 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 871 (1971).
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is an abuse of discretion. While approval of a settlement must depend upon
the facts of the case and the terms of the settlement, it is suggested that
Bryan should not be read narrowly to indicate that class action settlements
are proper only when 20 percent or less of the class members object.
Rather, this opinion should be interpreted as a firm commitment to en-
couraging class action settlements which bind all class members. When
viewed in this light, it is squarely in line with the public policy of compro-
mise and the judicial policy of generally easing the burden upon the federal
courts which formed a part of the basis of recent Supreme Court decisions
placing limitations upon the ability to bring class action suits.1
2
Jack R. Goldberg
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - MANDAMUS ACT OF 1962 - FEDERAL
COURTS HAVE AUTHORITY, UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, TO
COMPEL DISCRETIONARY ACTIONS OF OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF
THE UNITED STATES BY WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
Chaudoin v. Atkinson (1974)
Plaintiff was employed as a civilian technician by the Delaware National
Guard (Guard).' Section 709(b) of the National Guard Technicians Act
of 19682 required that he also be a member of the Guard, and, taking
. 52. In Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1970), and Zahn v. International Paper
Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), the Court reached conclusions which, in effect, make bring-
ing class actions more difficult. In Snyder, the Court refused to allow aggregation of
individual class members' claims in order to meet the jurisdictional amount require-
ment of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). 394 U.S. at 337-41. In Zahn, the Court made it clear
that in a diversity suit each individual, named and unnamed, in a class action must
meet the jurisdictional amount requirement of section 1332(a).
The Court also restricted the potential effectiveness of class actions through
its decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), wherein it
determined that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 requires the plaintiff to bear the
expense of providing individual notice to all class members who can be identified
with reasonable effort. Id. at 2152.
1. Plaintiff's employment as an administrative supply technician was authorized
by the National Guard Technicians Act of 1968, which provides in pertinent part:
(a) Under regulations prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary
of the Air Force, as the case may be, and subject: to subsection (b) of this
section persons may be employed as technicians in-
(1) the administration and training of the National Guard; and
(2) the maintenance and repair of supplies issued to the National Guard
or the armed forces.
32 U.S.C. § 709(a) (1970).
2. Section 709(b) provides:
(b) Except as prescribed by the Secretary concerned, a technician employed
under subsection (a) shall, while so employed, be a member of the National
Guard and hold the military grade specified by the Secretary concerned for that
position.
32 U.S.C. § 709(b) (1970). 18
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advantage of this dual status, the plaintiff's supervisor ordered him to
participate in a uniformed firing squad at a military funeral.3 Plaintiff
refused because he said this duty was not within his job description.4 As
a consequence, the Adjutant General of the State of Delaware, acting in
his civilian capacity as supervisor of National Guard technicians, 5 dis-
charged him." Plaintiff thereafter brought suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Delaware7 seeking damages, injunctive relief,8 and
reinstatement to the position from which he had been dismissed.9 Jurisdic-
tion was allegedly based upon the general federal question statute, 0 section
10 of the Administrative Procedure Act," and the Mandamus and Venue
Act of 1962 (Mandamus Act).' 2 Upon cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, 13 the district court determined that it had jurisdiction,' 4 but refused
3. Chaudoin v. Atkinson, 494 F.2d 1323, 1326 (3d Cir. 1974). Plaintiff's
supervisor was a captain in the Guard unit. Id.
4. Id. Plaintiff's official job description outlined his duties in detail. See note 46
and accompanying text infra.
5. The Technicians Act provides in pertinent part:
(c) The Secretary concerned shall designate the adjutants general . . . to employ
and administer the technicians authorized by this section.
32 U.S.C. § 709(c) (1970).
6. 494 F.2d at 1327.
7. Chaudoin v. Atkinson, Civil No. 4197 (D. Del., Feb. 16, 1973) (hereinafter
cited as Civil No. 4197).
8. The plaintiff sought an injunction prohibiting his superiors from requiring
him to perform any further tasks not authorized by his job description. Id. at 3.
9. Id. See 494 F.2d at 1326.
10. The federal question statute provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest
and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970).
11. Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act provides:
A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely af-
fected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is
entitled to judicial review thereof.
5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
12. The Mandamus Act provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature
of mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970).
13. Actually, the defendant had moved, pursuant to rule 12(b) (6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, to dimiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted, while the plaintiff had moved for summary judgment
under rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, counsel for both
parties stipulated at oral argument that if the court were to determine that it had
jurisdiction, it should decide the case as though it were before the court on cross-
motions for summary judgment. 494 F.2d at 1326.
14. The district court found jurisdiction under both the Mandamus Act and the
federal question statute. Civil No. 4197 at 5-6. With respect to jurisdiction under
the Mandamus Act, the district court said that jurisdiction in federal employee rein-
statement cases had been "tacitly acknowledged" by the Third Circuit in Charlton v.
United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969). Civil No. 4197 at 4-5. This statement by
the district court appears unfounded, however, since Charlton found jurisdiction under
the Administrative Procedure Act. See 412 F.2d at 392. Also, the Charlton holding
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to grant a writ of mandamus.1 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and
remanded, holding, inter alia, that the court had jurisdiction under the
Mandamus Act to compel the performance of an action statutorily com-
mitted to the discretion of an officer or employee of the United States,
when he abuses that discretion. The court further held that the defendant-
adjutant general had abused his discretion and that, therefore, the plaintiff
should be reinstated. Chaudoin v. Atkinson, 494 F.2d 1323 (3d Cir. 1974).
Prior to 1962, the authority of the federal courts to issue original
writs of mandamus was extremely limited.16 There were two fundamental
limitations upon this authority,' 7 the first and most basic of which derived
from the federal courts' lack of jurisdiction, outside of the District of
Columbia, to issue these writs.' s The Supreme Court of the United States,
in 1813, had decided that the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the federal
courts did not include the authority to issue original writs of mandamus.'9
Later, the Supreme Court modified this situation to allow the District of
Columbia federal courts to issue original writs of mandamus, 20 but the
other federal courts were fettered until the passage of the Mandamus Act
in 1962.21 The purpose of this Act was not to enlarge the scope of the
mandamus action, but to attempt to give all federal courts an authority to
review and compel official action equal to that of the District of Columbia
Circuit.22
has been undermined by the Third Circuit's more recent holding in Zimmerman v.
United States, 422 F.2d 326 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 39) U.S. 911 (1970). See note
27 and accompanying text infra.
15. Civil No. 4197 at 13. The district judge found no abuse of discretion by the
defendant. Id.
16. Comment, Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARV.
L. R v. 827, 46-50 (1957).
17. Byse & Fiocca, Section 1361 of the Mandamus and Venue Act of 1962 and
"Nonstatutory" Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action, 81 HARV. L. REV.
308, 308-10 (1967).
18. Id.
19. M'Intire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 504 (1813). This decision involved
an interpretation of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78, which conferred
jurisdiction in "all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity." The Court
held that this language did not include jurisdiction to issue original writs of mandamus.
11 U.S. at 506.
20. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
The Supreme Court granted the District of Columbia court this unique authority
upon the basis of a statute which provided that the laws of the State of Maryland
should apply in the territory sculpted from that state to create the District of Columbia.
Act of Feb. 27, 1801, ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 103. The Court reasoned that, since Maryland
courts had authority to issue original writs of mandamus, the courts of the District
should have the same power. 37 U.S. at 621, 626.
21. Marshall v. Crotty, 185 F.2d 622, 627 (1st Cir. 1950) ; Byse & Fiocca, supra
note 17, at 311; H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1378 (2d ed. 1973). The Mandamus Act of 1962 is codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1970). For the text of the Act, see note 12 supra.
22. The Senate report provided, in part:
The purpose of this bill, as amended, is to make it possible to bring actions against
government officials and agencies in U. S. district courts outside the District of
Columbia, which, because of certain existing limitations on jurisdiction and venue,
may now be brought only in the U. S. District Court: for the District of Columbia
1974-1975]
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Even after the passage of the Act, however, there remained a question
as to the scope of the authority it granted. This uncertainty existed because
of the second fundamental restriction upon a court's authority to issue
writs of mandamus; that the writ is an appropriate remedy only when the
government official's action sought to be compelled is an absolute or
"ministerial" 2 duty. The normal rule, oft-repeated in cases where a writ
of mandamus is sought, is that judicial interference by the writ is not
permissible when the activity sought to be compelled is within the defendant
official's discretion. 24 This common law limitation is reflected in the legis-
lative history of the Mandamus Act. The Senate report on the Act contains
language mirroring the restrictive, ministerial-discretionary dichotomy and
casting doubt upon the authority of the federal courts to take action similar
to that taken by the Chaudoin court.25
The importance of Chaudoin, then, lies in its apparent circumvention
of the traditional writ of mandamus rule precluding judicial intervention in
governmental actions committed to the discretion of particular officials. It
is submitted, however, that what the court actually accomplished was not
so much a circumvention of the traditional rule, as a more rational and
useful interpretation of the federal courts' authority under the Mandamus
Act.
The court began by analyzing the various grounds for jurisdiction
alleged by the plaintiff. The allegation of jurisdiction under section 10(a)
.... This bill will not give access to the Federal Courts to an action which
cannot now be brought against a Federal official in the U. S. District Court for
the District of Columbia.
S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-4 (1962). See also Byse & Fiocca, supra
note 17, at 318; K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 23.06 (3d ed. 1972).
23. "Ministerial" is the term most frequently used in traditional mandamus
cases to denote the kinds of duties which can be judicially compelled by the writ. As
a term of art, ministerial duty is defined as
[olne regarding which nothing is left to discretion - a simple and definite duty,
imposed by law and arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist ....
It arises when an individual has such a legal interest in its performance that
neglect of performance becomes a wrong to such individual.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1148 (4th ed. 1951) (citations omitted). See, e.g., Richard-
son v. United States, 465 F.2d 844, 849 (3d Cir. 1972) ; United States v. Walker, 409
F.2d 477, 480 (9th Cir. 1969); Prairie Band of Pottawatomie Tribe v. Udall, 355
F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1966).
24. The Supreme Court has said:
Where the right of the petitioner is not clear, and the duty of the officer,
performance of which is to be commanded, is not plainly defined and peremptory,
mandamus is not an appropriate remedy.
United States ex rel. Girard Trust v. Helvering, 301 U.S. 540, 543 (1937). See also
Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Kadrie, 281 U.S. 206 (1930); Work v. Rives, 267 U.S.
175 (1925).
25. The Senate report provides in pertinent part:
[Jlurisdiction conferred on the district courts by the bill is limited to compelling
a government official or agency to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff or to
make a decision, but not to direct or influence the exercise of discretion of the
officer or agency in the making of the decision.
S. REP. No. 1992, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1962).
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of the Administrative Procedure Act 26 was summarily dismissed ;27 the
court did, however, sustain jurisdiction because of the presence of a federal
question involving a claim in excess of $10,000.28 These jurisdictional
holdings were, essentially, applications of existing doctrine. 29
It is in the area of the scope of its jurisdiction under the Mandamus
Act that the court displayed initiative.30 Since the passage of the Mandamus
Act in 1962, the various circuits have not agreed upon the extent of
26. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). For the text of the statute see note 9 supra.
27. This holding was predicated upon the earlier Third Circuit decision in
Zimmerman v. United States, 422 F.2d 326 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 911
(1970), wherein the court held that the Administrative Procedure Act could not serve
as an independent basis for jurisdiction. The rationale for this decision was that
that act provides remedies only in cases that come within federal jurisdiction under
other statutes. Id. at 330-32. Accord, PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718
(3d Cir. 1973), noted herein, 20 VILL. L. REv. .. __ (1974).
28. 494 F.2d at 1327-28, citing 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). For the text of the
statute, see note 10 supra. Since the question of the propriety of the plaintiff's dis-
charge involved an interpretation of a federal statute, the National Guard Technicians
Act of 1968, the case was one which "arose under the Constitution, laws, or treaties
of the United States" and hence proper subject matter for a federal court. 28 U.S.C.§ 1331(a) (1970). For the text of the Technicians Act and a discussion of the
statutory interpretation issue, see note 46 and accompanying text infra. In dealing
with other subissues under the federal question provision, the court agreed with the
plaintiff that his damages could exceed $10,000 and also considered, pursuant to a
sua sponte request to counsel to brief the question, the crucial threshold issue of
whether judicial review of the Adjutant General's action was precluded by an express
provision in the National Guard Technicians Act of 1968. Section 709(e) of that
act provides, in pertinent part:
(e) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and under regulations prescribed
by the Secretary concerned-
(3) a technician may, at any time, be separated from his technician employ-
ment for cause by the adjutant general of the jurisdiction concerned;
(5) a right of appeal which may exist with respect to clause (1), (2), (3),
or (4) shall not extend beyond the adjutant general of the jurisdiction
concerned ....
32 U.S.C. § 709(e) (3), (5) (1970). The court concluded that the Congress' intent
in the above provision was to limit administrative appeals to the level of the adjutant
general of the state, but not to preclude judicial review. 494 F.2d at 1327-28 n.5.
29. See note 27 supra; H.M. HART & H. WECHSLER, supra note 21, at 844-50.
30. For the text of the statute, see note 12 supra. Prior to its discussion of the
scope of authority granted by section 1361, the court considered another important
threshold issue: The Mandamus Act allows an action in the nature of mandamus
against "an officer or employee of the United States or any agency thereof." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361 (1970) (emphasis added). The question was whether a state adjutant general
was one of those three entities. Clear precedent showed that he was not an officer of
the United States, since he had not been called into active service. 494 F.2d at 1329.
Additionally, it was apparent that the Adjutant General was a state employee and
not a federal employee. 494 F.2d at 1329. The court decided, however, that since a
United States statute, 32 U.S.C. § 709 (1970), gave state adjutants general authority
for the employment and administration of National Guard technicians, who were federal
employees, the adjutants general thereby became agents or agencies of the United
States, thereby falling within the ambit of section 1361. 494 F.2d at 1329.
1974-1975]
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authorty granted by the Act.3' The question has arisen with respect
to the authority of the federal courts to review discretionary decisions by
public officials. Chaudoin was the first Third Circuit case to venture into
this area of judicial power under the Mandamus Act. The rationale of the
court's finding of jurisdiction consisted entirely of excerpts from two other
decisions. 32 First, the court quoted dicta from Davis v. Shultz,38 an earlier
Third Circuit case recognizing authority in the federal courts to review
discretionary actions of United States officials. The court then quoted
Leonhard v. Mitchell,34 in which the Second Circuit held that it had
authority under section 1361 to review abuses of official discretion, although
it upheld the official's act upon the facts of that case. 5 Solely upon the
basis of these two excerpts, the Chaudoin court summarily concluded that
it had the authority under the Mandamus Act to review and thereafter
correct discretionary actions taken by officers, agencies, or employees of
the United States if it were determined that discretion had been abused.8 6
Having established this basis for jurisdiction, the court proceeded to
consider the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff's ouster by Adjutant
General Atkinson to determine if that dismissal was an abuse of discretion. 7
The court began by examining the guidelines which should have governed
the Adjutant General's decision, in an attempt to fix the parameters for
that decision. The court first considered the punishment guidelines pro-
vided by the National Guard Regulations (Regulations).g8 The Regulations
31. The First and Second Circuits have agreed with the Chaudoin court that
the Mandamus Act confers jurisdiction to review abuses of discretion. See notes 33-34
and accompanying text infra. The District of Columbia Circuit has also agreed.
See Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agr., 427 F.2d 561 (D.C. Cir. 1970). Prior
to the instant case, the Third Circuit had been inconsistent. The Chaudoin court
quoted dicta from Davis v. Shultz, 453 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1971), to support its view,
but in Richardson v. United States, 465 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1972), a case ignored by
the instant court's opinion, a different Third Circuit panel adhered to the ministerial-
discretionary limitation. Id. at 849-50. The Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Walker,
409 F.2d 477, 481 (9th Cir. 1969), and the Tenth Circuit, in Prairie Band of
Pottawatomie Tribe v. Udall, 355 F.2d 364, 367 (10th Cir. 1966), have also interpreted
section 1361 under the traditional mandamus rule of judicial noninterference with
discretionary actions.
32. 494 F.2d at 1329-30.
33. 453 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1971). In Davis, Judge Van Dusen, reviewing the
decisions under section 1361, included language from Ashe v. McNamara, 355 F.2d
277 (1st Cir. 1965), which permitted federal judicial review of official discretion under
section 1361. 453 F.2d at 502. That language was unnecessary to the holding in
Davis, however, since the plaintiff in that case had alleged the failure of a government
official to perform a mandatory duty, and the court held that it had no jurisdiction
under section 1361 because the alleged duty was not mandatory. Id. at 503.
34. 473 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 949 (1973). See note 53 and
accompanying text infra.
35. 473 F.2d at 714.
36. 494 F.2d at 1329-30.
37. Id. at 1330.
38. The National Guard Regulations (N.G.R.) are published by the Defense
Department and distributed to the various National Guard units. They are unavailable
in the Code of Federal Regulations. For this reason, subsequent citations will be to
the appropriate regulation and to the page number of the Chaudoin decision where
it appears.
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were promulgated by the Secretary of the Army pursuant to authority
granted in the National Guard Technicians Act 39 in order to implement
the provisions of that enabling statute. Although the enabling statute is
phrased in terms which permit an adjutant general to terminate a tech-
nician "for cause," 40 the Regulations made it clear that, since this was
Chaudoin's first offense,41 his punishment should have been, at most, a
suspension for some brief period of time.42 The court attached importance
to the fact that Chaudoin's immediate superiors had recommended that he
be given only 3 days' leave without pay. 43 Additionally, the court noted that
a Technician Hearing Board had agreed with Chaudoin's immediate su-
periors and had recommended to the Adjutant General that the dismissal
be set aside. 44 The court found that the Adjutant General's total disregard
of the recommendations of the hearing board, the plaintiff's supervisors, and
the Regulations, without any statement of his reasons for having done so,
constituted an abuse of discretion.45 Based upon this finding, the court
directed the district court to grant a writ of mandamus requiring the
Adjutant General to reinstate Chaudoin to the position from which he had
been dismissed.
4 6
39. 32 U.S.C. § 709(a) (1970). See note 1 supra.
40. The statute provides in pertinent part:
(3) a technician may, at any time, be separated from his technician employment
for cause by the adjutant general of the jurisdiction concerned ....
32 U.S.C. § 709(e) (3) (1970).
The N.G.R. define "cause" as follows:
A "cause" for an adverse action is a recognizable offense against the employer-
employee relationship. What constitutes a proper cause, therefore, may run the
entire gamut of such offenses, including inadequate performance of duties and
improper conduct on or off the job. In addition, every adverse action must be for
such cause "as will promote the efficiency of the service."
494 F.2d at 1330, quoting N.G.R. 51, § 7-39(d).
41. 494 F.2d at 1331.
42. The recommended punishments for the plaintiff's offense are:
Offense. 1. Insubordination (refusal to obey orders, impertinence, like offense).
Penalties. First offense. Official written reprimand or 1-day suspension. Second
offense. 2 to 5-day suspension. Third offense. 6 to 10-day suspension, or removal.
494 F.2d at 1331, quoting N.G.R. 51, § 7-37.
43. 494 F.2d at 1331. See note 42 supra.
44. Id. The hearing board, consisting of one enlisted man and four officers of
the National Guard Unit, was convened at Chaudoin's request pursuant to the pro-
cedure outlined in N.G.R. 690-2, § 7-47. Civil No. 4197 at 3.
45. 494 F.2d at 1331.
46. Id. at 1332. The court also found that the order for the plaintiff to perform
firing squad duty was illegal. Id. Because of this finding the court was able to order
the award of the injunctive and monetary relief which plaintiff had also demanded
Id. at 1327. This theory of relief from unauthorized state or agency action traces
its origins to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), in which the Supreme Court held
that the federal courts had the power to enjoin enforcement of a state law by the
state's attorney general when such enforcement would result in a deprivation of a
constitutional right. Id. at 148-49. A later case, Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223
U.S. 605, 607 (1912), extended this rationale to suits against federal officers. These
cases established the doctrine that a plaintiff is entitled to judicial review of, and
injunctive relief from, treatment accorded him by a governmental officer, although the
officer had acted in his official capacity, if it is determined that the officer thereby had
exceeded the scope of his authority. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON
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This treatment of the Adjutant General's action as an abuse of dis-
cretion under the Mandamus Act is novel, at least in the Third Circuit.
The court's close analysis of the facts surrounding the plaintiff's discharge
and its independent determination of whether those facts justified the dis-
charge followed a pattern similar to that established in government em-
ployee reinstatement cases by the District of Columbia Circuit. 47  In its
examination of all the circumstances attending Chaudoin's discharge, the
court displayed the same fact sensitivity and disregard for arbitrary con-
clusions that the District of Columbia Circuit had employed in the rein-
statement cases.48 Hence, the Third Circuit in its disposition of Chaudoin
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERNMENT AGENCIES,
S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 80-81 (1941). A plaintiff who successfully proves
conduct by the defendant official which is not justified under the statute giving the
official authority to act, and who can prove financial harm, is also entitled "to money
damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401, 2671-80
(1970). See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61 (1955); Dalehite v.
United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953). See also K. DAvIS, supra note 20, § 25.03.
The official job description in effect at the time of Chaudoin's offense contained
the phrase "[plerforms other duties as assigned." Id. at 1332. See Appendix, id. at
1334, quoting DEPARTMENTS OF THE ARMY AND THE AIR FORCE NATIONAL GUARD
BUREAU, TECHNICIAN POSITION DESCRIPTION. In meeting the contention that this
phrase legally permitted the assignment of the plaintiff to firing squad duty, the court
observed that the predecessor of the National Guard Technicians Act of 1968 had
contained a description of civilian technicians' general duties, "other duties that do
not interfere with the performance of his duties as caretaker." National Guard Act
of 1956, ch. 7, § 709(a), 70A Stat. 615 (emphasis added). See 494 F.2d at 1331.
However, this section was modified in the 1968 act to delete entirely the language
emphasized above. H.R. REP. No. 1823, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962). See also
494 F.2d at 1332 n.9. Therefore, the court found that, although the National Guard had
not amended Chaudoin's job description as of the time of his offense, the order to
perform the funeral detail was not legal, "since the explicit authorization of such
unrelated duties was eliminated." Id. at 1332. Having concluded that the funeral
detail order was not lawful, the court proceeded logically to infer that all the con-
sequences which had befallen Chaudoin as a result of this illegal order constituted
an indefensible wrong to him, and therefore ordered the district court to award damages
and injunctive relief. Id.
47. See Byse & Fiocca, supra note 17, at 342. Because, as noted above (see note
20 and accompanying text supra), the District of Columbia federal courts have long
held the authority to issue writs of mandamus against agencies, officers, and employees
of the United States; and because of the large number of federal employees within
that jurisdiction, there have been numerous government employee reinstatement cases
in that circuit. Byse & Fiocca, supra note 17, at 341-44.
Essentially, the District of Columbia Circuit's approach requires an examination
of the evidence brought forward by the Government to justify the plaintiff-employee's
dismissal and a determination of whether there was "supporting" or "substantial"
evidence to justify the decision to discharge, an approach consonant with the well-
established rule for judicial review of administrative agency action. See Universal
Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); NLRB v. Columbian Enam. & Stamp.
Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939) ; Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938).
The "substantial evidence" standard of judicial review is also that embodied in the
Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). See K. DAVIS, supra note 22,
at § 29.02. While the Chaudoin court did not enunciate a "supporting" or "substantial"
evidence test, it appears nonetheless that its procedure essentially tracked that of the
District of Columbia Circuit. See notes 38-46 and accompanying text supra.
48. In asserting its authority to review abuses of official discretion under the
Mandamus Act, the Chaudoin court simply adopted in toto the rationale of other
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achieved the goal sought by the drafters of the Mandamus Act, and did so
by following the tradition of review of discretionary official action estab-
lished by the District of Columbia Circuit. 49 It is submitted that the Third
Circuit's assertion of authority under the Mandamus Act to review dis-
cretionary actions and the court's concomitant rejection of the ministerial-
discretionary limitation constituted a decision to follow the path of enlight-
ened modern authority. Professor Davis has stated that the ministerial-
discretionary distinction has "no affirmative justification" and "has proved
unworkable." 50 It is true that certain of the circuits have, to date, refused,
upon the grounds of traditional judicial restraint, to abandon the ministerial-
discretionary limitation;51 yet the First, Second, and now the Third
Circuits have followed the commentators and the District of Columbia
Circuit in refusing to accede to that limitation when the facts have indicated
that discretion had been abused. While there has been no decision by the
Supreme Court upon the scope of the Mandamus Act,5 2 the present dis-
agreement among the circuits might prompt a resolution by the Court.
Such a decision should agree with Chaudoin, since, it is submitted, the
Third Circuit has adopted the more rational and useful interpretation of the
Mandamus Act.58
circuits as authority for the proposition that federal court jurisdiction under the
Mandamus Act extends to review of discretionary actions. See notes 33 & 34 and
accompanying text supra.
49. Perhaps the best authority upon which to found such a conclusion is pro-
vided by the extensive analysis provided this area in Byse & Fiocca, supra note 17.
Professors Byse and Fiocca therein review the Mandamus Act in detail and do so
with some authority, as Professor Byse coauthored the Act. Id. at 308. Indeed, the
cases relied upon by the Third Circuit were expressly premised upon that article.
See, e.g., Leonhard v. Mitchell, 473 F.2d 709, 713 (2d Cir. 1973). Another such case,
decided before the article was written, cited Professor Byse' earlier work, Byse,
Proposed Reforms in Federal "Nonstatutory" Judicial Review: Sovereign Immunity,
Indispensible Parties, Mandamus, 75 HARV. L. RV. 1479 (1962), cited in Ashe v.
McNamara, 355 F.2d 277, 279 (1st Cir. 1962). See notes 33 & 34 and accompanying
text supra.
50. K. DAVIs, supra note 22, § 23.06, at 450-51.
51. See cases discussed in note 31 supra.
52. Although the Supreme Court has not yet faced this issue, it is perhaps relevant
to mention that at least one Justice has taken note of recent developments. In National
R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R. Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974),
Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
Although I am in agreement that the legislative history of the Amtrak Act
provides a clear and convincing expression of Congress' intent to preclude any
except the Attorney General and in certain situations an employee or his duly
authorized representative from maintaining an action under the Act against
petitioners, I would leave open the question whether a private suit for mandamus
under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 might be maintained against the Attorney General if his
refusal to act under § 307 - even though within the letter of his authority -
went "beyond any rational exercise of discretion."
Id. at 465 (Brennan, J., concurring), quoting United States ex rel. Schonbrun v.
Commanding Officer, Armed Forces, 403 F.2d 371, 374 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 929 (1969), and citing Byse & Fiocca, supra note 17.
53. The utility lies in the ability of courts in the Third Circuit now to review
acts of official discretion formerly unreviewable. Since the National Guard Technicians
Act, for example, expressly reserves discretion in firing to the relevant adjutant
general, 32 U.S.C. § 709(e) (1970) (see note 40 supra), there would be no federal 26
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To keep with the traditional rule in writ of mandamus cases, the
court could have simply repeated the ministerial-discretionary litany and
denied relief. Instead of placing Third Circuit plaintiffs in this cul-de-sac,5 4
however, the Chaudoin court resolved the dilemma by allowing the assertion
of an abuse of discertion claim in federal court. Although it is quite pos-
sible that future Third Circuit decisions may limit the Chaudoin principle
to reinstatement cases, or, even more severely, to federal civilian em-
ployee reinstatement cases, it is hoped that this will not occur, because
Chaudoin is clear authority for judicial review of any abuse of agency
or official discretion; and federal courts within the Third Circuit should
implement that authority.
R. L. Sebastian
FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE - RULE 4(e) (2) - ATTACHMENT
BORROWING PROVISION HELD NOT TO INCLUDE STATE VENUE
REQUIREMENTS.
FDIC v. Greenberg (1973)
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) brought suit' in
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
to set aside the transfer of real and personal property from FDIC's debtor
to the defendant, a Massachusetts resident. 2 In an effort to obtain quasi
question jurisdiction for a review of discretionary firings, absent such illegality as
there was in the instant case, since there would be no cause to interpret a federal
statute. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970). Likewise, under the restrictive reading given
section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act by ,the Third Circuit, jurisdiction
could not be founded thereupon. See note 27 supra. Hence, Chaudoin affords a pre-
viously remediless plaintiff a right to review under the only available alternative,
the Mandamus Act.
One must note, however, that since the Third Circuit views "government em-
ployee discharges" as a distinct class of cases, the effect of the instant decision may
be limited thereto unless there is, in a given case, an express statutory grant of juris-
diction. See Charlton v. United States, 412 F.2d 390 (3d Cir. 1969).
54. See note 53 supra.
1. Suit was commenced pursuant to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act § 9,
12 U.S.C. § 1819 (1970), which grants to the United States district courts original
subject matter jurisdiction over any case arising under the laws of the United States
to which FDIC is a party, regardless of the amount in controversy. FDIC v. Green-
berg, 487 F.2d 9, 10 (3d Cir. 1973).
2. FDIC v. Greenberg, 52 F.R.D. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1971). The merits of the con-
troversy were not before the district court. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that
its debtor had entered into an agreement of sale with his joint venturers whereby he
agreed to purchase their interests in various parcels of real property located in Mont-
gomery and Philadelphia Counties. To assure performance, the debtor delivered to
an escrow agent deeds representing the debtor's interest in the property and assign-
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in rem jurisdiction, the plaintiff caused a writ of foreign attachment to be
issued in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, against the transferred prop-
erty,3 which consisted of three tracts of real estate located in Montgomery
County, Pennsylvania, one tract of real estate located in Philadelphia
County, and 500 shares of capital stock.4
The district court granted a pretrial motion to vacate the attachments
upon the Montgomery County real estate and the shares of stock,5 being
of the opinion that the borrowing provision of Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 4 (e) (2)6 had not been met because of the plaintiff's failure to satisfy
Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1254,7 which sets the venue for the
issuance of writs of foreign attachment.8 The 'Third Circuit reversed in
part and affirmed in part, holding that rule 4(e) (2), which provides for
service of process in quasi in rem actions in compliance with the statute
or rule of the state in which the district court is held, does not require
adherence to state venue requirements.0 FDIC v. Greenberg, 487 F.2d 9
(3d Cir. 1973).
ments of his interest in the capital stock of a corporation owned by the debtor and
his joint venturers. Upon the debtor's purported forfeiture, pursuant to both the
contract of sale and the escrow agreement, the deeds for the property and the assign-
ments were conveyed to the defendant acting as trustee for the joint venturers. It was
this transaction the plaintiff wished to set aside. Id. at 241-42.
3. Id. at 242.
4. 487 F.2d at 10. At the time of the district court's order, neither the defendant
nor the plaintiff knew the location of the stock certificates. The stock certificates
were subsequently located in Massachusetts. Id. at 14. See note 9 infra.
5. 52 F.R.D. at 241.
6. Rule 4(e) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a statute or rule of court of the state in which the district court is
held provides . . . (2) for service upon or notice to [a party not an inhabitant
of or found within the state in which the district court is held] to appear and
respond or defend in an action by reason of the attachment or garnishment or
similar seizure of his property located within the state, service may . . . be
made under the circumstances and in the manner prescribed in the statute or rule.
FFD. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
7. The proper venue for a Pennsylvania court's issuance of writs of foreign
attachment is governed by Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1254, which provides:
(a) An attachment against personal property of the defendant may be issued
in and only in a county in which
(1) the property is located, or
(2) a garnishee may be served.
(b) An attachment against real property of the defendant may be issued in
and only in a county in which all or any part of the property is located.
PA. R. Civ. P. 1254.
8. 52 F.R.D. at 242. The defendant also attacked the attachment of the stock
because the certificates had not been actually seized. The district court declared that
it was unnecessary to make a determination upon that ground since improper venue
alone would mandate vacation of the attachments. Id. at 243. Literal compliance
with the state venue requirements, in this instance, was impossible. As stated above,
the real property, upon which the attachment was vacated, was situated in Mont-
gomery County, Pennsylvania. United States District Court is not held in that county.
See 28 U.S.C. § 118(a) (1970).
9. The Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's vacation of the attachment of
the shares of capital stock not because of improper venue, but because the certificates
1974-19751
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Prior to 1963, federal district courts could not exercise'0 quasi in rem
jurisdiction" unless the action had originated in a state court 12 and had
been properly removed to the district court. 13 In 1963, the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure were amended 14 to permit the institution of quasi in rem
actions in the district courts. 15
Rule 4(e) presently allows the district courts to assert original quasi
in rem jurisdiction if the rule or statute of the state in which the district
court is held provides for service or notice to a defendant to appear because
of an attachment or garnishment of his property.1 The question of whether
had been located in Massachusetts, so that attachment by a court sitting in Pennsyl-
vania would be improper. 487 F.2d at 13-14.
In Pennsylvania, a share of stock cannot be attached unless it is physically
seized. This procedure is mandated by section 8-317(1) of the Uniform Commercial
Code - Investment Securities, which provides:
(1) No attachment or levy upon a security or any share or other interest evi-
denced thereby which is outstanding shall be valid until the security is actually
seized by the officer making the attachment or levy ....
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 8-317(1) (1970). Since, in the instant case, the stock
certificates had not been located in Pennsylvania, the court had lacked jurisdiction
over them; hence, the attachments were properly vacated. See Nederlandsche Handel-
Maatschappij v. Sentry Corp., 163 F. Supp. 800 (E.D. Pa. 1958). See also 4 C.
WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1071, at 274 (1971); Note,
Attachment of Corporate Stock: The Conflicting Approaches of Delaware and the
Uniform Stock Transfer Act, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1579 (1960).
10. See, e.g., Big Vein Coal Co. v. Read, 229 U.S. 31 (1913) (defendant's
property not subject to attachment in action originating in federal court unless per-
sonal jurisdiction could be exercised over defendant); Davis v. Ensign-Bickford Co.,
139 F.2d 624 (8th Cir. 1944) (federal district courts could not acquire jurisdiction
over defendant by means of attaching defendant's property).
11. Quasi in rem jurisdiction may be generally defined as the power of a court
to adjudicate a personal claim or claims by virtue of the attachment, garnishment, or
seizure of the defendant's property located within the court's jurisdiction. See
generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 75 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973).
12. An action which had been begun in a state court by means of attaching or
garnishing the defendant's property could have been removed to a United States dis-
trict court under 28 U.S.C. § 1450 (1970), which states:
Whenever any action is removed from a State court to a district court of the
United States, any attachment or sequestration of the goods or estate of the
defendant in such action in the State court shall hold the goods or estate to
answer the final judgment or decree in the same manner as they would have been
held to answer final judgment or decree had it been rendered by the State court.
Id.
13. Removal of cases from the state court to federal district courts is authorized
by 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-51 (1970).
14. Prior to amendment, rule 4(e) read as follows:
Whenever a statute of the United States or an order of court provides for service
of a summons, or of a notice, or of an order in lieu of summons upon a party
not an inhabitant of or found within the state, service shall be made under the
circumstances and in the manner prescribed by statute, rule, or order.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), 308 U.S. 666-67 (1939). For the relevant current text of
rule 4(e) see note 6 supra.
15. See Advisory Comm. Notes, 31 F.R.D. 621, 627-28 (1962). The purpose of
the 1963 amendment to rule 4(e) was to conform state and federal practice by allow-
ing the federal plaintiff the use of "familiar state procedure" for the institution of a
law suit by means of attachment or garnishment, and to make federal jurisdiction in
original and removed cases compatible. Id. See also Currie, Attachment and Gar-
nishment in the Federal Courts, 59 MICH. L. REv. 337 (1961).
16. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e). Advisory Comm. Notes, 31 F.R.D. 621, 627-28 (1962). 29
Editors: Federal Jursidiction and Procedure
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
rule 4(e) requires the adoption of state venue limitations was answered
affirmatively in Dunn v. Printing Corp. of America,'7 wherein a Pennsyl-
vania resident brought suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for
breach of contract against a corporation having its principal place of busi-
ness in New York.18 Pursuant to rule 4(e) (2), writs of foreign attachment
were issued upon seven garnishees, only two of whom were located in the
county where the district court was held and from which the writs issued.' 9
The district court ordered the other five garnishments vacated for failure
to comply with the Pennsylvania venue requirements for the issuance of
writs of attachment. 20
In the instant case, the Third Circuit found implicit in the district
court's decision the assumption that rule 4(e) (2) embraced Pennsylvania
venue limitations upon quasi in rem actions. 2' While the court agreed with
the district court that the issuance of the writs of attachment in Philadelphia
County contravened these venue rules for the issuance of writs of foreign
attachment upon the Montgomery County property, 22 it rejected the lower
court's view that such a violation mandated its vacating the attachments. 23
Instead, the Third Circuit stated that rule 4(e) (2) related only to service
of process 24 and only "borrows methods of service employed in state quasi
in rem proceedings." 25 The court noted that service of process and venue
were distinct concepts, 26 and since Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure
17. 245 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
18. Id. at 877.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 879.
21. 487 F.2d at 11.
22. Id. It should be noted, that in recognizing the issuance of writs of foreign
attachment for the real estate located in Montgomery County from Philadelphia
County as a violation of Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1254, the Greenberg
court lent support to the interpretation of the venue rule that was used by the dis-
trict court. The plaintiff argued that it had complied literally with Pennsylvania Rule
of Civil Procedure 1254(b). This contention was based upon the fact that one of
the four tracts of attached real estate was located in Philadelphia County, the county
from which the writs of foreign attachment were issued; therefore, the provision that
the writ must be issued in the county "in which all or any part of the property is
located" had been satisfied. The district court found no merit in this proposition.
52 F.R.D. at 243. The district court interpreted that part of Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 1254(b) to provide for situations wherein a single tract of land
extended over more than one county. If such be the case, a writ of attachment may
be properly issued in any county in which a portion of the land is situated. Id. For
a further discussion of Pennsylvania rule 1254(b), see P. AMRAM & M. FELDMAN,
GOODRICII-AMRAM PENNSYLVANIA PROCEDURAL RULES SERVICE 64 (1955).
23. 487 F.2d at 11.
24. Id. at 12.
25. Id. (emphasis supplied by the court). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4
delineates federal procedure for the service of process. For a general discussion of
service of process under rule 4, see 2 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ff 4.01-.45, at
901-1300 (2d ed. 1974).
26. 487 F.2d at 12. The court characterized the difference:
Service of process, a prerequisite of jurisdiction, relates to the power of a court
to adjudicate. Venue, on the other hand, is a limitation on the exercise of that
power relating to the locality of the lawsuit.
1974-19751
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1254 was not concerned with service of process, but only with venue, the
court concluded that it, like all other state rules not dealing with service
of process, 27 had not been incorporated into federal procedure by rule
4(e) (2).21
The Third Circuit based its conclusion that rule 4(e) (2) did not re-
quire adherence to state venue limitations upon two propositions: first, that
the venue of a federal court action was determined by federal law, 29 and
therefore was not subject to state control ;30 and second, that rule 4(e) (2)
was a statement of procedure concerned only with service of process and
not venue,3' and had the Supreme Court and Congress wished to restrict
federal venue law they would have expressed their intent more clearly.3
2
As to the issue of the proper venue in quasi in rem proceedings
originating in federal courts, the Third Circuit indicated that federal law
controlled. 33 Therefore, the court found this suit to set aside the transfer
of property to be a local action,3 4 and determined that the "plain inference"
of the federal statute which sets venue in local actions 5 was that where the
attached property is located in only one district, proper venue is that
district.86
The instant case afforded the Third Circuit an opportunity to scrutinize
the Dunn decision, which the district court relied upon heavily.3 7 The Dunn
court had based its decision to construe rule 4(e) (2) as requiring adher-
ence to state venue limitations upon two considerations: the possibility
of prejudice to the nonresident defendant 8 and the questionable utility 9
of the quasi in rem procedure.40
27. See id. at 13.
28. Id.
29. The venue for various types of actions heard in the federal courts is deter-
mined by federal statute. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1391-1407 (1970).
30. 487 F.2d at 12. Accord McCoy v. Siler, 205 F.2d 498 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 872 (1953); Stuart v. Al Johnson Constr. Co., 236 F. Supp. 126 (W.D. Pa.
1964) (Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure relating to venue were inapplicable
in a federal diversity action insofar as the state rules conflicted with federal
venue statute).
31. 487 F.2d at 12.
32. Id. In support of this proposition, the court cited Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 82, which states in part:
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the
United States district courts or the venue of actions therein.
FED. R. Civ. P. 82.
33. 487 F.2d at 12. For the applicable federal venue statutes, see note 29 supra.
34. 487 F.2d at 12 n.9. A suit to set aside the transfer of property is a "local
action." Collet v. Adams, 249 U.S. 545 (1919). A "local action" is one which must
be brought in the district in which the subject of the suit is located. Pellerin Laund.
Mach. Sales Co. v. Hogue, 219 F. Supp. 629, 637 (W.D. Ark. 1963). For a more
detailed discussion see 1 J. MOORE, supra note 25, f" 0.142, at 1455.
35. 487 F.2d at 12 n.9. Federal venue in a local action is determined by 28
U.S.C. § 1392(b) (1970).
36. 487 F.2d at 12 n.9. Accord, Pellerin Laund. Mach. Sales Co. v. Hogue, 219
F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Ark. 1963).
37. 52 F.R.D. at 242.
38. 245 F. Supp. at 878-79.
39. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
40. 245 F. Supp. at 879.
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The Greenberg court answered the argument of possible prejudice to
the nonresident defendant by suggesting that if there were any prejudice, it
would be no greater in a quasi in rem proceeding than in an ordinary
diversity action.41 The court dismissed the second contention, that the quasi
in rem device was of questionable utility, by saying:
We are not persuaded by the Dunn reasoning .... As to the question-
able utility of quasi-in-rem proceedings, this is a matter of legislative,
and not judicial, concern.42
It is submitted that the Third Circuit cogently perceived Dunn as an
evisceration of the 1963 amendment to rule 4(e) (2),43 but in rejecting
Dunn it failed to confront directly the issue of the potential unfairness
inherent in the use of the quasi in rem procedure.4"
There appear to be two possible interpretations of Dunn. The first,
the one seemingly accepted by the Third Circuit, is that the decision was a
thinly concealed attempt to limit the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction
in the federal courts. However, a second view would be that the Dunn
court may have been attempting to ameliorate what it viewed as the poten-
tially unfair effects of quasi in rem procedure4" as a means of effecting
service of process. It may be forcefully contended, when, as in the instant
case, real property is involved, that the possibility of attachment is an
incident of property ownership. Conversely, it may be argued that it is
not always fair to require a party to litigate wherever its property is located.
Professor Carrington has suggested the following argument: Quasi in rem
jurisdiction will normally be resorted to by a plaintiff who is unable to
obtain in personam jurisdiction. If the standard for the exercise of personal
jurisdiction is whether the defendant maintains such minimum contacts
with the forum that requiring him to defend in it is not unfair,46 frequently
quasi in rem jurisdiction will be invoked when it is not fair to require that
particular defendant to litigate in the forum state. 47
While the Greenberg court found no prejudice in the use of this pro-
cedure, this blanket denial should not obscure recognition of the fact that
sensitivity to the problem raised by the Dunn court does not necessarily
mandate acceptance of the method employed in that decision to avoid the
41. 487 F.2d at 13.
42. Id.
43. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 272 (2d ed.
1970).
44. See text accompanying note 47 infra.
45. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, § 1121, at 501-03. For dis-
cussion of the possible detrimental effect of the use of quasi in rem procedure see
text accompanying note 47 infra.
46. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See generally
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 9, §§ 1067-69, at 1073.
47. Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi in Rein Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L.
REv. 303 (1962). 32
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possible unjust effect of the quasi in rem procedure. Other, more appro-
priate procedural devices, may accomplish the same result. For example,
Pennsylvania recognizes the application of the doctrine of forum non con-
venens" to actions commenced by the attachment or garnishment of the
defendant's property.49 Under this theory, a state court may decline to hear
a case in those instances in which there is available a more convenient forum
and great prejudice to the defendant exists.50 Adoption of forum non
conveniens would represent a middle ground between the Dunn court's fear
of unfairness concomitant with quasi in rem procedure, 51 and the Greenberg
court's aversion to the imposition of unwarranted procedural burdens. 52
However, at present, federal courts probably cannot use the state doctrine
in a quasi in rem action because federal forum non conveniens5 is entirely
a statutory remedy.5 4 Additionally, it is by no means certain that the statute
applies to federal quasi in rem actions since a district court is precluded
from transferring an action if there is no other district in which it can be
48. The doctrine of forum non conveniens balances the competing interests of
the plaintiff's traditional privilege of choosing the place of litigation, and the resulting
inconvenience to the defendant of being forced to litigate in the plaintiff's chosen
forum. Where another forum is available, a court may, in its discretion, dismiss the
case despite the fact that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter,
and venue is proper. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 43, at 164-65. See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84, comment c (1971).
49. Plum v. Tampax, Inc., 402 Pa. 616, 168 A.2d 315, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 826
(1961). In Plum, a subject of Denmark brought an action in which a writ of foreign
attachment was served upon a Pennsylvania garnishee possessing property of the
defendant, a foreign corporation. Id. at 617-18, 168 A.2d at 315. In ruling that dis-
missing the complaint under the theory of forum non conveniens was not an abuse
of judicial discretion although the action was properly instituted by garnishment of
the defendant's property, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania said:
Plaintiff has also contended that the doctrine of forum non conveniens should
not be applied in actions instituted by writs of foreign attachment since to do so
would destroy the efficacy of that remedy. This contention is unfounded. A writ
of foreign attachment is nothing more than "the equivalent of a summons for the
commencement of a personal action . . . ." Upon obtaining jurisdiction over the
person of appellee, as occurred in this case, the question of whether the doctrine
of forum non conveniens should be applied is the same as in any other case in-
stituted by summons or by complaint.
Id. at 619, 168 A.2d at 317 (citation omitted). But see Root v. Superior Court, 209
Cal. App. 2d 242, 25 Cal. Rptr. 784 (2d Dist. 1962) (questioning whether the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens can be invoked when court is exercising quasi in rem
jurisdiction).
50. See text accompanying note 47 supra.
51. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.
52. See text accompanying note 43 supra.
53. The federal forum non conveniens statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might have been brought
28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1970). For detailed discussion of section 1404(a) see C.
WRIGHT, supra note 43, at 165.
54. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). For the text of the federal
forum non conveniens statute see note 53 supra.
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brought.r5 Expansion of this limited doctrine to allow the transfer of quasi
in rem actions to avoid prejudice would most likely have to originate in the
legislature and not the courts.
FDIC v. Greenberg should have the initial impact of discouraging
interpretations of rule 4(e) (2) which render the operation of quasi in rem
jurisdiction more difficult by unnecessarily applying a plethora of state
procedural requirements. It is hoped that by removing the diversionary
problem of whether particular state procedures are mandated, the instant
case will have the salutary effect of focusing legislative and, possibly, judi-
cial, attention upon the issue of the fairness in certain circumstances of
requiring a nonresident defendant to litigate in a particular jurisdiction
solely because his property is located within that court's jurisdiction.
Stephen C. Braverman
FEDERAL PROCEDURE - EVIDENCE - VIDEOTAPED INTERROGATION
OF INCOMPETENT INADMISSIBLE WHERE TAPE Is NOT ILLUSTRATIVE
OR CORROBORATIVE OF EXPERT MEDICAL TESTIMONY, AND AMOUNTS
TO HEARSAY AS THE Ex PARTE TESTIMONY OF AN INCOMPETENT
WITNESS.
F-dster v. Crawford Shipping Co. (1974)
Plaintiff sued in federal district court to recover damages for personal
injuries suffered in an accident while he was unloading defendant's ship.1
On motion by his attorneys, the court entered an order adjudicating plaintiff
incompetent and appointed a guardian ad litem.2 With the plaintiff absent,
the case went to trial with the result that a directed verdict was entered
55. Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29, 32 (1955). The Norwood Court
stated:
The harshest result of the application of the old doctrine of forum non con-
veniens, dismissal of the action was eliminated by the provision in § 1404(a)
for transfer. When the harshest part of the doctrine is excised by statute, it can
hardly be called mere codification.
Id. Thus, in an action commenced by the attachment of the defendant's property,
relief under the federal forum non conveniens statute would arguably be unavailable
since transfer to the district where the action could be brought would be impossible,
especially in a local action such as Greenberg. But see Comment, Transfer of Quasi
in Rem Actions Under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a): A Study in the Interpretation of "Civil
Action," 31 U. Cai. L. R~v. 373 (1964), arguing that under certain circumstances
section 1404(a) may be used in quasi in rem actions.
1. Foster v. Crawford Shipping Co., 496 F.2d 788, 790 (3d Cir. 1974).
2. Id. Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that the
court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an incompetent person not otherwise pre-
sented in an action. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(c). The same hearing adjudicated him in-
competent to testify. 496 F.2d at 790.
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for the plaintiff on the issue of liability.8 In the triWi of the damages issue,
plaintiff's expert witness, a physician, gave a diagnosis df severe schizo-
phrenia as a result of the accident 4 and a prognosis of continued deteriora-
tion of that condition, with the consequence that he never again would
be gainfully employed, that he would need periodic hospitalization, and that
he would require monthly visits to a psychiatrist.5
During the trial, plaintiff's attorney offered into evidence a 2 minute
videotape, taken the previous day, of his interrogation of the partially
catatonic plaintiff who answered with grunts and growls.6 Defendant ob-
jected on the grounds that it was made in his absence, and that there was
nothing to establish the circumstances surrounding the taping or plaintiff's
condition either before or after the taping, both of which were believed
to be necessary if the videotape were offered to prove the plaintiff's current
condition.7 He further contended that the prejudicial effect on the jury
outweighed the benefits of admission for any purpose for which it was
offered. s After questioning counsel regarding the purpose for which the
videotape was offered,9 the trial court admitted the videotape, and the jury
returned a $500,000 verdict in favor of the plaintiff.' 0
Defendant's motion for a new trial on the issue of damages, based upon
the admission of the videotape and remarks made in summation by plaintiff's
counsel," was denied.' 2 On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed and re-
manded, holding that the denial of defendant's motion for a new trial was
3. The trial was bifurcated according to rule 42(c) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides for the separate trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 42(c).
4. Plaintiff's theory was that the accident had been the "triggering mechanism"
of his condition. 496 F.2d at 790.
5. Id. There was testimony establishing a life expectancy of 37 years and a
work expectancy of 30 years. Id. Defendant's expert witness disputed the causal con-
nection between the accident and the plaintiff's schizophrenia, and rendered a prognosis
of periodic remission. Id.
6. The videotape was made at plaintiff's home. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. The exchange between the trial judge and plaintiff's attorney was as follows:
(The Court) What is the purpose that you are introducing this?
(Plaintiff's Counsel) I am introducing this strictly to be illustrative of Dr.
Dillon's testimony. It has no greater purpose than a chart that a doctor would
use to talk about his testimony. It has no greater purpose than a schedule [sic -
skeleton] to know what a doctor would use to explain a broken bone . . . and
this is illustrative of his present condition.
(Plaintiff's Counsel) I think the jury may have some question as to what he
is really like, and . . . that weighs heavily in favor of showing it to the jury
because they have never seen Mr. Foster.
Id. at 790-91.
10. Id. at 790.
11. Plaintiff's counsel made remarks concerning the financial disparity of the
parties, the fact that defendant as a foreign corporation, and that, if the defendant did
not pay for the injuries to the plaintiff, the taxpayers would. Id. at 792.
12. Id. at 789.
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inconsistent with substantial justice13 in that 1) in reference to the tape
it was unauthenticated and not illustrative or corroborative of the expert
witness's testimony; it was communicative and therefore amounted to hear-
say; and the tape would have been prejudicial even if it were offered for an
admissible purpose; and 2). the closing remarks of counsel for the plaintiff
were improper. Foster v. Crawford Shipping. Co.., 496 F.2d 788 (1974).
Courts have considered photographs and motion pictures, 14 and, more
recently, videotapes' 5 as demonstrative evidence,,that is, as "[e]vidence
from which the trier of fact may derive a relevant firsthand sense impression
.... "1 However, the courts have developed three criteria for admissibility,
referred to as the foundation, to safeguard the opposing party and the
court from deceptive, distorted, or fabricated photographs and videotapes.17
First, the videotape must be authenticated by a witness who is familiar
with the original scene, and who is competent to state that the film accurately
represents the person, place, or thing reproduced at the time in issue.18
13. Rule 61 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence . .. is ground for
granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict . . . or otherwise disturbing
a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court in-
consistent with substantial justice ...
FED. R. Civ. P. 61.
14. See, e.g., 1 C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE §§ 1291-1334 (2d ed. 1969)
[hereinafter cited as SCOTTi; 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 790-98 (Chadbourn rev. ed.
1970) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; Gardner, The Camera Goes to Court, 24 N.C.L.
REV. 233 (1946) ; Paradis, The Celluloid Witness, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 235 (1965).
15. See, e.g., Zollman v. Symington Wayne Corp., 438 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 827 (1971) (videotape of a reconstruction of the accident which
caused plaintiff's injury). See also Kornblum, Videotape in Civil Cases, 24 HASTINGS
L.J. 9 (1972) ; Kornblum & Rush, Television in Courtroom and Classroom, 59 A.B.A.J.
273 (1973).
16. State v. Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473 (1971). See McCoRmICK'S
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 212, at 524-25 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972) [here-
inafter cited as MCCORMICK], where the author* states that this kind of evidence
allows the jury to draw its own conclusion rather than relying solely on the testi-
mony of the witness. See also Hare, Demonstrative Evidence, 27 ALA. LAW. 193
(1966) ; Stewart, Videotape: Use in Demonstrative Evidence, 21 DEF. L.J. 253 (1972).
17. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 530. These criteria, which were
first developed for photographs, have been applied to motion pictures for the follow-
ing reason:
As photographs and phonographic reproductions of sounds have been held to be
admissible in evidence, there would seem to be no sound reason for refusing to
accept a talking motion picture which is but a combination of the two when it is
shown to be accurate and reliable.
Commonwealth v. Roller, 100 Pa. Super. 125, 130 (1930). It would follow that since
the difference between a motion picture and a videotape is a merely technological one,
in that a film is recorded on celluloid and a videotape on electromagnetic tape, the
same criteria which had been applied to films would be applied to videotapes. ScoTT,
supra note 14, § 1294, at 152. See Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1969);
State v. Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 593, 484 P.2d 473, 477 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 859 (Fla. 1969). WIGMORE,
supra note 14 at § 793. The authenticating witness, however, does not have to be the
photographer. People v. Heading, 39 Mich. App. 126, 132, 197 N.W.2d 325, 329 (1972).
Some courts do require that the witness actually be present during the filming due
to the technical aspects of motion pictures. See Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 686 (1958) and
cases cited therein. The film also does not have to be continuous since editing is
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Secondly, the videotape must be relevant to the issues by tending to prove
or disprove a material fact in question. 19 Third, the videotape must not
be excessively prejudicial to the opposing party.20 In applying all of these
criteria, the decisions have emphasized that the determination of admis-
sibility is largely within the discretion of the trial judge. 21
If the videotape satisfies the criteria, it is admissible for the purpose
of illustrating the oral testimony of a witness (as would be a map or
anatomical chart), or for the purpose of corroborating, that is, verifying
his testimony.22 However, the videotape, just as a photograph, is only
demonstrative evidence. By itself it cannot be admitted into evidence, rather
allowed so long as the film is not spliced together in a misleading way. Pritchard v.
Downie, 326 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1964) ; Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita Flour
Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 100 (10th Cir. 1958).
19. See, e.g., State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 7, 498 P.2d 697, 699 (1972) ; McCoR-
MIcK, supra note 16, at § 185. The videotape, however, does not have to be taken
contemporaneously with the occurrence to be relevant, but may be taken afterwards
if the conditions are basically the same and any inaccuracies or minor changes are
specifically pointed out to the jury and are readily understandable to them. People
v. Mines, 132 Ill. App. 2d 628, 630, 270 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1971).
The courts are split on whether the videotape may be cumulative of detailed
testimony or repetitive of evidence introduced earlier, even when it is offered to
illustrate or corroborate a witness' testimony. Compare Id. and State v. Helm, 66
Nev. 286, 307-08, 209 P.2d 187, 197 (1949) (photograph), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 942
(1950), with Frankel v. Lull Engineering Co., 334 F. Supp. 913, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
(motion picture), aff'd, 470 F.2d 995 (1973) and Pursche v. Atlas Scraper & Eng'r
Co., 300 F.2d 467, 489 (9th Cir. 1962) (motion picture).
20. WIGMCORE, supra note 14, § 792, at 237. The courts will not admit in-
flammatory or lurid pictures whose purpose is to elicit sympathy or rage and, thus,
enhance plaintiff's verdict or make more certain defendant's conviction if it is a
criminal trial. Ryan v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 205 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1953)
(.photograph of deceased with his head hanging out of a doorway of an automobile
depicting blood or an opening in his head not admissible). However, a film or photo-
graph, even if it is gruesome, will be admitted if it is a fair representation of the
subject's condition at the time taken, its purpose is not to inflame the jury, and its
probative value outweighs any possible prejudice to the other party. United States v.
Odom, 348 F. Supp. 889, 894-95 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mern., 475 F.2d 1397 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 836 (1973) (photograph of deceased depicting stab
wounds held admissible since they had not been introduced to inflame the jury).
21. See generally SCOTT, supra note 14, at § 1021. The judge may always preview
the film in his chambers to determine if the film would be inadmissible due to its
prejudicial effects. State v. Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 593, 484 P.2d 473, 477 (1971),
citing Paradis, supra note 14, at 246.
22. United States v. Odom, 348 F. Supp. 889, 894 (M.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd mem.,
475 F.2d 1397 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 836 (1973) (photograph) ; McCoR-
m cK, supra note 4, at § 214. Although the two purposes are similar, the distinction
is crucial. When a photograph is offered to illustrate the testimony of a witness, it
may represent an approximation of the object, event, or condition in question, as
would, for example, a medical textbook photograph illustrating a plaintiff's condition.
However, when the same photograph or videotape is offered to corroborate the wit-
ness' testimony, it must represent the actual condition, object, or place in issue and
at the time in issue. Thus, in the present case, where the plaintiff's condition was
in issue, a videotape of him could have been presented to corroborate the testimony
of a witness rather than to illustrate it. If, of course, the videotape is staged, that is,
if plaintiff's portraying what his condition was at some other time, then the videotape
would be illustrative of the witness's testimony as it would not portray plaintiff's
actual condition, but would rather be a later dramatization of it.
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it must constitute a part of the witness' testimony.2 3 The only context in
which a film can be introduced into real evidence is when its content is in
issue.2 4 In a minority of jurisdictions, however, a film will be admitted
as a "silent witness" when it has probative value on its own merits.2 5 Finding
all of these requirements fulfilled, courts have admitted into evidence video-
tapes of depositions in civil cases, 26 and videotapes of confessioqs, 27 line-
ups, 28 and police investigations" in criminal cases.
Videotapes do, however, pose one possible problem if the videotape
itself is considered a communication from the subject of the tape, rather
than part of the testimony of the witness; in that case, it will be deemed
hearsay. 0 This contention was raised with respect to a motion picture in
Richardson v. Missouri-K-T-Ry.3 1 in which the defendant sought to place
into evidence a film depicting a plant foreman operating the machine which
had injured the plaintiff.82 Stating that "[t]he main test to determine
whether picture testimony is hearsay is as to whether or not it is subject
to cross examination through the witness who verifies and uses it,"33 the
court held that the film, rather than being hearsay, was part of the au-
23. WIGMORE, supra note 14, at § 790.
24. Feeney v. Young, 191 App. Div. 501, 181 N.Y. Supp. 481 (1920) (motion
picture), discussed in Paradis, supra note 14, at 249-51. In an action to recover dam-
ages for the exhibition of the plaintiff in the film without her consent, the film had
been introduced to identify it as plaintiff's picture. Id. at 503, 181 N.Y. Supp. at 482.
Thus, a showing that plaintiff had been in the film was necessary to establish plaintiff's
cause of action. Id.
25. The film or photograph is admitted into evidence independently of the wit-
ness' testimony or observation on the theory that, if the accuracy of the photographic
equipment and procedure is established, the photograph or film will be accurate and
should be admissible just as an X-ray is admissible even though there is no witness
to state that it represents the interior of the person's body. People v. Bowley, 59
Cal. 2d 855, 382 P.2d 591, 31 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1963) (motion picture) ; State v. Goyet,
120 Vt. 12, 132 A.2d 623 (1957) (photograph). For a discussion supporting this view,
see MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at § 214; Gardner, supra note 14, at 245-46.
26. Carson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 492 (D. Neb. 1971). See
Judicial Conference, Modernizing Trial Techniques and Management: Audio-Visual
Testimony, 58 F.R.D. 221 (6th Cir. 1972); Thornton, Expanding Videotape Tech-
niques in Pretrial and Trial Advocacy, 9 FORUM 105 (1973).
27. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972); Paramore v. State,
229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969) ; State v. Lindsey, 507 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1974).
Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588. 484 P.2d 473 (1971).
28. People v. Heading, 39 Mich. App. 126, 197 N.W.2d 325 (1972); State v.
Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473 (1971).
29. People v. Mines, 132 Ill. App. 2d 628, 270 N.E.2d 265 (1971) (videotape of
dark spots leading from the scene of the crime to the vicinity of defendant's residence).
30. Hearsay evidence has been defined as:
testimony in court, or written evidence, of a statement made out of court, the
statement being offered as an assertion to show the truth of the matters asserted
therein, and thus resting for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court
asserter.
MCCORMICK, supra note 16, § 246, at 584 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
31. 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
32. The plaintiff had severely injured his hand while operating the machine in
defendant's shop. The film purported to demonstrate how the plaintiff's injury could
have resulted from his own carelessness. Id. at 821-22.
33. Id. at 823, citing 3 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 791, at 178 (3d ed. 1940).
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thenticating witness' testimony, which, of course, was subject to cross
examination.8 4
In contrast, the court in State v. Thurman5 held segments of a video-
tape inadmissible as hearsay.86 In Thurman the police had made a videotape
of dark spots (allegedly blood) leading from the scene of the crime to
the vicinity of defendant's residence. 87 The audio portion of the videotape
consisted of a narration by a police officer which may have been made after
the video portion was recorded.88 The trial court ordered the hearsay
portions of the tape struck from the record and instructed the jury to dis-
regard additional portions of the narration not included in the motion to
strike.8 9
The Thurman casewas not cited by the court in the instant case in
support of its finding that the videotape of the catatonic plaintiff amounted
to hearsay.40 Rather, the Foster court proceeded by first examining the con-
tention that the tape was corroborative of the expert witness' testimony.
41
34. 205 S.W.2d at 823. The fact that the actor was also the authenticating wit-
ness would not affect the hearsay question, and thus the principle enunciated would
apply equally to a situation when the actor is'not the authenticating witness.
35. 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (1972).
36. Id. at 8, 498 P.2d at 700.
37. Id. at 7, 498 P.2d at 699.
38. Implicit in the court's designation of the audio portion as a "narration," was
the fact that the audio was not part of what had actually transpired during the taping,
but one officer's account or explanation of what had happened which may have very
well been added after the video portion was taped. Thus, unlike Foster, the audio
portion was severable from the tape without affecting what had actually transpired.
39. Id. at 8, 498 P.2d at 700.
40. 496 F.2d at 791.
41. The court presented virtually no discussion on the defendant's claims at trial
that none of the three criteria of admissibility - authentication, relevancy, lack of
prejudice - had been satisfied. It should be noted that no witness had authenticated
the videotape at trial. Id. On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the defendant had
waived this objection by not demanding that someone from the tape crew appear and
testify. Id. The court summarily rejected this argument, apparently concluding that
defendant's objection, that the circumstances surrounding the taping were unknown,
sufficed to preserve this objection, for the court merely stated, "This contention mis-
states the record." Id.
In arguing that the tape was relevant, the plaintiff had contended at trial
that the jury might have some question as to what the plaintiff was really like, since
they had never seen him. Id. However, as defendant's counsel at trial and the Third
Circuit on review pointed out, neither plaintiff's condition prior to or after the film
were disclosed. Id. at 790. To be relevant the videotape had to represent the general,
continuing condition of the subject since the time in question was more than just the
2-minute taping segment.
On the issue of prejudice, the defendant made his strongest objection to the
videotape, claiming that he was absent during the taping and that the tape was highly
inflammatory to the jury. Id. at 790-91. The trial court had ruled that the videotape
was not prejudicial in this former sense and correctly so, as there is only one juris-
diction which recognizes the opposing party's right to be present during a filming.
Balian v. General Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 118, 296 A.2d 317 (1972) (motion picture),
cert. denied, 62 N.J. 195, 299 A.2d 729 (1973). Contra, e.g., Hawkins v. Missouri
K & T Ry., 36 Tex. Civ. App. 633, 83 S.W. 52 (1904) (photograph). With respect
to inflaming the jury, there was no indication in the Third Circuit's opinion that the
tape was being used in this manner. The Foster court only stated that the tape was
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Although the court did acknowledge that corroboration 'is a permissible
purpose by citing Jenkins v. Associated Transport Inc., 42 which held that
a photograph of the injured plaintiff was admissible to corroborate the
testimony of the doctor who authenticated it and was present when it was
taken, 43 it rejected plaintiff's argument here because the videotape con-
tradicted what his expert witness had testified to.44 The crucial dis-
tinction which the court drew between Jenkins and the present case was
that, even if the tape had corroborated the witness' testimony, the video-
tape and its soundtrack of the attorney interrogating Foster had a "com-
municative content other than merely pictorial" and therefore amounted to
hearsay. 45
Anticipating the court's finding that the tape was hearsay, the plaintiff
alleged that it was nevertheless admissible under one of two exceptions
to the hearsay rule. First, the plaintiff claimed that the well-settled excep-
tion of communications to a physician for purposes of treatment4 6 was
applicable. In response, the court stated that the exception was not appro-
priate here because the tape had been made outside the presence of the
physician for use as testimony.47 Second, the plaintiff contended that the
videotape was admissible even if hearsay under the theory that all conduct
establishing insanity can not be denied entry into evidence. 48  Without
resolving the issue of whether the tape qualified as evidence of insanity,
the court noted that the plaintiff's sanity was not even in issue since he
prejudicial in the sense that it was ex parte testimony from an absent incompetent.
496 F.2d at 792. Hence, as with the defendant's other challenges to the trial court's
conclusions that the various criteria had been met, the Foster court apparently chose
to rest its analysis on the hearsay issue.
42. 330 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1964).
43. Id. at 711.
44. The testimony was as follows:
(The Court) Is [the film] illustrative of what you would testify to? Have
you seen him in a condition like this?
(The Witness) No sir. . . . [H]e was totally mute and catatonic. He was
not making the grunting growling and snarling things at the time I saw him.
496 F.2d at 791.
45. Id.
46. This exception to the hearsay rule is firmly established due to-the reliability
and sincerity of such statements. McCoRMICK, supra note 16, at § 292.
47. According to the court:
Undoubtedly hearsay communications to a physician for the purposes of obtaining
treatment, and possibly videotapes and motion picture recordings of those com-
munications, are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule on the theory that
the need for accurate diagnosis and treatment and the opportunity to cross
examine the physician afford appropriate hearsay safeguards. But that rule is
inapplicable to ex parte communications prepared outside the presence of a treat-
ing physician for use as testimony.
496 F.2d at 791 (emphasis added).
48. Although sometimes referred to as an exception to the hearsay rule, such
conduct is not hearsay. Wigmore states: "The first and fundamental rule, then, will
be that any and all conduct of the person is admissible in evidence." 2 WIGMORE,
supra note 14, § 228, at 9 (original emphasis).
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had been judged incompetent; rather, "[t]he issue was the extent of his
disability and his prognosis."'49
Finally, the court rejected plaintiff's argument that the purpose for
which the film was introduced was to illustrate the expert's testimony, as
would an anatomical chart, on the grounds that this was not the purpose
it was used for at all. Instead, the videotape was placed in evidence to
establish the plaintiff's condition.5° Significantly, the court went on to
state :
But even if its use had been so restricted, any benefit which might
have been derived in the factfinding process by such an illustration
was far outweighed by the prejudice of admitting what amounted to
ex parte testimony from the absent incompetent. 51
The oourt was faced with balancing the competing interests of any possible
"illustrative" value of the videotape, the subject of which was an incom-
petent witness, and its testimonial content. If a videotape of an attorney
interrogating an incompetent witness was held admissible as illustrating
a witness' testimony, it would render the adjudication of a witness as
incompetent to testify meaningless. The court in effect limited the trial
court's discretion on the issue of prejudice by holding that a videotape is
prejudicial, and therefore inadmissible, even if it is illustrative of a wit-
ness' testimony, if it amounts to the ex parte testimony of an incompetent
witness. 52
It was not clear from the court's opinion exactly what aspect of the
videotape consisted of "communicative content." Although the court may
have believed that the videotape of the interrogation was communicative
because of the "statements" made by persons in the tape,53 it is submitted
that the court could have found that videotape or film, even without a
soundtrack, could be considered communicative if the subject of the film
conveyed by his motions or lack of motion that which his oral statements
would convey. 54 Such a conclusion may be criticized upon the ground that
49. 496 F.2d at 791. Although these statements by the court appear somewhat
contradictory (in that the extent of his disability would be directly related to his
sanity), in reality they are not. Since the plaintiff had already been adjudicated in-
competent, the issue was to what extent his condition disabled him in relation to his
capabilities, and to what extent it necessitated treatment, regardless of his mental state.
50. Id. at 791-92. This blatant inconsistency was never resolved by the trial
court, which only stated: "I am trying to figure out for what purpose it is being
introduced if this doctor had never had a chance to observe him in that condition."
Id. at 791.
51. Id. at 792.
52. Id.
53. Conceptually, this would certainly fit Professor McCormick's definition of
hearsay as opposed to the argument that it be considered the testimony of the witness.
See note 30 su pra.
54. See McCORMICK, supra note 16, at § 250. The Federal Rules of Evidence
define hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying
at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted."
Statement is defined as "an oral or written assertion or 2) nonverbal conduct of a
person, intended by him as an assertion." Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595,
Rule 801(e), (c), 88 Stat. 1939.
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a tape or film is no more communicative than a still photograph, which is
generally considered not hearsay, but the testimony of the witness through a
different medium.55 Arguably, the difference in degree between a video-
tape and a photograph is as great as that between a photograph and a
diagram so the same rules should apply to videotapes just as the same rules
concerning diagrams were held to apply to photographs. A diagram is
merely an approximate reproduction of the witness' testimony, an abstrac-
tion of it, while a photograph is the actual reproduction of it. However,
the transition from being the testimony of the witness to being the testi-
mony of the subject of the "photograph" may occur when motion, or
motion and sound are added. In a case such as the present one, the videotape
is no longer corroborating the testimony of the witness, but it is allowing
the subject of the videotape to directly communicate verbally and visually
to the jury. The subject, then, is testifying for himself via the film, which
testimony is an out of court statement by the subject of the film offered to
prove the truth of the matter asserted, and therefore hearsay.
In comparing Foster to Thurman, one basic similarity can be observed.
In both cases, the audio portion was not part of the witness' testimony
when the tape was introduced. 56 The hearsay problem was much more
apparent in Thurman, however, since the audio portion was not an in-
tegral part of what had transpired during the taping since it was a narration
of what had happened.5 7 The most important dissimilarity between the
cases is that the Thurman court admitted the visual portion of the video-
tape,5 8 while in Foster the entire tape was held inadmissible. This may
have been due to an "all or nothing" attitude by the Foster court, or more
importantly, attributable to its belief that the videotape would have amounted
to hearsay even without the soundtrack. 59
With respect to Richardson, where the court admitted into evidence
a motion picture over a hearsay objection,6 ° Foster is distinguishable upon
the basis of the purposes for which the film and videotape were introduced
and the relation of the subject to the film or videotape. The film in
Richardson, which tended to prove that the accident could only be at-
tributable to the operator, was offered to show the maintenance of the
machine and not the condition of the subject as in Foster.61 Also the
operator of the machine was in no way communicating to the jury in a
testimonial sense as was the case in Foster.
55. See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
56. In Foster, the audio consisted of the attorney's questions and the plaintiff's
responses, rather than the witness' (the physician) testimony. 496 F.2d at 790.
In Thurman, the audio portion consisted of a narration by an officer, which implies
that it was not made by the same officer who was the witness.
57. See notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
58. 84 N.M. 8, 498 P.2d at 697.
59. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
60. See notes 31-34 and accompanying text supra.
61. 205 S.W.2d at 822-23.
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.As the Foster court properly characterized the videotape as hearsay,
it was also on sound legal ground in rejecting the plaintiff's assertions
that the tape was admissible under exceptions to the hearsay rule. Since
the plaintiff's insanity was not in, issue,62 the court declined to consider
whether "an ex parte staged demonstration, rather than testimony respect-
ing observations of the everyday conduct of the allegedly insane person,
qualifies as evidence of irrational conduct." 68 The court's reluctance to go
further than necessary was prompted not only by judicial discretion, but
also by its suggestion that the videotape was staged. 4 Although a majority
of courts will admit staged, posed or artificially reconstructed photographs,
films, 5 or videotapes 6 to illustrate the testimony of the witness, other
courts reject them, emphasizing the possibility of the jury confusing the
staged film with the actual occurrence.67 Although a staged film should be
admissible for illustrative purposes on the same theory as a diagram, in
the case of a staged film dramatizing insane conduct, it would be self-
contradictory in that the actor's ability to pose as insane would demon-
strate that he is actually sane.
It should also be noted that the court, in discussing the exception to
the hearsay rule for statements made to a physician to obtain treatment,
only stated that films or videotapes of such may "possibly" be admissible.0 5
Although the court gave no explanation for its caveat, its caution is per-
haps due to the fact that the rationale for admitting such statements as
exceptions to the hearsay rule may be negated by the videotaping or filming.
The mere fact that the patient taped or filmed the occurrence in preparation
for possible future litigation militates against the conclusion that the sole
purpose of the patient's statements was to obtain accurate diagnosis and
treatment.6 9 The danger of colored statements and insincerity is greatly
enhanced, and therefore, the rationale for admitting such statements be-
comes inapplicable.
The standard which the Third Circuit has formulated, then, is that the
film must first meet the traditional standards or criteria for admissibility by
being authenticated, relevant, and not prejudicial in the sense of being
gruesome. In addition, the videotape must not amount to hearsay by being
62. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
63. 496 F.2d at 791 (emphasis added).
64. If the film was not staged, then there would be no objection to allowing it
to corroborate the witness' testimony if he had testified.
65. See, e.g., 50 Nev. 271, 257 P. 619 (1927) (photograph of reconstructed
crime); Richardson v. Missouri-K-T-Ry., 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)(film depicting experiment supporting party's version of the actual event) ; Annot.,
19 A.L.R.2d 877 (1951).
66. Zollman v. Symington Wayne Corp., 438 F.2d 28 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 827 (1971).
67. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Knowles, 108 Vt. 195, 184 A. 705 (1936). See also
Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 877 (1951).
68. 496 F.2d at 791.
69. A few jurisdictions will admit statements made to a physician in obtaining
treatment, even though he is also employed to testify. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra
note 14, at § 293.
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communicative rather than pictorial, and must not amount to the ex parte
testimony of an absent incompetent witness. Since Foster was an incom-
petent witness, there would be no manner in which a videotape with a
soundtrack could be introduced since the court would hold that it amounted
to the testimony of an incompetent witness. If, however, Foster had not
been adjudicated incompetent, a videotape of his communications to his
physician while he was obtaining treatment might have been held admis-
sible, if properly authenticated. 70
The court, in its brief but well reasoned opinion, recognized that the
traditional standards for admitting photographs would not always suffice
in dealing with videotapes, and provided a flexible standard for determining
whether a videotape is inadmissible hearsay. Although the term "com-
municative" is broad, and perhaps even vague, such a general term was
necessary, given the lack of case law on the subject of videotapes. Also,
by allowing the specifics to be determined in subsequent cases, the court
adhered to the long established precedent of leaving the admissibility of
photographic materials within the discretion of the trial judge.71
Mark Armbrust
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT SECTION
2680(a) DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION - THE PROFES-
SIONAL EVALUATION OF A SCIENTIST Is NOT A DISCRETIONARY ACTION
AND THEREFORE AN ERROR COMMITTED PURSUANT TO SUCH AN
EVALUATION MAY BE THE BASIS FOR A SUIT UNDER THE ACT.
Griffin v. United States (1974)
Less than 1 month after receiving the second of three doses of vaccine
in a locally sponsored polio immunization program, 1 plaintiff Griffin had
begun to feel sick. She subsequently required hospitalization and became a
permanent quadriplegic, allegedly as a result of ingesting Type III polio
vaccine. 2 The vaccine which the plaintiff had received had been tested for
safety and potency by the Division of Biological Standards (DBS) of the
United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, yet she
70. See 496 F.2d at 791.
71. See note 21 and accompanying text supra.
1. Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1062 (3d Cir.. 1974). The program
which had been sponsored by the Montgomery County (Pa.) Medical Society, called
for the doses of Sabin oral polio vaccine to be administered upon three different dates.
Plaintiff never received the final dose. Id.
2. Id.
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claimed that DBS had released it to the public in violation of agency regu-
lations3 in that the DBS approved vaccine that did not meet the prescribed
standards. In bringing the instant action against the United States under
the Federal Tort Claims Act 4 (FTCA), plaintiffs had contended, and the
district court had found, that Mrs. Griffin was a member of the class of
persons which the regulation was designed to protect; that she had suffered
the harm which the regulation was designed to prevent; and that there-
fore, the approval of the vaccine by DBS had been negligent per se.5 The
trial court had further held that the negligence of the United States had
been the proximate cause of the plaintiff-victim's injuries.6
The Government had contended that the suit was prohibited by the
so-called discretionary function exception in section 2680 (a) of the FTCA,7
because DBS' decision to release the vaccine had involved the exercise of
judgment.8 The district court, however, had concluded that the Govern-
ment's construction of that exception was too broad, and held that the
action was not barred by section 2680(a) because DBS' conduct in re-
leasing the vaccine deviated from the regulation and that any such deviation
"which imposes a higher risk on the public, no matter how slight, is not a
matter of discretion." 9 The district court had awarded damages to the
3. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's holding that the release
of the vaccine violated 42 C.F.R. § 73.114(b)(1)(iii) (1973), which provided for a
comparative evaluation of the neurovirulence (virulence or effect upon the central
nervous system which could be related to a pathologic entity such as polio) of the
vaccine being tested as against the neurovirulence of a reference strain of vaccine.
500 F.2d at 1064 & n.10, 1065. This evaluation was accomplished by sacrificing and
.dissecting members of a vaccinated group of monkeys, and performing thereupon five
comparative tests outlined in the regulation. By the terms of the regulation:
The virus pool under test is satisfactory for poliovirus vaccine manufacture only
if at least eighty percent of the animals in each group survive the observation
period and if a comparative analysis of the test results demonstrate that the neu-
rovirulence of the test virus pool does not exceed that of the NIH Reference
Attenuated Poliovirus.
42 C.F.R. § 73.114(b) (1) (iii) (1973). The appeals court said that the release of the
vaccine violated the regulation because the specified comparative analysis had not
shown that the neurovirulence of the test lot did not exceed the neurovirulence of the
reference strain. 500 F.2d at 1062-63.
4. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671-80 (1970). For the text of the statute, see note
19 infra.
5. Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10, 34 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
6. Id. The court concluded that the negligence of the United States had been
the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries for the following reasons:
[B]ut for the negligence the harm would not have occurred . . . the negligence
set in motion forces which led to the injury which D.B.S. might or ought to
have anticipated, even though in advance the injury seemed improbable and the
precise form in which the injury resulted could not have been foreseen . . .the
negligence created a significantly larger risk to the protected class of ultimate
consumers which should have been foreseen and which came to fruition in the
case of Mary Jane Griffin, and ...the harm was the very injury intended to be
prevented by the regulation, and must therefore be taken as proximately caused
by its violation ...
Id.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1970). For the text of the statute, see note 22 infra.
8. 351 F. Supp. at 33.
9. Id.
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plaintiff-victim for her past and future medical expenses, lost future earning
capacity, and her, pain and suffering, and to her. husband for loss of past and
future donsortium.' 0 The trial court had .rejected the Government's con-
tention that the plaintiffs' recovery should .be reduced by half due to the
terms of a, joint tortfeasor release ,which the plaintiffs had signed pursuant
to the settlement of a separate suit against .the drug manufacturer."
On appeal, the 'Third Circuit affirmed: in. part and reversed in part,
holding that the district court had' correctly% determined the issues of the
Government's liability and the computation of damages; that the action had
not been barred by the discretionary function ;exception to the FTCA be-
cause the decision to release the vaccine.-was not thd protected, discretionary
determination of a policymaker .but the :professional evaluation of a scien-
tist ;12 -and, alternatively, that section 2680(a) did not-afford protection for
the violation of a mandatory regulation.' 3 The court further held that the
joint tortfeasor release should be given effect,14 and remanded the case for
proceedings consistent with its .opinion. Griffljt v.,.United States, 500 F.2d
1059 (3d.Cir. 1974).
The doctrine of sovereign immunity was adpted and rigorously ap-
plied by American' ourts as a part of their -legal inheritance from England,
where the Ci-owh had been immune from' anly suit to which it had not
consented. 15 As the Federal Government expanded, however, the number
of wrongs committed by its agents also increased; and the only remedy
available to citizens' for redress of these wrongs,'. that of the private bill
10. Id. at 34-38.
11. Griffin v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 324, '329 (E.D. Pa. 1973). The plain-
tiffs had commenced four separate actions : the'instant action against the United States
under the FTCA; an action in federal court against Charles Pfizer & Co., the drug
manufacturer, which was settled out of court-, and two actions in the state courts
against the Montgomery 'County Medical Society which' were voluntarily dismissed
after the settlement with Pfizer. 500 F.2d at 1062 & n.5.
12. 500 F.2d at 1066.
13. Id. at 1069. For the discussion of this alterntive holding, see text accom-
panying notes 37-43 infra.
14. THE UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, PA. STAT. ANN.
fit. 12, §§ 2082-89 (1967), provides inpertinent part:
A release by the injured person of one joint tortfeasor . . . reduces the claim
against the other tortfeasors in the . . . proportion by which the release provides
that the total claim shall be reduced . . ..
Id. § 2085. The district court, held the release to be legaUy ineffective for purposes of
reducing the judgment because the controlling' Pennsylvania case of Davis v. Miller,
385 Pa. 348, 123 A.2d 422 (1956), stood 'for the rule thatin order to give effect to a
'pro rata share" clause in a plaintiff's release, a court must first determine the joint
tortfeasor status of the settling party. Since the United States had not joined
Charles Pfizer & Co., the vaccine's manufacturer, as a third party defendant, there
was no determination of its joint tortfeasor status. 353 F. Supp. at 327-29. The
Third Circuit, however, because the district court had ignored language in the release
by which plaintiffs had waived the benefits of the. Davis holding, held that the United
States was entitled to the benefit of the release.' 500 F.2d at 1073.
15. See Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 57 GEO. L.J. 81 (1968).
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in Congress, became increasingly burdensome and inequitable.'" The de-
mand arose, therefore, that federal tort claims be submitted to adjudication.' 7
Finally, in 1946, after nearly 30 years of consideration,' Congress
passed the FTCA, a general waiver of immunity which rendered the federal
government liable to the same extent a private person would be in a par-
ticular case.'0 Congress was particularly worried, however, about the
potential liability of the Government for acts of a governmental nature or
function. 20 Consequently,. the Act included several exceptions to the waiver
of immunity. 21
One of these exceptions was the discretionary function exception. 22
In the landmark case of Dalehite v. United States,23 the Supreme Court
of the United States dealt with this exception and relied upon the "sub-
stantial historical ancestry I.24 of the concept of discretion in defining it as
16. Id.
17. Id. For a partial legislative history of the FTCA and the discretionary func-
tion exception thereto, see Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24-30 (1953) ; Feres
v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 139, 140 (1950).
18. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953).
19. The FTCA provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions of chapter 171 of this title, the district courts . . .
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United
States, for money damages, accruing on and after January 1, 1945, for injury or
loss of property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful
act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the
scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States,
if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law
of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
20. See H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1945) ; H.R. REP. No. 2800,
71st Cong., 3d Sess. 13 (1931). See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 28
& n.18 (1953).
21. 28U.S.C.§§2680(a)-(n) (1970).
22. The discretionary function exception is embodied in section 2680(a) of the
FTCA, which provides in pertinent part:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not
apply to-
(a) Any claim . . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure
to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved
be abused.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)- (1970).
23. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
24. Id. at 34. The Court found this history in its own cases. For example, in
Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1895), it had written:
In exercising the functions of his office, the head of an Executive Department,
keeping within the limits of his authority, should not be under an apprehension
that the motives that control his official conduct may, at any time, become the
subject of inquiry in a civil suit for damages. It would seriously cripple the
proper and effective administration of public affairs as entrusted to the executive
branch of the government, if he were subjected to any such restraint.
Id. at 498.
Further, the Court had stated in Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627
(1913), that
if the matter . . . is one in which the exercise of either judgment or discretion is
required, the courts will refuse to substitute their judgment or discretion for
[VOL. 20
47
Editors: Federal Jursidiction and Procedure
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1975
THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW
being the freedom of the executive or the administrator to act according
to his judgment of the best course. 25 The Court stated that discretion
includes not only the initiation of programs and activities but also the
determinations made in establishing plans, specifications, or schedules of
operations.2 6 The Court concluded that "where there is room for policy
judgment and decision there is discretion. '27 Two years later, in United
States v. Union Trust Co.,28 the Supreme Court affirmed the District of
Columbia Circuit's restatement of the Dalehite rationale and its inference
from the Dalehite Court's definition of discretion that the United States was
liable only when the negligence of its employees occurred at the operational
level, where there was no room for policy judgment or decision.29
In its own cases, the Third Circuit had relied heavily upon Dalehite
and, to a lesser extent, upon Union Trust in applying the planning-opera-
tional distinction to its consideration of the discretionary function excep-
tion.30 However, Griffin presented a more difficult analytical problem than
had previous cases because there was no clear factual basis for resolving
the issue of the applicability of the discretionary function exception.
The crucial consideration in Griffin was the characterization of the
process by which DBS approved the polio vaccine for release to the public.8 '
The Government argued that the process involved a discretionary function
because the determination that the neurovirulence of a particular lot of
vaccine did not exceed that of the reference strain involved the exercise
that of the official entrusted by law with its execution. Interference in such a
case would be to interfere with the ordinary functions of government.
Id. at 633. See also Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 131 (1939); Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803).
25. 346 U.S. at 34.
26. Id. at 35-36.
27. Id. at 36.
28. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955) (per curiam). In
this case, Eastern Air Lines had sued the Government for damages allegedly caused
by the negligence of federal control tower employees in regulating air traffic. The
circuit court had found the controllers' actions to be clearly at an operation level devoid
of policymaking authority and therefore not within the section 2680(a) exception.
Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
29. Eastern Air Lines v. Union Trust Company, 221 F.2d 62, 76-77 (D.C. Cir.),
aff'd sub norn. United States v. Union Trust Co., 350 U.S. 907 (1955) (per curiam).
30. In Mahler v. United States, 306 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1962), plaintiffs had been
injured when the automobile in which they were riding struck a boulder that had
fallen upon a highway constructed under a federal grant. Id. at 714-15. The court
affirmed a district court judgment for the Government concluding that the decision
made by the Secretary of Commerce to approve the highway plans obviously had
been a policy judgment falling upon the "planning side of the planning-operational
distinction drawn in the Dalehite case, subsequently adopted and approved in Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co...... ." Id. at 723.
In Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1973), plaintiffs alleged
personal injury and property damage stemming from sonic booms caused by military
aircraft. Id. at 668. The court recognized that the discretionary function exception
barred recovery for the possible negligence of the individuals at the planning level
who had authorized the flights, but not for the possible negligence of those at the
operational level who actually had executed the flights. Id. at 670.
31. See note 3 supra.
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of judgnent.32 The Third Circuit, however, rejected the Government's
contention as overly broad, stating that since almost all activity includes
some judgmental component, the effect of the Government's interpretation
would be to immunize all but the most purely ministerial acts.38 The court
said that even Dalehite limited the class of decisions which could be con-
sidered discretionary to those which "involved, at minimum, some con-
sideration as to the feasibility or practicability of Government programs." 34
While the court acknowledged that DBS had made a judgmental deter-
mination of the degree to which each of the regulation's five tests indicated
neurovirulence in monkeys,8 5 it reasoned that the agency had not been
acting as a policymaker balancing policy considerations, but as a professional
making a scientific determination of neurovirulence. Hence, the agency's
decision did not come within the discretionary function exception. 6
The court established an alternative basis for its decision denying the
applicability ,of section 2680 (a).37 In the court's view, even if one assumed
arguendo that DBS' approval of vaccine lots for release had been a dis-
cretionary function, plaintiffs' action would not have been barred because
DBS had relied upon a factor called "biological variation" 8 in disregarding
the unsatisfactory test results obtained in determining the neurovirulence
of the vaccine.8 9 Since such reliance was not authorized by the regulation,40
the court concluded that DBS' activity, even if classified as discretionary,
was not immunized from judicial review because no discretion to disregard
the regulation had been conferred. 41 In support of its conclusion, the court
cited the Ninth Circuit's opinion in United Air Lines v. Wiener,42 which
32. 500 F.2d at 1063.
33. Id. at 1063-64.
34. Id. at 1064, citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 41 (1953).
35. The regulation specified five different comparative tests by which the neu-
rovirulence of the test lot of vaccine could be measured against the neurovirulence
of the reference strain of vaccine. These tests involved examining the effects of the
vaccines upon the brains and spinal columns of monkeys. For a general outline of
the procedure, see note 3 supra.
36. 500 F.2d at 1066.
37. Id. at 1067-69.
38. The court discussed this factor as follows:
The concept of "biological variation" is premised on the fact that a group of simi-
lar subjects will respond differently to a single stimulus. The variation in response
is due not to variations in the stimulus but rather to differences in the subjects.
Id. at 1067.
39. Id. In the neurovirulence testing, DBS had concluded that the unfavorable
test results were not due to a defect in the vaccine, but rather to unusual characteristics
in the monkeys inoculated with the test vaccine. Id. at 1068.
40. See id. at 1068-69.
41. Id.
42. 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). This case
arose out of the midair collision between a United Air Lines airliner and a United
States Air Force jet fighter. Air Force regulations required Air Force Command to
establish local flying areas in the least congested airspace available so that fighters
executing the type of maneuver in which the ill-fated fighter had been involved could
do so safely. Id. at 393-94. The Ninth Circuit had recognized that such a designa-
tion of permissible flying areas would have been an unreviewable discretionary deter-
mination, Id. at 394. The regulations, however, were never complied with and
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had held that the violation of a mandatory, regulatory command took an
otherwise discretionary function beyond the scope of the statutory ex-
ception.43
Judge Van Dusen submitted a vigorous dissent to the majority's
holding that no discretion had been involved in approving the vaccine ;44
and in light of the established case law upon the subject of the discretionary
function exception, 45 it would appear that his exception was well taken.
judge Van Dusen reasoned that DBS' procedures had involved the exercise
of discretion in two respects
First, in making the comparative analysis of the vaccine lot test results
and the reference strain test results, DBS had to determine, as a pre-
liminary matter, how much weight to accord to each of the five factors
enumerated in the regulation, based on the degree to which it believed
each factor reflected neurovirulence.40
Second, DBS had to make "the determination of exactly what the
neurovirulence level of the reference strain was at any given time." 47
He concluded, therefore, that these determinations involved the exercise
of policy and planning discretion as well as the exercise of professional
judgment because the making of these determinations had constituted the
selection of the method by which DBS undertook to determine whether or
not the vaccine was safe for release to the public.4
8
The cases cited in Dalehite to establish the "substantial historical
ancestry" of the concept of discretion 49 unanimously discussed both the
problem of judicial review interfering with the discretionary action of a
government official and the resulting disruption of the governing process.
Griffin appears to have been the type of situation which the Court ad-
dressed in those cases.50 As government activities reflect society's increas-
approximately 85 percent of the maneuvers had taken place over and within an air-
space designated for commercial air traffic. Id. at 393-94.
43. Id. at 393-94.
44. 500 F.2d at 1073-78 (Van Dusen, J., dissenting).
45. See notes 23-30 and accompanying text supra.
46. 500 F.2d at 1075 (citation omitted). In making this determination, DBS
had had to decide which of these tests was the most significant in terms of reflecting
the neurovirulence of the lot being tested, and, consequently, whether a negative
result from one or two of the less significant tests was grounds for failing to release
a test lot despite a positive result from the three or four more significant tests. Id.
47. Id. at 1076. This determination was quite complicated because the neuro-
virulence of the reference strain was constantly varying. Each retest of that strain
produced a different result, and therefore DBS had to determine what weight to
give the retest in setting the neurovirulence level of the reference strain. Id.
48. Id. In addition, Judge Van Dusen stated that he found it difficult to dis-
tinguish the activities of DBS from the activities which the Supreme Court had held
to be discretionary in Dalehite. But see id. at 1066 n.16A.
49. See note 24 supra.
50. It is submitted that if DBS had made its decision with a view toward possible
litigation, very little vaccine might have been released. DBS would be inclined, in
order to protect itself, to estimate the neurovirulence of the reference strain at a low
level and be extremely rigorous in demanding that the test lots met this standard in
all respects. This approach, instead of emphasizing the greatest good for the public -
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ing technological orientation, more government officials will become in-
volved in policy decisions of a professional, scientific nature.5 ' If each
such decision, although mandated by statute and fully within the official's
function, were made under the potential threat of civil suit, the resulting
atmosphere of fear and pressure could require officials to spend more time
anticipating and preparing for court battles than attempting to satisfactorily
perform their designated duties.5 2
Despite this possible disruptive effect upon the functioning of its
officials, the Government has chosen not to appeal Griffin and has paid
the modified judgment. This decision can be attributed to several factors.
First, since the majority had an alternative basis for its decision, a reversal
of the court's holding that the DBS official's decision was not discretionary
would not necessarily have meant reversal of the instant decision.53 Second,
Griffin was a difficult fact situation involving a relatively minor official. 54
Third, the Government may have anticipated that the Court would be
swayed in the plaintiffs' favor due to the extreme hardship they had
suffered. The combination of these factors might have led the Government
to conclude that it would be advantageous to select a more appropriate case
for appeal to the Supreme Court in order to successfully refute the Third
Circuit's reasoning about the inapplicability of section 2680(a).
Of course, a court faced with a victim who had suffered as greatly
as the plaintiff in the instant case might raise another issue: Does equity
demand that some relief be granted to the victims of errors committed by
government officials? Cases of extreme hardship, however, are probably
uncommon; and the disruption of the governing process which could result
from the removal of the protection which the discretionary function ex-
ception provides to officials in their planning capacity would be great.
Therefore, some mechanism which retains the general protection of the
exception yet remedies extreme wrongs worthy of redress should be
devised. One such system is presently in existence: private bills in Con-
gress. The plaintiffs in Dalehite, who suffered injury in a disaster, ulti-
the release of sufficient vaccine to adequately control the disease with minimum
risk - would emphasize the protection of DBS.
51. The Grifin majority opinion cited the Second Circuit's opinion in Hendry v.
United States in support of the following proposition:
The fact that judgments of government officials occur in areas requiring pro-
fessional expert evaluation does not necessarily remove those judgments from the
examination of courts by classifying them as discretionary functions under the Act.
500 F.2d at 1066, quoting Hendry v. United States, 418 F.2d 774, 783 (2d Cir. 1969).
In Hendry a ship's officer alleged that a psychiatrist's determination that he was
unfit for sea duty had been negligent, and the court conceded that "[tihe only dis-
cretion apparently contemplated is that inherent in the judgments of any medical
doctor in private practice." Id. at 783. The discretion exercised by DBS involved
more consideration of planning and the policy objective of the safe release of vaccine,
and Hendry, therefore, appears clearly distinguishable.
52. Reynolds, supra note 15, at 121.
53. See text accompanying notes 37-43 supra.
54. The precedential value of the case, therefore, may be relatively limited.
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mately obtained relief in this manner.- 5 The process of presenting private
bills before Congress has been burdensome and inequitable in the past,
56
however, and it could be expected that such a method would be largely
governed by political considerations. Therefore, another alternative, such
as an impartial committee to review the worthiness of claims, might
redress the hardships of a situation like Griffin without limiting the pro-
tection of section 2680 (a).
Until such time as the Third Circuit's logic, in deciding that scientific
determinations such as the one in Griffin, were not discretionary, is
tested in the Supreme Court, a decrease in the protection offered by the
discretionary function exception can be expected; and government officials
must be aware of their increased susceptibility to suit under the FTCA.
Robert Anthony
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS - IN A PRO-
CEEDING TO ENFORCE A FEDERAL GRAND JuRY SUBPOENA, THE Gov-
ERNMENT MUST PROVIDE COURT AND WITNESS WITH AN AFFIDAVIT
STATING THE RELEVANCE OF MATERIAL IT SEEKS.
In re Schofield (1973)
Appellant Jacqueline Schofield was held in civil contempt for failure
to show cause why she should not obey an order issued by the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania directing
her to comply with a grand jury subpoena.1 Ms. Schofield was subpoenaed
to testify before a federal investigative grand jury, but when she appeared
at the office of the United States Attorney at the designated time, she was
not asked to testify, but to provide handwriting exemplars and submit to
fingerprinting and photographing.2 She refused, arguing that a grand jury
witness had no need to comply with such requests unless the Government
stated the necessity and purpose for the requested information and per-
mitted the witness to examine any documents in its possession which the
witness allegedly had signed.8
55. Reynolds, supra note 15, at 96. The Texas City disaster of 1947 occurred
when fires and explosions erupted after the federal government had loaded ships with
fertilizer containing combustible ammonium nitrate. A House Committee investigated
the merits of private relief bills shortly after the Dalehite decision, and relief was
granted by Congress in 1955. Id.
56. See text accompanying notes 16 & 17 supra.
1. In re Schofield, 486 F.2d 85, 87 (3d Cir. 1973). A form subpoena was rou-
tinely issued by the office of the clerk of the court, and, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 17(a), was delivered to the office of the United States Attorney
who thereafter filled in the blanks. Id. at 87.
2. Id.
3. Id. at 88.
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The Third Circuit reversed the district court's civil contempt judg-
ment, 4 holding that before a witness can be found in contempt for refusing
to ,obey a grand jury subpoena, the Government must make a showing by
affidavit that each item sought by the subpoena is relevant to an investigation
properly being conducted by the grand jury and is not sought primarily
for another purpose. The court further held that absent extraordinary
circumstances the Government must, in an enforcement proceeding, disclose
the affidavit to the witness. In re Schofield, 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973).
Despite its great antiquity as an institution,", the grand jury can still
create judicial controversy.6 The Supreme Court of the United States
recently expressed its attitude towards the rights of grand jury witnesses
in a case decided after Schofield, United States v. Calandra,7 wherein the
Court reversed the lower courts' rulings that a grand jury witness could
invoke the fourth amendment's judicially-fashioned exclusionary rule,8
holding that the rule was not applicable to grand juries because to extend
4. Contempt proceedings were brought against the appellant pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(g) and Section 301(a) of the Organized Crime Con-
trol Act of 1970, 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970). Rule 17(g) provides in pertinent part:
CONTEMPT. Failure by any person without adequate excuse to obey a subpoena
served upon him may be deemed a contempt of the court from which the sub-
poena issued ....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g). While rule 17(g) speaks of contempt in general terms, it
does not specify whether a contemner is to be found in criminal or civil contempt.
A court imposes criminal contempt sanctions to punish action which it considers an
affront to its dignity. On the other hand, it imposes civil contempt sanctions to coerce
a contemner to do that which he or she has refused to do. See United States v.
United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303 (1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 442 (1911). Like rule 17(g), section 1826(a) permits the recal-
citrant witness to avoid the sanction of contempt by showing just cause for refusing
to comply with an order to testify or provide information to the grand jury. 28
U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970).
5. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186 (5th Cir. 1965). See In re Grand
Jury January, 1969, 315 F. Supp. 662, 671 (D. Md. 1970); Campbell, Eliminate The
Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIm. L. & C. 174 (1973).
6. See generally United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974) ; United States
v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973); United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Branz-
burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) ; Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. 41 (1972) ;
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Costello v. United States, 350 U.S.
359 (1956).
7. 414 U.S. 338 (1974), noted in 19 VILL. L. REv. 645 (1974). Calandra's office
was searched by federal agents with a search warrant for gambling paraphernalia.
In the course of the search, an agent who was aware of a pending federal investigation
of loansharking seized a record of loansharking activities. 414 U.S. at 340-41. Sub-
poenaed to appear before a grand jury, Calandra sought suppression and return of
the evidence pursuant to rule 41 (e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure upon
the grounds that (1) the affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient, and (2)
the search had exceeded the scope of the warrant. In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737
(N.D. Ohio 1971) ; United States v. Calandra, 465 F.2d 1218 (6th Cir. 1972).
8. The exclusionary rule requires that evidence seized as a result of illegal
searches and seizures not be admissible against the defendant. The Supreme Court
devised and applied this rule to federal courts in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S.
383 (1914). The Court, thereafter, held that the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment required that the states exclude from trial evidence seized in violation of
the fourth amendment in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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it to such proceedings would delay and disrupt them without substantially
furthering the rule's objectives. 9
Delay of grand jury proceedings -occasibiied by fourth 'aniendment
claims was also the Court's focus in United States v. Dionisio,"°'wh.ere a
federal grand jury witness refused, upon fourth amendment grounds, to
provide voice exemplars."' The Supreme Court therein held that com-
pelling the witness to furnish voice exemplars did not violate the amend-
ment, and therefore the circuit court had incorrectly required a preliminary'
showing of reasonableness.' 2 The Court stated that "neither the Constitu-
tion nor our prior cases justify any such interference with grand jury
proceedings."' 3  While the Dionisio Court acknowledged that the grand
jury does not always fulfill its traditional role of buffer between the prose-
cutor and the citizen,' 4 it reiterated its respect for the grand jury's tradi-
tional freedom to pursue its investigations "unhindered by external influ-
ence or supervision so long as it does not trench upon the legitimate rights
of any witness called before it."'u
Thus, in Calandra and Dionisio the Supreme Court seemed to express
hostility towards the granting of additional procedural rights to grand jury
witnesses. Specifically, it refused to allow grand jury witnesses to invoke the
9. 414 U.S. at 350-52. The rule's purpose is that of deterring unlawful police
conduct, not that of providing a remedy to the victim. Hence, the Court said that the
rule only applied when the deterrent purpose would best be served. Id. at 348. In thejudgment of the Court, the rule was best applied in proceedings where a criminal
sanction could result from the unlawfully obtained evidence. Id. at 348.
10. 410 U.S.1 (1973).
11. In re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971). The witness appealed from
the district court's finding of contempt in an unreported decision, and won a reversal
from the Seventh Circuit upon the ground that the fourth amendment required the
Government to make a preliminary showing of reasonableness. Id. at 280-81.
12. 410 U.S. at 9. This holding was based upon two grounds: First, the subpoena
was not a seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment. Second, since the
voice is constantly exposed to public scrutiny, ordering an exemplar was not a viola-
tion of a witness' reasonable expectation of privacy. Id. at 14. A companion case,
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973), reached a similar result as to hand-
writing exemplars.
13. 410 U.S. at 14. The Court did note that the fourth amendment does provide
protection against an unreasonable subpoena duces tecum. Id. at 11.
14. Id. at 17-18. The traditional role of the grand jury was to stand between the
prosecutor and the individual as an independent investigatory body with broad powers
to bring evidence before itself in order to decide whether or not the prosecutor's
charges were well founded. Campbell, supra note 3, at 176. Many commentators
argue that in a modern urban society, where the grand jurors have no personal knowl-
edge of the persons and acts under investigation, the grand jury is functionally reduced
to a tool in the hands of the prosecutor. See, e.g., id. at 177-78. Campbell noted:
The impact of the prosecutor's position in this scheme of things cannot be
overestimated. Its pervasiveness is high-lighted by the simple fact the grandjury proceedings are non-adversarial in nature. There is no requirement that
both sides be heard. Witnesses appearing before a grand jury are not entitled
to the presence of counsel. Questions propounded a witness are not subject to
the ordinary rules of evidence. The scope of the grand jury's inquiry, although
unlimited in theory, is subject to the skillful control and direction of the prosecutor.
Id. at 177.
15. 410 U.S. at 17-18. The Court wrote that it disfavored any holding that would
"saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings." Id. at 17. 54
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fourth amendment procedural safeguards available to defendants at trial,16
while strongly supporting the traditionally broad scope of the grand jury's
powers, and demonstrating a disinclination to restrict or impede its work.
The first issue facing the Schofield court was the Government's argu-
ment that Dionisio controlled the case at bar and precluded the court from
making any inquiry beyond the facts appearing upon the face of the grand
jury subpoena.17 The instant court characterized this contention as giving
"much too broad a compass to the holding in Dionisio."'8 That case, the
court reasoned, concerned the substantive question of whether the fourth
amendment required a showing of reasonableness in order to permit the
enforcement of a grand jury subpoena, while the instant case raised only
the question of what procedures a court should require as part of its super-
visory powers over subpoenas in an enforcement proceeding. 19
In describing the judiciary's supervisory powers over grand jury
proceedings,20 the court articulated three fundamental propositions. First,
federal grand juries are essentially law enforcement agencies; that is,
elements of the investigative arm of the executive branch. 21 Second, since
the court clerk issues the subpoenas in blank to anyone requesting them,
the court exercises no control over their initial use.22 Third, it is a fiction
to discuss grand jury subpoenas as if they were instruments of the grand
jury because they are, in fact, almost universally tools of the prosecutor's
office. 23 The grand jury, the court noted, is functionally a part of the
executive branch, and grand jury subpoenas are "exactly analogous" to
subpoenas issued by federal administrative agencies. 24 Therefore, Judge
Gibbons reasoned, since a court acts judicially and functions as more than
a rubber stamp when it enforces administrative subpoenas, it must make
16. 414 U.S. at 348-55; 410 U.S. at 9-15. For discussions of the fifth amend-
ment rights of grand jury witnesses, see Comment, The Fifth Amendment and Com-
pelled Testimony: Practical Problems in the Wake of Kastigar, 19 VILL. L. REv. 470(1974); Comment, The Grand Jury Witness' Privilege Against Self-Incrimination,
62 Nw. U.L. REV. 207 (1967).
17. 486 F.2d at 88-89.
18. Id. at 89.
19. Id. at 92. The Schofield Court noted:
Both [Mara and Dionisio] hold that the fourth amendment does not require
any preliminary showing for the issuance of a grand jury subpoena, either to
compel testimony, or to compel production of voice or handwriting exemplars.
Neither, however, involves any question as to the propriety of the grand jury's
investigation, the legitimacy of the purpose for issuing the subpoena, or any non-
constitutional objection to its enforcement. . . .The issues raised by this appeal
were not presented to or passed upon by the Supreme Court in Dionisio ....
Id. at 89.
20. A noncomplying witness can avoid a citation for contempt by demonstrating
that he has "good cause" for his noncompliance. See note 4 supra. The court's
determination of whether "good cause" exists is an exercise of its supervisory power
over the grand jury. 486 F.2d at 90-92.
senting) ; Campbell, supra note 5. See also note 14 supra.
21. 486 F.2d at 89-90.
22. Id. at 90.
23. Id. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting) ; Campbell, supra note 5. See also note 14 supra.
24. 486 F.2d at 90.
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a similarly full and complete judicial determination of whether an alleged
contemner has shown just cause for his or her noncompliance with the
grand jury subpoena. 25
In determining the scope of a hearing upon the question of just cause,
the Third Circuit rejected the Government's contention that a district court
has only a limited role in enforcing a subpoena.2 6 In reaching its conclusion
that a district court inquiry is appropriate, the court said that since the
Supreme Court held in Gelbard v. United States27 that section 310(a) of
the Organized Crime Control Act of 197128 allowed a noncomplying witness
to attack contempt charges by presenting, all defenses properly available
to him, 29 clearly something more than a summary proceeding was required. 30
Turning its attention to the necessary procedures, 3 1 the court recog-
nized that since a presumption of regularity attaches to a subpoena, the
burden of showing some irregularity is upon the witness.8 2 However, the
relevant information is usually in the hands of the governmental enforce-
ment agency, and is unavailable to the witness because of Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which provides for secrecy of matters oc-
curring before the grand jury.83 The court concluded that since secrecy
25. Id. at 90-91. It is submitted that insofar as the court sought to advance the
proposition that the grand jury is subject to judicial control and review, the analogy
between administrative and grand jury subpoenas may have been superfluous. The
court could have reached the same conclusion by emphasizing a point that it mentioned
only in passing: the subpoenas are issued by the court clerk in blank, and filled in
and served by the prosecutor at the direction of the grand jury. Id. at 90. Since an
enforcement proceeding is the only opportunity for the court to make an independent
determination of the subpoena's merits, it seems to be beyond question that the court
has both the right and the obligation through judicial review to control grand juries
and prevent abuse of the subpoena.
The drawing of an analogy between administrative and grand jury subpoenas
is valid because the Supreme Court has indicated that both types of subpoenas serve
the same function, that both are subject to the same limitations, and that the federal
courts act properly when they require proof of the relevance to an investigation of
the information sought by each. See Oklahoma Press Publ. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S.
186, 217 n.57 (1945).
26. 486 F.2d at 92.
27. 408 U.S. 41 (1972). Although Gelbard, like Schofield and Dionisio, involved
a prosecution under section 1826(a) of a noncomplying federal grand jury witness,
the case has little relevance to Schofield or Dionisio. Gelbard's defense was based
upon 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1968) which provides, inter alia, that evidence obtained by
federal agents from an illegal wiretap is inadmissible in federal grand jury proceedings.
The Gelbard Court characterized the issue as "[t]he narrow question . . . whether
under these circumstances the witnesses may invoke the prohibition of § 2515 as a
defense to contempt charges . . . . We think they may." 408 U.S. at 47.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970).
29. 408 U.S. at 41.
30. 486 F.2d at 92-93.
31. Id. at 92.
32. Id. See note 4 supra.
33. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e). See 486 F.2d at 93. See generally Comment, Secrecy
in Grand Jury Proceedings: A Proposal For a New Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 6(e), 38 FORDHAm L. REV. 307 (1969); Comment, Federal Grand Jury
Secrecy, 5 GONZAGA L. REV. 255 (1970).
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precluded any effective discovery by the witness, the party seeking enforce-
ment should be required to make a minimum showing ,of the existence of a
proper purpose as a prerequisite for judicial enforcement of the subpoena. 34
This showing, the court, stated, must indicate that the information sub-
poenaed is "at least relevant to'an investigation being conducted by the
grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction; and . . not primarily
sought for another purpose."3 5
The court noted that although an in camera presentation of an affidavit
might be required in extraordinary circumstances, in most cases, the
Government's affidavit should be disclosed to the witness a 6 The court
added that the determination of whether the witness could obtain discovery
beyond the Government's: affidavit requires a court to balance "the quite
limited scope of an inquiry into abuse of the subpoena process, and the
potential for delay, against any need for additional information which might
cast doubt upon the accuracy of the Goyernment's representations.
3
T
The Schofield dicta granting possible additional discovery to a witness
may operate to undermine the Supreme Court's policy against - as it
termed them in Dionisio - "minitrials. '38 'As applied to Schofield, the
minimum showing required .before enforcement proceedings can be initi-
ated would involve only the court and the Government; although the witness
would obviously be an interested party, he or she would have no active
role after having made the initial refusal that necessitates the enforcement
proceedings. However, it is submitted that once the Government has made
a sufficient showing of regularity and its affidavit has been given to the
witness, any further proceeding concerning the regularity of the subpoena
will inevitably be adversary in nature, because in a motion for additional
discovery the witness would make specific objections to the Government's
affidavit in an attempt to overcome the Government's prima facie showing
of the subpoena's regularity. Such a proceeding involving directly con-
flicting interests would generate exactly the sort of adversary "minitrial"
which Dionisio And Chief Judge Seitz, in his concurring opinion,3 9 con-
demned.
This potential problem, leads 'to the broader question of whether
Schofield is consistent with Dionisio. In light of Dionisio's narrow holding,
it seems clear that the instant court soundly stated that "[t] he issues raised
in this appeal were not presented to or passed upon by the Supreme Court
in Dionisio.'40 However, because the Schofield court never addressed the
34. 486 F.2d at 92-93.
35. Id. at 93.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 410 U.S. at 17. See notes 8-15 and accompanying text supra.
39. 486 F.2d at 94 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
40. Id. at 89.
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Dionisio dicta condemning preliminary showings and minitrials, it failed
to clarify the scope of its minimal showing requirement.
First, as Chief Judge Seitz pointed out in his concurring opinion, the
majority did not make it clear whether the minimal showing of proper
purpose can be factually litigated by the witness.41 If Schofield stands for
such a proposition, he wrote, it is clearly inconsistent with Dionisio's ad-
monition against minitrials. 42 Furthermore, if Schofield is read to require
only a minimal showing by the Government, it still may be argued that
even this requirement conflicts with the Dionisio dicta condemning pre-
liminary showings.43 Certainly Schofield requires that the Government
make a showing of certain facts prior to the enforcement of a subpoena,
and it is submitted that this is, at least technically, a preliminary showing
such as that condemned by the Dionisio Court.
There are at least three possible explanations for the Third Circuit's fail-
ure to address this apparent conflict with Dionisio. First, the Schofield court
may have declined to discuss that portion of Dionisio because it was clearly
dicta. However, the Third Circuit did not mention this as a reason; and
the Supreme Court's language is so obviously relevant to Schofield that
it probably merited discussion even if not strictly a part of the holding.
Second, the Schofield court may have viewed the Dionisio language as a
part of the Supreme Court's holding; i.e., the Court was condemning, not
all preliminary showings, but only preliminary showings of reasonable-
ness.44 Under this analysis, the dicta would appear to only restate the
holding. Such an interpretation is questionable, however, given the Court's
failure to limit its condemnation to preliminary showings of reasonableness
and its express statement that it disfavored preliminary showings and
minitrials because they would "assuredly impede [the grand jury's] in-
vestigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious
administration of the criminal laws." 45
A third reason for the court's apparent circumvention of the Dionisio
dicta may be an arguable distinction between preliminary showings that
would cause delay and those that would not. Though Schofield involved a
preliminary showing, its requirements should not result in any measurable
delay. A prosecutor who wants a subpoena enforced must go to court in
any event;46 Schofield only requires that the prosecutor file an affidavit
of minimal showing along with his snotion for enforcement. There is no
additional proceeding and thus no unnecessary delay. If the Dionisio
41. Id. at 94 (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
42. Id. (Seitz, C.J., concurring).
43. Id.
44. See notes 10-16 and accompanying text supra.
45. 410 U.S. at 17.
46. See 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1970). See also note 4 supra.
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Court's dissatisfaction with preliminary showings was based upon their
potential for delay - an interpretation suggested by the Court's discussion
of the "expeditious administration of the criminal laws" - then the affidavit
procedure outlined in Schofield seems defensible. 47
The Schofield court made no express attempt to reconcile the policy
articulated in Dionisio against preliminary showings and minitrials with
the permissible scope of the court's supervisory powers over the grand
jury. The court's failure to discuss this apparent policy conflict is evidence
that it may have thought that the issue was insolvable, or, at least, that there
was no way of harmonizing the Dionisio policy with the facts before it. 48
It is submitted that the Schofield holding will affect Third Circuit
contempt cases only when the abuse of the subpoena power is flagrant.
The power of the grand jury is broad and the minimal showing require-
ment of the instant case is indeed minimal. The prosecutor need show
only that the information is relevant to an investigation being conducted
by the grand jury and properly within its jurisdiction, and that the in-
formation requested is for a proper purpose.49 The prosecutor need not
show the necessity for the subpoena, or even its reasonableness ;5o and
with such broad parameters, a skillful prosecutor can probably obtain, in
a large majority of cases, any desired information or evidence without
committing any irregularities.
However, the Schofield procedure does protect a grand jury witness
against an obviously improper subpoena before it is enforced. Prior to
Schofield, Third Circuit grand jury witnesses who refused to comply with
a subpoena for what they believed to be a legally sufficient reason had no
assurance that the district court would consider the issue of whether the
subpoena was improper.51 Thus, they had the choice of either obeying
what they felt was an illegal subpoena, or refusing to comply and raising
47. It is submitted that since the relevance of questions asked a witness is usually
self-evident, the Schofield minimal showing procedure should perhaps be limited to
similar factual situations. A witness requested to submit nontestimonial evidence
such as handwriting, fingerprints, or photographs, has no way of determining that
the request is a proper part of an investigation within the power of the grand jury,
and since the information is nontestimonal, he has no basis for a claim of self-
incrimination. 410 U.S. at 22. The minimal showing requirement protects the witness
in such a situation. However, when testimonial evidence is involved, the witness has
an opportunity to claim self-incrimination, and generally it is readily determinable
whether or not the information is relevant to a proper purpose.
48. See, e.g., 414 U.S. at 349-50; 410 U.S. at 17 n.16, where the Supreme Court
discussed the problem of delay resulting from preliminary showings.
49. 486 F.2d at 93.
50. 410 U.S. at 17 n.16.
51. The instant case provides an example of this lack of judicial scrutiny. The
district court issued an order directing compliance with the grand jury subpoena based
only upon the Government's representations that the witness had been subpoenaed, had
refused to comply, and had no fourth or fifth amendment grounds for refusal. 486
F.2d at 87.
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the issue of its invalidity in an appeal from a contempt conviction. Now,
a Third Circuit grand jury witness can be certain that the district court
will pass upon the issue of the subpoena's legality at the outset of enforce-
ment proceedings.
Neil Albert
FEDERAL PROCEDURE - ATTORNEYS' FEES - ATTORNEYS PETI-
TIONING FOR FEES FROM A CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT FUND ARE
LIMITED TO THE FAIR VALUE OF THEIR SERVICES, As DETERMINED
AT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.
Lindy Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp. (1973)
In a complex antitrust class action,1 a settlement was concluded where-
by a $26 million fund was established for the class. Following the settle-
ment, attorneys for the represented plaintiffs petitioned the court for fees,
in addition to those received pursuant to private agreements, to be awarded
from the fund.2 Humble Oil and Friendswood Development, unrepresented
members of the class, objected to the award of these additional fees, arguing
that the attorneys would be adequately compensated by their private fee
arrangements, and that even if the attorneys could properly be compensated
from the fund, application must be made by the represented plaintiffs, and
not by their attorneys.3 Further, they contended that in the event that
fees should be awarded, the court must first hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine the value of the attorneys' services. The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denied the requested evi-
l. The nature and history of this litigation are discussed in opinons of the Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania which are listed in Philadelphia
Housing Auth. v. American Rad. & Stand. San. Corp., 323 F. Supp. 364, 365 n.1
(E.D. Pa. 1970). Later opinions of the district court, the Third Circuit, and the
Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litigation are listed in Lindy Bros. Bldrs., Inc. v.
American Rad. & Stand. San. Corp., 341 F. Supp. 1077, 1079 n.2 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
2. Successful attorneys in class actions are compensated by the so-called salvage
fund method. That is, the attorneys salvage a fund shared by the entire class;
expenses of litigation and attorneys' fees are paid from this fund. See generally
Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorneys Fees From Funds, 87 HARv.
L. REv. 1597 (1974). See also Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor
in Counsel Fee Awards, 69 HARV. L. REv. 658, 663-65 (1956); Comment, Attorneys'
Fees in Individual and Class Action Antitrust Litigation, 60 CALIF. L. Rav. 1656,
1672 (1972) ; Note, Allowance of Attorneys' Fees From a Fund in Court, 35 COLUM,
L. REv. 740 (1935).
3. 341 F. Supp. at 1082, 1087.
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dentiary hearing,4 concluding that attorneys' fees must be assessed against
the fund5 and that the attorneys themselves could petition directly to receive
the value of their services to the unrepresented class members. 6 Humble
Oil and Friendswood appealed and the Third Circuit reversed, holding that
the attorneys were indeed entitled to petition the court directly for fees
representing the value of their services to unrepresented class members.
The court further held that when a trial judge uses expertise to determine
value, if there are disputed facts, there must be an evidentiary hearing to
reasonably value, by appropriate standards, the attorneys' services. Lindy
Brothers Builders, Inc. v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp.,
487 F.2d 161 (3d Cir. 1973).
In the past, a court's general equitable powers provided authority for
the award of attorneys' fees when the litigation resulted in a fund benefiting
unnamed parties. The Supreme Court of the United States in Trustees v.
Greenough,7 enunciated the "equitable fund doctrine" - that is, when one
prosecutes a suit which results in a fund being created or salvaged, and
other unnamed parties participate in the fund, the active plaintiff is entitled
to reimbursement from that fund for expenses and counsel fees in proportion
to the benefit conferred upon the nonlitigating beneficiaries8 because deny-
ing the diligent plaintiff this reimbursement would be inequitableY Insofar
as a determination of the reasonable value of the expenses and fees was
concerned, the Court concluded that the trial court, because of its familiarity
with the facts, should have broad discretion. 10
4. Id. at 1083. Indeed, the district court remarked that in assessing the value
of an attorney's services a court is itself "an expert on the question and may make its
judgment as to the amount to be awarded from its own knowledge and experience
of reasonable fees and from the facts before it without the aid of the testimony of
witnesses as to value." Id. (citations omitted).
5. Id. at 1086. The district court reasoned that to allow the nonlitigating
claimants against the fund to recover their share without requiring payment of a
portion for attorneys' fees "would be to give a free ride to those who expended the
least effort." Id.
6. Id. at 1087. The district court found authority for this position in Central
R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885).
7. 105 U.S. 527 (1882).
8. Id. at 532-33. In Greenough, the plaintiff was a bondholder who instituted
a suit on behalf of himself and other bondholders to prevent the trustees of the fund
securing the bonds from committing waste. Id. at 528-29. The litigation resulted
in the fund's being "salvaged"; thus, all bondholders were benefited. Id. at 532.
9. Id. at 532. Indeed, the Court reasoned that to deny the active plaintiff attor-
neys' fees from the fund
would not only be unjust to him, but it would give to the other parties entitled
to participate in the benefits of the fund an unfair advantage. He has worked
for them as well as for himself; and if he can not be reimbursed out of the fund
itself, they ought to contribute their due proportion of the expenses which he has
fairly incurred. To make them a charge upon the fund is the most equitable way
of securing such contribution.
Id.
10. Id. at 537.
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In Central Railroad & Banking Co. v. Pettus," the Supreme Court
refined the Greenough principles by holding that while the specific fees
awarded were excessive, the lower court could properly award fees from
the fund in response to a petition by the attorneys without requiring a prior
application to the court by the plaintiff. 12
In ascertaining the amount of a reasonable fee, as distinguished from
passing upon the authority of a court to award the fee,13 the courts have
expressed divergent views in the past.14 As a source of guidance, the Code
of Professional Responsibility attempts to summarize broadly the factors
relevant to the assessment of a reasonable fee:
The determination of the reasonableness of a fee requires consideration
of all relevant circumstances . . . . The fees of a lawyer will vary ac-
cording to many factors, including the time required, his experience,
ability and reputation, the nature of the employment, the responsibility
involved and the results obtained.15
11. 113 U.S. 116 (1885). In this class action, the plaintiffs had had a private
agreement with the attorneys for payment for services rendered to them, and it was
understood that separate arrangements would be made for compensation for services
rendered to the nonlitigating members of the benefited class. Id. at 125.
12. Id. at 124-25. The Court, reasoning from Greenough, observed that at the
commencement of the litigation,
the unsecured bonds of the Montgomery and West Point Railroad Company
were without any value in the financial market. That litigation resulted in their
becoming worth all or nearly all, that they called for. The creditors who were
entitled to the benefit of the decree had only to await its execution in order to
receive the full amount of their claims; and that result was due to the skill and
vigilance of the [petitioning attorneys], so far as the result of litigation may, in
any case, be referred to the labors of counsel.
Id. at 126.
It has been suggested that attorneys may petition for an award of fees only
when their clients have not reimbursed them for services rendered to the other
claimants of the fund. Where the clients have agreed to pay for all the services of
benefit to the class, then only those clients can petition the court for reimbursement
for attorneys' fees. E.g., Wallace v. Fiske, 80 F.2d 897, 902, 909-11 (8th Cir. 1935).
13. Authority for the award of attorneys' fees may be conferred by statute as
well as by equity. Section 4 of the Clayton Act authorizes a court to. award reason-
able attorneys' fees to a successful plaintiff in addition to the damages recovered
against the defendant. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). Of course, when the plaintiffs repre-
sent a class, the attorneys' fees are awarded directly from the damages fund realized.
However, in Lindy Brothers, a settlement was reached prior to a trial and judgment
upon the merits, and section 4 was therefore inapplicable. Also, section 4 refers to
the payment of fees by an unsuccessful defendant, whereas in the instant case, fees
were sought from the nonlitigating claimants against the fund. Lindy Bros. Bldrs.,
Inc. v. American Rad. & Stand. San. Corp., 487 F.2d 161, 164 (3d Cir. 1973).
14. Indeed, one commentator has concluded that while reasonable fees are recover-
able by statute in antitrust actions, "[jfudging from the reported cases, there are
nearly as many notions of what is reasonable as there are judges." Clark, The Treble
Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MicH.
L. RFv. 363, 412 (1954).
15. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Consideration 2-18.
For more elaborate discussion of these elements, see Angoff v. Goldfine, 270 F.2d
185, 188-89 (1st Cir. 1959) (the courts are governed by the standard of reasonableness
with reference to the facts of each case) ; In re Osofsky, 50 F.2d 925, 927 (S.D.N.Y.
1931) (the controlling factors differ from case to case) ; 6 U. CHI. L. REv. 484 (1936).
1974-19751
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In antitrust litigation where the suit has actually gone to judgment,
the tendency has been to award reasonable fees upon the basis of a fixed
percentage of the damages awarded plaintiff.' In the same type of case,
other courts have computed a reasonable fee upon the basis of their respec-
tive consciences' 7 or the free market price - "the figure which a willing
successful client would pay a willing successful lawyer" ;18 upon the peculi-
arities of each case;19 or in antitrust class actions, upon the basis of the
benefits conferred upon the class members.20 However, regardless of which
standard a court may adopt in determining the reasonableness of the fee,
a claim for fees under the Greenough equitable fund doctrine is quasi-
contractual and thus is not subject to the same limitations as a claim for
attorneys' fees as tort damages under the antitrust laws. 2 1
With this as its historical scenario, the controversy in Lindy Brothers
allowed Chief Judge Seitz to discuss attorneys' fees and their calculation
in his opinion for the court. Applying the equitable fund doctrine announced
in Greendugh and Pettus, he easily disposed of appellants' contention that
the lower court lacked authority to award fees directly to the attorneys. 22
Therefore, under a quantum meruit analysis, the attorneys were entitled
to the reasonable value of their services which had benefited the non-
litigating claimants.
However, Chief Judge Seitz disapproved the standards used by the
district court to assess the reasonable value of the attorneys' services as
16. See Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1962) ;
Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 166 F. Supp. 865 (D.D.C. 1955),
rev'd & cross-appeal concerning attorneys' fees dismissed as moot, 243 F.2d 418
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). However, "[tihe rigid requirements
of the 'fixed' percentage theory, with its insensitivity to individual differences in anti-
trust suits, make it inappropriate in the great majority of cases." Comment, supra
note 2, at 1662. Or, as one court remarked:
A percentage fee gives undue weight to the size of the recovery. In cases with
small recoveries, it completely ignores professional skill and the complexity of
the work involved, and could result in an insufficient award for services ren-
dered . . . . Conversely, where the recovery is extraordinarily high, it could
result in an excessive award.
Trans World Airlines v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (citations
omitted), modified and af'd, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd upon other grounds,
409 U.S. 363 (1973).
17. See Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Brookside Theatre Corp., 194
F.2d 846 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952); Milwaukee Towne Corp. v.
Loews, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952).
18. Cape Cod Food Prods., Inc. v. National Cranberry Ass'n, 119 F. Supp. 242,
244 (D. Mass. 1954). Accord, Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co.,
297 F. Supp. 924, 926 (D. Me. 1969).
19. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc. v. Eastern R.R. Pres. Conf., 166 F. Supp. 163,
168 (E.D. Pa. 1958), aff'd, 273 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1959), rev'd upon other grounds,
365 U.S. 127 (1961).
20. Illinois v. Harper & Rowe Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 224 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
21. Cherner v. Transitron Elec. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55, 58 (D. Mass. 1963).
See also Comment, supra note 2, at 1672-73. For a list of attorneys' fee awards in
both private and class action antitrust litigation, see Appendix, id. at 1679-82.
22. 487 F.2d at 164-65.
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inadequate and improper 23 and delineated the proper three-step process:
First, a court should ascertain the reasonable value of the attorneys' services
to the whole class by multiplying the approximate number of hours spent
in the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate,2 4 since "[t]his figure provides
the only reasonably objective basis for valuing an attorney's services. '25
Second, this preliminary figure should be adjusted to account for the con-
tingent nature of success in the action and the quality of the attorneys'
work as measured by the amount of the recovery, the trial judge's observa-
tions of the attorney, and the novelty and complexity of the issues involved.2 0
The final step requires calculating the relative benefit to individual claimants,
based upon the percentage of the fund each received.2 7 The court said
that some of these factors were inapplicable to the instant case because the
contingency was slight and success in the litigation had been almost as-
sured.2 8 The court further determined that the quality of the attorneys'
work should be considered by the trial judge at an evidentiary hearing.239
Moreover, the Lindy Brothers court concluded that, while a judge
ordinarily may pass upon the amount of the fee award without hearing
expert testimony,30 "where the facts to be weighed in light of the judge's
expertise are disputed, an evidentiary hearing is required."3' Therefore,
the trial judge's denial of the requested hearing was an abuse of discretion
requiring reversal.3 2
23. Id. at 166-67. In determining the reasonableness of the fee, the district
court had enlisted the following factors: 1) the percentage of a claimant's recovery
awarded in other cases; 2) the amount of the recovery from which fees were being
awarded; 3) the amount the attorneys had received from their clients under private
agreements; and 4) the time spent by the attorneys upon the case. 341 F. Supp.
at 1089-90. The appellate court observed that the trial court failed to explain its
application of these criteria. 487 F.2d at 166-67.
24. 487 F.2d at 167. The court reasoned that "[tihe value of an attorney's time
generally is reflected in his normal billing rate. A logical beginning ...is to fix a
reasonable hourly rate for his time - taking account of the attorney's legal reputa-
tion and status (partner, associate)." Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 168.
27. Id. at 169. Thus, for example, if it were determined that the reasonable
value of the attorney's services to the whole class was $100,000, and an unrepresented
claimant was entitled to 10 percent of the settlement fund, he would be assessed
$10,000 of his recovery for attorneys' fees.
28. Id. at 168. In concurrent criminal antitrust action against these defendants,
a jury had found those who had pleaded not guilty liable for violating antitrust laws.
A criminal conviction after a plea of not guilty is prima facie evidence of violation
of the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 16 (1970).
29. 487 F.2d at 168-69.
30. The court noted:
A judge is presumed knowledgeable as to the fees charged by attorneys in general
and as to the quality of legal work presented to him by particular attorneys;
these presumptions obviate the need for expert testimony such as might establish
the value of services rendered by doctors or engineers.
487 F.2d at 169.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 170. In insisting upon an evidentiary hearing, the appellate court relied
upon the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in Perkins v. Standard Oil Co., 399
U.S. 222 (1969), involving the award of attorneys' fees under section 4 of the Clayton
1974-1975]
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In passing upon the attorneys' petition for fees, the Third Circuit recog-
nized that the litigating claimants also had a cause of action to recover
their expenses, including attorneys' fees, from the fund insofar as these
expenses had been incurred for the benefit of the whole class.33 However,
because there was no petition by the plaintiffs in Lindy Brothers, the court
did not pass upon an issue which, it is submitted, might have substantial
practical impact upon the calculation of an award of attorneys' fees - to
wit, whether the petitioning attorney must remit a portion of his recovery
from the nonlitigating claimants' share of the fund for his own client who
has paid or will pay a private fee. If the payment to the attorney were, in
fact, a reimbursement to the client-plaintiff, the court would probably arrive
at a figure different from the one it would were the payment to the attorney
merely additional compensation. Indeed, in the equitable fund situation,
some courts have awarded fees to petitioning attorneys but have directed
that the award be credited against the contractual amount the client-plaintiff
owes the attorney. This result has been reached even in the absence of a
petition by the client-plaintiff for expenses.8 4 However, since the attorney's
request for fees is for the attorney's benefit, and not for the client's, the
court could have disposed of the issue of client reimbursement simply by
declaring the fee award to be only for the attorneys' benefit, 5 thereby
leaving intact both the attorneys' private fee arrangements with the client-
plaintiffs and their compensation for services benefiting nonlitigating class
members.8 6
Moreover, when a court attempts to employ the instant court's an-
alytical framework and proceeds to figure the reasonable value of the
Act: "The amount of the award for such services should, as a general rule, be fixed...
by the District Court after hearing evidence as to the extent and nature of the
services rendered." Id. at 223.
33. 487 F.2d at 165.
34. In re Continental Vending Mach. Corp., 318 F. Supp. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
The Continental Court followed Gibbs v. Blackwelder, 346 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1965),
in requiring the attorneys' fees from the fund to be treated as reimbursement to the
client-plaintiffs who had had private fee contracts with the attorneys. 318 F. Supp.
at 433. Such courts apparently view the request for fees by the attorney as having
been made for the benefit of the plaintiffs, whereas in fact such a request is for the
attorney's own enrichment.
35. See, e.g., Wallace v. Fiske, 80 F.2d 897 (8th Cir. 1935), in which no reim-
bursement of the client-plaintiff was contemplated or directed.
36. The concept is simple: the attorney, though retained by only some members,
has given benefit to all members in the form of the recovered fund. His client has
previously contracted, freely and knowingly, to pay for such services; has paid, and
has benefited by his participation in the recovered fund. The unrepresented class
members, in participating in the fund, are availing themselves of services for which
the attorney intended to charge. If the court assesses these members a portion of
their recovery for attorneys' fees, these persons are only paying their due. And this
amount belongs solely to the lawyer. Likewise, the represented client, by contract
and without regard to the other class members, has paid his due. To declare reason-
able fees recovered by the petitioning attorney from nonlitigating members as reim-
bursement to the client-plaintiff would be to make a new contract for the attorney
and .his client and deny the attorney the reasonable value of his services to non-
litigating class members.
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attorneys' services to the whole class, dividing that figure among the class
members according to their percentage of the recovery, it will, in part, be
estimating the reasonable value of the attorney's services to the client-
plaintiff. This estimate will likely differ from the actual contract figure.
Thus, the contract price will become implicitly unreasonable because it
will be either lower or higher than the court's calculation. One might ask
whether the contract then becomes, in effect, unenforceable, and whether
this potential voidability of the contract means that in class action suits
involving recovery of a fund, the represented members and their attorneys
should even bother to contract.3 7
When Chief Judge Seitz' opinion established the method for calculating
a reasonable fee by ordering the trial court to multiply the time spent by
a "reasonable hourly rate" for each attorney,3 8 it appeared unmindful of
the potential unfairness to the attorney created by this method of fee
determination. As the District Court for thee Southern District of New
York has observed while assessing attorneys' fees in another complex anti-
trust suit, "attributing substantial weight to an hourly rate is unfair in a
case such as this where success and complexity of issues are such important
factors."'39 Moreover, the court in Lindy Brothers observed that it is diffi-
cult to calculate actual compensable attorney time.40 Thus, it determined
that the initial reasonable fee must be modified to compensate for the risk
created by the contingent nature of success and for the quality of the at-
torney's work. Unfortunately, such qualifying factors often appear, as one
commentator has observed, to be little more than "a means for retrospective
justification of the figure that is finally chosen."'41
While the Third Circuit attempted to devise a flexible formula for
figuring reasonable attorneys' fees, it failed to consider the difficult policy
problem created by fee awards in antitrust litigation and general class
37. Indeed, the Lindy Brothers formula has been applied recently to a contract
between the lawyer and his own client which had left the amount of the fee unde-
termined. In re Professional Hockey Antitrust Litigation, 371 F. Supp. 742 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
38. 487 F.2d at 167.
39. TWA v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478, 484 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified and
aff'd, 449 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd upon other grounds, 409 U.S. 363 (1973). The
TWA Court concluded:
[T]he major factors bearing on the fixing of attorneys' fees in antitrust cases
are the complexity of the problems presented, the skill of counsel, and the
measure of success achieved by counsel. The other factors are subsidiary to these
and may be helpful in evaluating them, but neither separately nor collectively do
these other factors constitute the basis for fixing the fee.
312 F. Supp. at 484.
See also Webster Motor Car Co. v. Packard Motor Car Co., 166 F. Supp.
865, 865-66 (D.D.C. 1955), rev'd & cross-appeal concerning attorneys' fees dismissed
as moot, 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957).
40. 487 F.2d at 167.
41. Comment, supra note 2, at 1661. The author further explained that "although
it is a simple matter to state that plaintiff's counsel is a highly respected antitrust
attorney, or that counsel displayed unusual skill and competence, it is quite difficult
to translate this into a formula for computing attorneys' fees." Id. 66
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actions - while it is the "policy of the law in class actions, including anti-
trust *actions . . . to provide a motive to private counsel, '4 2 attorneys often
take advantage of class actions to obtain inordinately lucrative fees. 43
Indeed, one commentator has observed that frequently the true beneficiaries
of antitrust class actions are the attorneys, not the plaintiff class members,
because very large fees reduce the class recovery. 44 This incentive-greed
aspect of fee awards was not analyzed by the instant court, except when it
quoted Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp.,45 to the effect that the
bar and bench might be brought into disrepute unless fee awards were
checked by time spent and skill displayed. 46 The court should have cau-
tioned that commercial considerations must not be primary in the "ancient
and honorable profession," that "ours is a learned profession not a mere
money getting trade .... ,,47
Because the trial court abused its discretion, the instant court did not
determine whether the district' court's award of some $2 million in fees was
excessive. Implicitly, the court announced that such a large award might
not be excessive if that figure were arrived at when the court's guidelines
were used just as the district oourt in TWA v. Hughes48 found a $7 million
fee award to be proper under its guidelines.49 While it may be tempting to
suggest that the court should have pronounced a multimillion-dollar fee
as per se excessive, upon reflection, such enormous fees can be justified -
not merely rationalized - when protracted and complex litigation has
resulted in a benefit to the public from the enforcement of the antitrust
laws, as well as an award of damages to a class. It is not simply that the
end alone justifies the fee, but that the successful negotiation of the long,
42. Illinois v. Harper & Rowe Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 223 (N.D. Ill.
1972), quoting Manual for Complex & Multi-district Litigation, proposed § 1.47.
43. Illinois v. Harper & Rowe Publishers, Inc., 55 F.R.D. 221, 224 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
See also Dawson, Lawyers and Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88
HARV. L. REV. 849 (1975), in which the author is highly critical of the overpayments
made to lawyers when they receive fees reflecting the size of the fund recovered (in
effect, a sort of profit-sharing), rather than the fair value of the attorney's services.
44. Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust
Suits - The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 10
(1971). The author noted that when the fund is created by an out-of-court settle-
ment so that the attorneys' fees are deducted from the fund itself, excessive fees have
a direct impact upon the value of the claimant's recovery. In addition, even where
the case reaches judgment and the defendant pays the fee, the defendant's litigation
expenses are costs of doing business which are passed on to the consumer. In either
case, large attorneys' fees tend to defeat the purposes of the antitrust laws. Id.
45. 221 F. Supp. 55 (D. Mass. 1963).
46. 487 F.2d at 168, quoting Cherner v. Transitron Elect. Corp., 221 F. Supp. 55,
61 (D. Mass. 1963).
47. ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 2 n.54, quoting ABA CoMm.
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS, No. 250 (1943). It has been observed that high
counsel fees excite the indignation of those whose money is used, and "the justified
outrage of the public if a court should use other people's money to make an award
equal to what ordinarily is earned only over many years as compensation for services
that took a short time to perform." Cherner v. Transitron Elect. Corp., 221 F. Supp.
55, 62 (D. Mass. 1963).
48. 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
49. Id. at 485.
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tortuous means to that end warrants the amount. Thus, the court could not
properly have passed upon the excessiveness of fees until those means
were analyzed at the evidentiary hearing.50
The Third Circuit, while adhering to the equitable fund doctrine, has
attempted to formulate guidelines for the award of fees in antitrust class
action settlements. The formula is flexible but imprecise; and does not
coincide with the views of other courts.51 While, upon the facts of this
case, the court could not properly have passed upon the amount of the
district court's fee award, it failed to consider in any detailed way the
relationship of the fee award to the lawyer's professional responsibility
and public image. Nevertheless, the court's formula does provide a method
for calculating the amount a lawyer can successfully seek as a fee in such
litigation, while its requirement of the evidentiary hearing distinguishes
the opinion by providing both a bridle for the trial judge's discretion and
a potentially effective check upon excessive fees.
Frederick Haase
FEDERAL JURISDICTION - THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT GIVES
PLAINTIFF A RIGHT TO SUE FOR A BREACH OF THE DUTY TO MAIN-
TAIN ACCURATE EMPLOYMENT RECORDS.
Quinones v. United States (1974)
Plaintiff, a former employee of the federal government, brought suit
under the Federal Tort Claims Act1 (FTCA) alleging damages stemming
from the government's negligence in maintaining inaccurate employment
records and in disseminating inaccurate information to plaintiff's prospective
employers. After having been employed by the Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs for approximately 8 years, compiling a superior record,
and receiving several promotions and commendations, he resigned when
personal reasons made it impossible for him to accept a transfer.2 In his
50. 487 F.2d at 166 n.10.
51. See notes 16-20 and accompanying text supra. Lindy Brothers has been
favorably noted by Professor Dawson because the court's novel formula prevents
attorneys from being profit-sharers in the funds they recover. Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients in Public Interest Litigation, 88 HARv. L. REv. 849, 925 (1975).
Lindy Brothers has been cited with approval in City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp.,
495 F.2d 448 (2d Cir. 1974) and Liebman v. J.W. Peterson Coal & Oil Co., 1974
Trade Cas. 96,974 (N.D. Ill. 1974). See also Merola v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 493
F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1974), in which the Lindy Brothers formula was extended to an
antitrust class action settlement in which the fee awards were based, not on the
Greenough equitable fund theory, but on the defendant's express promise to pay the
plaintiffs' attorneys.
1. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346 etseq. (1970).
2. Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269, 1272 (3d Cir. 1974).
1974-1975]
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complaint, plaintiff alleged that, although he left the Government as an
employee in good standing, all of his applications for subsequent employ-
ment had been rejected because of the adverse comments contained in his
work record regarding his performance.3 Plaintiff's suit, brought under-
FTCA section 1346(b), 4 argued that the Government, having assumed the
status of plaintiff's employer, and being required to maintain employment
records, 5 implicitly undertook the obligations of maintaining them ac-
curately and accurately representing plaintiff's employment history to
prospective employers.6 The district court dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction,7 reasoning that since- the interest sought to be protected
- freedom from injury to one's reputation - was identical to that pro-
tected by rights of action for defamatory torts, the action was barred by
the section 2680(h) libel-slander exception to liability under the FTCA.s
The Third Circuit, while agreeing that dissemination of inaccurate
employment history was libel and therefore within the section 2680(h)
exception, reversed, holding that the duty to maintain accurate employment
records existed and could be enforced through an action based upon a
general negligence theory. Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269
(3d Cir. 1974).
By recognizing that the duty to maintain accurate employment records
was actionable under section 1346(b), the instant court further reduced
the area of sovereign immunity from actions in tort, an area which has
3. Id. at 1272. Plaintiff alleged that the immediate causes of his rejection for
employment were the adverse comments made by his government superiors. Id. He
further alleged that the Bureau had failed to keep accurate records of his employment
history. Id. However, plaintiff did not allege that the comments made by his superiors
to prospective employers reflected any of the inaccuracies in plaintiff's employment
record.
4. The FTCA provides in pertinent part:
[T]he district courts . . . shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on
claims against the United States, for money damages, accruing on and after
January 1, 1945, for injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death caused
by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances
where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in
accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
. 5. Pursuant to Executive Order No. 10,561, 3 C.F.R. § 205 (1954), the Civil
Service Commission issued regulations which required each executive agency to estab-
lish an official personnel folder for each employee. 5 C.F.R. §§ 293.201 ct seq., 294.101
et seq. (1974).
6. 492 F.2d at 1272.
7. Id. at 1271.
8. Id. Section 2680(h) provides:
The provisions of this chapter and section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply
to-
(h) Any claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest,
malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or
interference with contract rights.
28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1970) (emphasis added).
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been gradually diminished since the FTCA was passed in 1947 in an effort
to streamline the method of redress for tort claims pressed against the
United States.9 However, Congress did embody in section 2680 a number
of specific exceptions to this waiver of sovereign immunity.10 Although the
Supreme Court of the United States encouraged the courts to "give hos-
pitable scope"" to the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity, lower courts,
when faced with a choice between expanded governmental liability and
sovereign immunity, have generally been cautious, tending to view the
action as barred by one -of the section 2680(h) exceptions. 12
The Supreme Court indicated the limits of its "hospitality" by its
resolution of the issues in United States v. Neustadt,"3 where it held that
the misrepresentation exception of section 2680(h) barred plaintiff's re-
covery for damages caused by his reliance upon an FHA inspection which
he claimed was negligently made.14 More important than the case's actual
holding, however, was the Court's approach to statutory interpretation.
While the circuit court viewed plaintiff Neustadt's reliance upon the mis-
representation as merely the means by which the damage caused by the
government's negligence inspection was occasioned, 15 the Supreme Court
made it clear that it considered the complaint's allegations of negligence as
9. Prior to the passage of the FTCA, tort claimants had to seek redress through
the introduction of a private bill in Congress - a method which had become increas-
ingly cumbersome by 1947. Gelhorn & Schenck, Tort Actions Against the Federal
Government, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 722, 724 (1947). For a further analysis of the impact
of the FTCA, see 2 L. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS §§ 260.01-06
(Supp. 1974).
10. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2680(a)-(n) (1970). In addition to providing immunity for
libel, slander, and other torts listed in section 2680(h) the FTCA also bars recovery
for other wrongs, including claims arising from the exercise of or failure to exercise
a discretionary function, claims resulting from the imposition of a quarantine, and
claims connected with the activities of certain governmental departments. Id.
11. Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. (;82, 704 (1949).
12. E.g., United States v. Shiveley, 345 F.2d 294, 297 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 883 (1965) (claim for bodily injuries barred by the section 2680(h) assault and
battery exception despite government negligence in issuing gun to the actor) ; Moos
v. United States, 225 F.2d 705, 706 (8th Cir. 1955) (suit for damages for unauthorized
surgery precluded by battery exception to section 2680(h) despite clear showing of
government negligence) ; Davidson v. Kane, 337 F. Supp. 922, 924 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(claim dismissed as within false imprisonment exception of section 2680(h) despite
allegation of Government negligence in hiring and training those who falsely imprisoned
plaintiff).
13. 366 U.S. 696 (1961), rev'g 281 F.2d 596 (4th Cir. 1960).
14. 366 U.S. at 711.
15. United States v. Neustadt, 281 F.2d 596, 602 (4th Cir. 1960). The circuit
court reasoned:
[W]e do not think that the government is necessarily absolved from liability in
every case of wrongful conduct on its part which incidentally embraces misrepre-
sentation. . . . Quite clearly the gist of the offense in this case was the careless
making of an excessive appraisal so that the home seeker, whom the Commissioner
was obligated to protect, was deceived and suffered substantial loss. This was
the gravamen of the offense to which the report of the Commissioner was merely
incidental.
281 F.2d at 602 (emphasis added).
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mere attempts circumventing the bar created by section 2680(h).16 The
difference in the two courts' modes of analysis is found in the tendency of
the circuit court to construe the exceptions of section 2680(h) as narrowly
as possible, guided as much by public policy considerations as by the
FTCA's literal prescriptions. 17 The Supreme Court nonetheless evidenced
a reluctance to erode the protection of sovereign immunity and refused to
go beyond the literal wording of the statute. The scope of the FTCA, the
Court pointed out, depends "solely upon what Congress meant by the
language it used in § 2680(h)."u8
The mode of analysis employed in Neustadt militated against any
expansion of the government waiver of immunity. If the facts of a particular
case were such that the cause of action could be characterized as being
within the exceptions of section 2680(h), courts looked no further for other
possible theories of liability not barred by that section. 19 This approach
made the Third Circuit's holding in Gibson v. United States2 0 significant,
because the court construed the FTCA in favor of government liability
rather than sovereign immunity.
Gibson, a federal employee, sought damages under the FTCA for
injuries sustained when he was attacked by a Job Corps trainee. It was
alleged that such attacks had .occurred in the past, but that the government
had taken no precautions to prevent them. 21 The district court dismissed,
finding that the case was within the assault and battery exception of section
2680(h).2 2 The Third Circuit reversed, reasoning that "under the cir-
cumstances" the possibility of such attacks was part of the risk which the
16. 366 U.S. at 703. The Court observed:
[T]he argument has been made by plaintiffs, and consistently rejected by the
courts, until this case, that the bar of § 2680(h) does not apply when the gist of
the claim lies in negligence underlying the inaccurate representation. . . . But
this argument . . . is nothing more than an attempt to circumvent § 2680(h) by
denying that it applies to negligent misrepresentation.
Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
17. The circuit court observed: "The real question is whether it was the intent
of Congress to absolve the government from liability in every case in which mis-
representation plays merely a part." 281 F.2d at 601.
The circuit court went on to conclude:
It is abhorrent to common sense to hold that the government can relieve itself
from liability for neglect of duty owed to an individual merely by telling him
falsely that the duty has been faithfully performed; and it cannot be supposed
that Congress had any such idea in mind when it included "misrepresentation"
among the exceptions to the statute.
Id. at 602.
18. 366 U.S. at 706.
19. See note 12 supra. The position of the federal courts strictly construing the
government's waiver of immunity is not unusual. As one commentator noted: "[s]o
strongly entrenched in the judicial mind is the principle of immunity in tort that
legislative consent to suit, though granted in the broadest language, has been deemed
to exclude liability for tort." Borchard, Government Liability in Tort, 34 YALE L. J.
1,9 (1924).
20. 457 F.2d 1391 (3d Cir. 1972).
21. Id. at 1393.
22. Id. at 1392.
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government failed to guard against,28 and as such, the attack was not
"such an intervening act as will sever the necessary causal rebation between
the negligence and the appellant's injuries."24 The Gibson court's approach
was noteworthy because, although the attack clearly amounted to an assault
and battery which was within the scope of the section 2680(h) exceptions,
the court did not simply end its inquiry; rather it went further and asked
whether the gist of the action was assault and battery or negligence. 25 The
court reasoned:
[I]t is clearly unsound to afford immunity to a negligent defendant
because the intervening force, the very anticipation of which made his
conduct negligent, has brought about the expected harm.
2 6
The court concluded that "the attack was not an intervening act and the
tort did not arise out of the assault and battery. It had its roots in the
Government's negligence."'27 Thus, the Gibson court, in determining the
scope of liability under the FTCA, looked beyond the definitional limits of
the section 2680(h) exceptions to the circumstances giving rise to the
harm, and by its emphasis upon negligence as the gravamen of the action,
effectively widened the Government's waiver of immunity, at least in those
cases where negligence caused bodily harm.
Considered in conjunction with Gibson and the earlier Neustadt de-
cision, Quinones takes on increased importance, as, without seeming to
depart radically from the Neustadt rationale, it chips away at the exceptions
to governmental liability.
After having preliminarily decided that plaintiff's action would not be
barred by Pennsylvania law,28 the Quinones court proceeded to the central
issue: whether plaintiff had stated a cause of action under the FTCA.
29
As had the Gibson tribunal, the Quinones court focused upon the "type of
governmental activity which might cause harm rather than the type of
harm caused" 30 as the criterion for determining whether the action fell
within the section 2680(h) exceptions. The court observed that Executive
Order Number 10,561 required each executive agency to establish and
maintain a personnel file for each employee. 81 Furthermore, the court ob-
23. Id. at 1395 (emphasis supplied by the court).
24. Id. (emphasis supplied by the court).
25. Id. It is interesting to note that the Fifth Circuit recognized but found it
unnecessary to resolve the problem of distinguishing between unanticipated intentional
torts and the intentional acts of a third party which bring about a foreseeable harm,
when it dismissed for lack of jurisdiction in United States v. Shiveley, 345 F.2d 294,
297 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 883 (1965). In contrast, the Gibson court
squarely met this issue. 457 F.2d at 1395.
26. 457 F.2d at 1395, citing Harper & Kime, The Duty to Control the Conduct of
Another, 43 YALE L.J. 886, 898 (1934).
27. 457 F.2d at 1395.
28. 492 F.2d at 1273-79. The FTCA specifically imposes liability upon the Gov-
ernment "in accordance with the law of the place where the act or admission occurred."
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970).
29. 492 F.2d at 1279.
30. Id. at 1280.
31. Id. at 1277. See note 5 supra.
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served, the Civil Service Commission's Federal Personnel Manual itself
directed that "the utmost care be taken and that all necessary precautions
be taken to safeguard the folder and its contents."3 2 Based upon their
examination of these materials, the court concluded:
Since the regulations contemplate the dissemination of information to
prospective employers and impose certain safeguards, a risk of injury
to an employee's reputation is contemplated. Thus, it follows that
there arises a corresponding duty to use reasonable care in maintaining
the accuracy of the records.33
Therefore, since the dissemination of the information was foreseeable, it
was not a supervening event which would relieve the Government of liability
for its negligence in maintaining inaccurate records.3 4 Just as the assault
and battery exception of section 2680(h) did not relieve the Government
of responsibility for its negligence in guarding against such attacks in
Gibson, the libel exception was found not to protect it from liability for
maintaining inaccurate records whose dissemination was clearly contem-
plated.3 5 Indeed, the Quinones court appeared to be expanding the Gibson
rationale to those cases where the harm complained of was economic rather
than physical. The court reaffirmed the protection due to such economic
interest when it noted that "[a]Ithough negligence law is generally asso-
ciated with bodily or physical injuries, there is no conceptual impediment to
the recovery for non-traumatic injury." 3 Thus, in recognizing a duty in the
Government to maintain accurate employment records, the court said it
did nothing more than "continue 'in the tradition of spinning out applica-
tions of accepted precedents . ' ,, 1 - specifically, Gibson.
Although the court appeared to favor the reasoning adopted in Gibson,
it could not ignore the mode of analysis used in Neustadt.38 Therefore, the
court sought to limit Neustadt to its facts and to distinguish it from
Quinones, reasoning:
As the tort of misrepresentation differs conceptually from the
tort of deceit, the tort of negligently maintaining the personnel records
of an employee differs from the defamatory torts of libel and slander.
32. 492 F.2d at 1277, quoting Federal Personnel Manual 293-7, -8 (court's em-
phasis omitted).
33. 492 F.2d at 1277. The court, however, added a caveat to its finding of a duty
to maintain accurate information when it noted:
By finding that the United States does owe plaintiff a duty of reasonable care
in the maintenance of his personnel folder, we do not indicate the precise bounds
of the government's duty, nor intimate that the duty is breached merely by per-
mitting inaccurate information to be filed or by failing to file pertinent information.
Questions of breach of duty and causation . . . will be considered by the district
court on remand.
Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1281.
36. Id. at 1278 & n.25.
37. Id. at 1278, quoting Keeton, Judicial Law Reform - A Perspective in the
Performance of Appellate Courts, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 1254, 1254-55 (1966).
38. See notes 14-18 and accompanying text supra.
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But here the resemblance between this case and . . . Neustadt . . .
comes to an end. Here only "libel, slander" are specifically excluded;
generic negligent claims are not. In Neustadt ... there was a specific
statutory exclusion of "misrepresentation"; here there is no express
exclusion of the remedy pursued.3 9
The distinction, however, is superficial because it assumes the very
question in contention. Essentially, the problem was not whether the pro-
hibition of section 2680(h) extends specifically to the tort of negligently
maintaining employment records but whether such an action is in fact dis-
tinguishable from an action in libel, the label of negligence notwithstanding.
For although the court recognized a duty upon the part of the Government
to maintain accurate records, there can be no demonstration of damage
from a breach of that duty, and thus no action maintained for negligence, 40
without proof of dissemination of the information in those records. As in
Quinones, such dissemination is usually intentional, and therefore techni-
cally libel.41 Thus, the Quinones court was confronted by a problem similar
39. 492 F.2d at 1280.
40. F. HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 129 (1933). "Even though
the defendant was negligent toward the plaintiff, he is not liable because he has com-
mitted no legal wrong if his negligence legally caused no harm ....... Id. at 283.
See also W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 30 (4th ed. 1971).
41. 492 F.2d at 1275. In Pennsylvania, libel has been defined as "a maliciously
written or printed publication which tends to blacken a person's reputation or to expose
him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to injure him in his business or Pro-
fession." Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 441, 273 A.2d 899, 904 (1971).
See also Cosgrove Studio & Camera Shop, Inc. v. Pane, 408 Pa. 314, 317-18, 182 A.2d
751, 753 (1962) ; Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609, 612, 107 A.2d 860, 862 (1954).
Therefore, the court began its analysis with two inquiries: whether the Penn-
sylvania law of libel and slander would preempt plaintiff's claim in negligence;
and, if not, whether plaintiff's allegations would constitute a cause of action in negli-
gence under Pennsylvania law. 492 F.2d at 1273. Since there was no Pennsylvania
case dealing with the precise question involved in Quinones, the court attempted to
rule as they reasoned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would have ruled. Id. at
1273, citing Gerr v. Emrick, 283 F.2d 293, 294 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S.
817 (1961). In response to the first question, the Quinones court reasoned that al-
though the interest asserted by the plaintiff and the interest protected by the rights
of action for the torts of libel and slander were the same - the interest in reputation -
the theory upon which the intentional torts of libel and slander proceeded was far
different from the theory of negligence upon which plaintiff's claim was based. 492
F.2d at 1273-76. The court further observed that plaintiff was not restricted to the
choice of one remedy. Id. at 1275, citing Rogers v. United States, 397 F.2d 12, 15
(4th Cir. 1968). The court therefore concluded thai the Pennsylvania courts would
not view the defamatory torts as preemptive of an action in negligence based upon a
failure to maintain accurate employment records. 492 F.2d at 1276.
Having decided that the Pennsylvania law of libel and slander would not bar
plaintiff's action, the court then turned to the question of whether plaintiff's complaint
stated a cause of action in negligence. After reviewing the principles governing the
standard of care in general, and analyzing the federal regulations mandating the main-
tenance of employment records, the court concluded "that the state courts would
recognize a duty of the defendant personal to the plaintiff to use due care in keeping
and maintaining employment records." Id. at 1276-77, 1278. The requirement of legal
malice is satisfied by "a wrongful act done intentionally, without just cause or excuse."
Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., supra at 451. Thus, it is not necessary that the act
be done with any manifestation of ill will but merely that the publication be intentional. 74
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to that faced by the lower court in Neustadt :42 is the action primarily one
for negligence and is the showing of intentional dissemination merely
incidental; or is it a libel action, the breach of the duty to maintain accurate
records being "negligence in the air" ?4 3 Unlike the Supreme Court in
Neustadt, the Quinones court found the action to be based upon negligence,
reasoning:
The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint, as recognized by the district
court, was the "BNDD's alleged failure to maintain adequate employ-
ment records . . ." [sic] It is not the publication of the incorrect
employment history and record that serves as the foundation of plain-
tiff's complaint; it is the method in which the defendant maintained
the record of his employment that is being criticized. 44
Certainly, however, the facts of the Quinones case do not necessarily
suggest an action in negligence rather than one in libel. 45 Other courts,
when faced with antecedent negligence of a most compelling sort, have found
that section 2680(h) nonetheless barred a claim against the Government. 6
One example is Duenges v. United States,47 in which the district court
dismissed, for failure to state a cause of action, a complaint alleging gov-
ernment negligence for failing to keep plaintiff's military records properly. 48
Upon the basis of the inaccurate information contained in his file, plaintiff
was jailed as a deserter and consequently suffered humiliation, mental dis-
tress, and lost wages.49 The Duenges court concluded that plaintiff could
show no damage from the Government's failure to maintain accurate
service records; rather, the alleged injuries occurred as a result of the
plaintiff's unjust imprisonment.50 Hence, the Duenges court viewed the gist
of that action as false imprisonment barred under section 2680(h). 51 Just as
42. See note 17 supra.
43. F. POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 472 (10th ed. 1916). The fact that the
actor is guilty of negligence toward the plaintiff is irrelevant - mere "negligence in
the air" - unless it can be shown that the actor's negligence caused or materially
contributed to the plaintiff's injuries. Id., citing Wakelin v. L. & S.W.R. Co., 56
Law J.Q.B. 229 (1868).
44. 492 F.2d at 1276.
45. Although plaintiff alleged that his rejection for subsequent employment was
caused by his superior's adverse comments, and the information filed in the employment
file was inaccurate (see 492 F.2d at 1272), plaintiff did not allege that his superior
utilized the employment records as a basis for the adverse comments. In the absence
of a showing that the inaccuracies in the file actually caused the inaccuracies in his
superior's statements, plaintiff's action would be for libel rather than negligence.
See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
46. See note 12 supra. It should also be noted that the Quinones court not only
viewed the action as sounding in negligence, but recognized that the Government, as
any other employer, was under a duty to maintain accurate employment records. 492
F.2d at 1277. This contrasts with earlier decisions where even a well established duty
could not circumvent the section 2680(h) exceptions. See note 12 supra.
47. 114 F. Supp. 751 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
48. Id. at 752.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Duenges' injury could be traced to his imprisonment rather than the Gov-
ernment's negligence in maintaining inaccurate records, so too could
Quinones' damage be deemed a result of the dissemination rather than the
compilation of inaccurate records. Thus, the Quinones court's finding of
jurisdiction, in contrast to those in the Duenges and Neustadt cases, cannot
be accounted for by factual differences. The Quinones decision was the
result of a shift in emphasis from the exceptions to governmental liability
embodied in section 2680(h), to a more inclusive view of governmental
responsibility based upon section 1346(b). The key to the Quinones
court's reasoning lies in its use of the Supreme Court's sweeping language
in United States v. Muniz :52
"[T] he Government's liability is no longer restricted to circumstances
in which government bodies have traditionally been responsible for
misconduct of their employees. The FTCA extends to novel and
unprecedented forms of liability as well."'53
The Third Circuit adopted the Muniz conclusion as its own " '[W] e should
not, at the same time that state courts are striving to mitigate the hard-
ships caused by sovereign immunity, narrow the remedies provided by
Congress.' 54 Such language reveals the instant court's opinion that, in
order to effectuate the purpose of the FTCA, courts must favor the finding
of jurisdiction and interpret the immunity provision of section 2680(h)
narrowly.
However, it must be noted that the Quinones court, while limiting the
section 2680(h) exceptions, did not abrogate them. This is clearly indi-
cated by the court's firm rejection of any government duty to disseminate
accurate information. 55 In rejecting this duty, the court could perhaps be
accused of drawing "distinctions so finespun and capricious as to be almost
incapable of being held in the mind for adequate formulation," 56 because
the duty to maintain accurate information seems inextricably intertwined
with the duty to disseminate accurate information. In reality, however,
the latter duty is much broader. Dissemination of inaccurate information
does not necessarily imply that there has been negligence in compiling that
information. Thus, no recognized duty would be breached when a govern-
ment official, although having access to accurate employment records,
disseminated inaccurate information. The dissemination of information,
rather than simply being an incidental showing in a wider negligence action,
would itself be the core of the action making it a libel action 57 The
Quinones court, therefore, in rejecting the duty to disseminate accurate
information, emphasized that it is only in those cases where the showing
52. 374 U.S. 150 (1963).
53. Id. at 159. See 492 F.2d at 1279.
54. 492 F.2d at 1280, quoting United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 165 (1963).
55. 492 F.2d at 1281.
56. Id. at 1279, quoting Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68(1955).
57. See note 41 supra. 76
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of disseminatiort is incidental to a larger negligence action that the action
will lie under section 1346(b).
It is difficult to judge the impact of Quinones because while evidencing
some change in judicial interpretation of the FTCA, the case may well be
limited to its particular facts. Standing alone, the decision indicates little
more than that the exceptions of section 2680(h) will not relieve the
Government of its duty to maintain accurate employment records. How-
ever, when considered in conjunction with Gibson, the Quinones decision
may evidence a tendency, at least in the Third Circuit, to hold that when-
ever there has been a convincing showing of the Government's antecedent
negligence, the court will view the action as within the parameters of
section 1346(b), rather than barred by the section 2680(h) exceptions.
Such an analysis would seem to comport with the broad policy underlying
the FTCA which recognizes government responsibility to a plaintiff "under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant ...... 5,1 Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that in apply-
ing the section 2680(h) exceptions narrowly to provide the Government
immunity only from the purely intentional torts of its employees, the Third
Circuit was facilitating the original congressional intent in formulating
such exceptions.59 Therefore, rather than being judicial legislation in
derogation of the purpose behind the FTCA, the Quinones-Gibson ap-
proach might actually be an effectuation of the congressional intent. At
this point, however, whether the Quinones decision is viewed as providing
a new approach to the interpretation of FTCA or is limited to its facts, is
mere speculation; future courts must determine its actual ramifications.
Regina M. David
58. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1970). The Supreme Court recognized this policy
when it said:
The broad and just purpose which [section 1346] was designed to effect was to
compensate victims of negligence in the conduct of governmental activities in cir-
cumstances like unto those in which a private person would be liable and not to
leave just treatment to the caprice and legislative burden of individual private laws.
Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68-69 (1955).
59. S. REP. No. 1400, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1946), "[S]ection [2680] specifies
types of claims which would not be covered by the title. They include .. .deliberate
torts such as assault and battery; and others." Id. (emphasis added).
It would seem therefore that in formulating such exceptions, Congress in-
tended to exempt the Government from liability only for those torts which were
purposely perpetrated, not those activities where the risk created by the Government's
negligence materialized through subsequent employee activity.
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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - RULE 11 AND SECTION 2255 - EVIDEN-
TIARY HEARING REQUIRED TO DETERMINE VOLUNTARINESS OF GUILTY
PLEA WHEN PETITIONER ALLEGES AN OUT-OF-COURT AGREEMENT
WITH PROSECUTOR WHICH DIFFERS FROM THE SENTENCE PRO-
NOUNCED BY THE COURT.
United States v. Valenciano (1974)
Defendant was indicted in the United States District Courts for the
Districts of Florida and New Jersey for narcotics offenses.' He consented
to a transfer of the Florida indictment to the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey 2 and pleaded guilty, during proceedings
conducted pursuant to rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure,3
to one count in the New Jersey indictment and to the Florida indictment.4
Defendant received consecutive sentences of 5 years upon the Florida in-
dictment and 2 years upon the New Jersey indictment,5 and a statutorily
required special parole term of 3 years.6 After sentence was imposed,
defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea7 and requested a hearing
1. United States v. Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585, 586 (3d Cir. 1974). The statute
for violation of which defendant was convicted provides in pertinent part:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally-
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manu-
facture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance ....
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1970).
2. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provide as herein relevant:
A defendant arrested or held in a district other than that in which the indictment
or information is pending against him may state in writing that he wishes to
plead guilty or nolo contendere, to waive trial in the district in which the indict-
ment is pending, and to consent to disposition of the case in the district in which
he was arrested or is held, subject to the approval of the United States attorney
for each district ....
FED. R. CRIM. P. 20 (a).
3. Rule 11 provides in part:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of the court, nolo
contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept
such a plea or a plea of nolo contendere without first addressing the defendant
personally and determining that the plea is made voluntarily with understanding
of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea .... The court shall
not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is factual
basis for the plea.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
4. 495 F.2d at 586.
5. Id.
6. Id. Section 841(b) (1) (A) provides in pertinent part:
Any sentence imposing a term of imprisonment under this paragraph shall, in the
absence of ... a prior conviction, impose a special parole term of at least 3 years
in addition to such term of imprisonment ....
21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1970).
7. Rule 32(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only
before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but to correct
manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of convic-
tion and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(d).
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pursuant to section 2255,8 contending that the record of the rule 11 plea
hearing failed to disclose that prior to sentencing his attorney had in-
formed him of an agreement with the prosecutor providing for concurrent
sentences, 9 and this agreement had induced his plea.'0  He also claimed
that his attorney had not mentioned the special parole term when the
plea agreement was revealed," and that he was aware of neither the con-
secutive sentences nor the special parole term until he arrived at the
United States Penitentiary. 12
At the rule 11 plea hearing, conducted through a Spanish-speaking
interpreter, 13 Valenciano's counsel reported that he had reached an agree-
ment, encompassing one New Jersey count and the Florida transfer,'1 4
with the United States Attorney, which he had communicated to Valen-
ciano. His attorney further stated that Valenciano wished to make a
voluntary profession of guilt in open court, although counsel stated that
he had made no promises to defendant regarding the sentence but rather
that Valenciano had been informed and understood that he could receive
a maximum sentence. 15 The court, through Valenciano's interpreter,
questioned him directly as to his guilt and his understanding of the con-
sequences of his guilty plea, cautioning him that he was giving up certain
constitutional rights by pleading guilty.'6 Valenciano responded that no
one had threatened him or promised him anything as an inducement for
8. 495 F.2d at 586. Section 2255 provides in pertinent part:
A prisoner . . . claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the
sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United
States . . . or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which
imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
A motion for such relief may be made at any time.
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that
the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall ... grant a prompt hearing ....
28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). For a discussion of post-conviction remedies, see Hunter,
Post Conviction Remedies, 50 F.R.D. 153 (1971).
9. Appellant alleged an agreement between his attorney, the United States Attor-
ney for the District of New Jersey, and the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of Florida about a rule 20 transfer of his case. Brief for Appellant at 3.
See note 2 supra. The alleged agreement was that petitioner would receive a 5-year
sentence upon the New Jersey indictment and 2 years upon the Florida indictment, to
run concurrently. Brief for Appellant at 3. 495 F.2d at 586.
10. Brief for Appellant at 4.
11. Id.
12. Id. Valenciano also claimed the court responded to his letters of protest by
saying nothing could be done. Id.
13. 495 F.2d at 586.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 587.
16. Id. The record of the rule 11 plea proceedings contained the following
exchange:Q. Now, do you know that by pleading guilty to Count 2 you are subjecting
yourself to penalties of $25,000 fine and fifteen years in prison?
A. Yes, your Honor.
Record of rule 11 Plea Proceedings at 7. This is the maximum sentence for a person
without a prior conviction specified by section 841, 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (A) (1970).
The judge made no mention of the special parole term which was also mandated by
this section. See note 6 supra. For a discussion of the significance of this omission,
see notes 58-62 and accompanying text infra. 79
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his guilty plea, and that there was no understanding or sentence agree-
ment with any judge, lawyer, or prosecutor. 17
The district court denied both the defendant's request to withdraw
his guilty plea and his request for an evidentiary hearing because it con-
sidered Valenciano's petition to be based solely upon an allegation of
inaccurate assurances of counsel, 18 and therefore barred by the Third
Circuit's holding in Masciola v. United States19 that "[i]naccurate assur-
ances by counsel, or erroneous expectations of defendant, as to sentencing
are not in and of themselves grounds for reversal of a conviction or for
permission to withdraw a guilty plea."'20
The Third Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the request
for an evidentiary hearing and remanded for such a hearing holding that
Masciola was limited to its particular facts and did not affect the vitality
of Moorhead v. United States,21 which had held that because any guilty
plea induced by out-of-court misrepresentations regarding a plea bargain
with the prosecution did not meet constitutional standards of voluntari-
ness, a defendant was entitled to a section 2255 hearing to determine the
veracity of his allegations that his plea was so induced, regardless of the
ostensible regularity of the rule 11 plea proceedings. United States v.
Valenciano, 495 F.2d 585 (3d Cir. 1974).
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court in Santobello v. New
York, 22 specifically approved plea bargaining discussions attempting to
reach an agreement whereby the defendant would plead guilty in exchange
for certain charge or sentence concessions.23 The Court noted that this
practice was an "essential component of the administration of justice, '24
and that "[p]roperly administered, it is to be encouraged. ' 25 However,
the Santobello Court also cautioned that plea agreements must be made
fairly, and if induced by promises, they must be made known.26 The basic
requirement for the acceptance of a guilty plea is that the defendant enter
17. 495 F.2d at 587.
18. Id. at 586.
19. 469 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972).
20. Id. at 1058.
21. 456 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1972).
22. 404 U.S. 257 (1972). In Santobello, the state had failed to keep a commit-
ment concerning a sentence recommendation when another prosecutor replaced the
one who had negotiated the plea. Id. at 259. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence
and remanded, to the state court to decide whether the circumstances of the case
required only that there be specific performance of the agreement upon the plea or
whether the petitioner should be allowed to withdraw his plea. Id. at 262-63.
23. See generally Introduction, ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (Approved Draft, 1968) and Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Com-
promises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
24. 404 U.S. at 260.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 261-62. While there is no absolute right to have a guilty plea accepted,
the Third Circuit has held that once a plea bargain is disclosed, if the judge should
determine that justice would not be served by accepting the bargain, the defendant
should be permitted to withdraw his plea. United States ex rel. Culbreath v. Rundle,
466 F.2d 730, 735 (3d Cir. 1972).
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into it knowingly and voluntarily. 27 The Supreme Court in Brady v.
United States28 adopted a standard for the voluntariness of guilty pleas
which required that the defendant be "aware of the direct consequences,
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court,
prosecutor, or his own counsel" and that his plea must not be "induced by
threats . . . misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable
promises)," or improper promises.2 9
Following Brady, the question remained whether a guilty plea is in-
voluntary when the defendant pleads guilty solely because of inaccurate
assurances by his own counsel without any mention of promises by the
prosecutor. In this situation, the principle enunciated by the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Wellnitz v. Page3 0 - that an erroneous prediction of sentence alone
does not render a guilty plea involuntary - requires a denial of the
petition to withdraw a plea. Similarly, bad advice,31 assurances of leni-
ency,3 2 or promises of concurrent sentences, 3 3 given only by defendant's
counsel, do not render a plea involuntary. While it may be argued that
a defendant who relied upon his own attorney's statements did not make
a voluntary plea because he was not fully aware of "the actual value of
any commitment made to him by ... his own counsel," 34 it is submitted
that the Wellnitz principle reflects judicial recognition of the fact that
most defendants will place greater reliance upon a promise made by the
prosecution than upon a promise made by their own counsel. To allow
the defendant's attorney's prediction to be the basis for plea withdrawal
would elevate the attorney's word over the court's power to impose sen-
tence. This refusal to allow plea withdrawal may also be a practical safe-
guard against attacks upon an attorney's competence 5 or, conversely,
against attorney-client complicity in alleging promises by counsel in order
to obtain withdrawal of a plea resulting in an unfavorable sentence. In
Paradiso v. United States,3 6 and Masciola v. United States,37 the Third Cir-
27. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). In Brady, the Court noted
that a guilty plea constitutes a waiver of a defendant's right to a trial. As such, it is
a waiver of a constitutional right that must be a voluntary, knowing, intelligent act,
done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances. Id.
28. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
29. Id. at 755, quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir.
1957), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
30. 420 F.2d 935, 937 (10th Cir. 1970).
31. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
32. Swanson v. United States, 304 F.2d 865 (8th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 894 (1962).
33. Criser v. United States, 319 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1963).
34. 397 U.S. at 755, quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th
Cir. 1957), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958).
35. Criser v. United States, 319 F.2d 849, 850 (10th Cir. 1963).
36. 482 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1973), noted in 19 VILL. L. REV. 335 (1973). In
Paradiso, the court denied defendants permission to withdraw their pleas when they
alleged that their attorney had told them that there was a good probability of receiving
concurrent sentences and the record established compliance with rule 11 in accepting
guilty pleas. 482 F.2d at 412-13.
37. 469 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1972). In Masciola, the court held that there was no
"mnnife-f ini,tice" in not nermitthinp withdrnwnl of a nlea nq nrnvided in Federnl
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cuit applied the Wellnitz principle to prohibit the withdrawal of guilty
pleas.
A quite different situation is presented when the petitioner alleges
that his plea of guilty was induced by promises made by the prosecution.
In Machibroda v. United States,38 the Supreme Court held that the peti-
tioner should have been granted a hearing upon this issue because if his
allegation had proved to be true, he would have been entitled to relief.3 9
The Third Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Moorhead v. United
States,40 wherein it held that Brady was applicable to the situation where
petitioner's sole allegation was that his plea was involuntary because it
had been induced by his attorney's representations that there was a "propo-
sition" with the prosecutor for, at least, a light sentence. 41 The Valenciano42
court considered Moorhead controlling authority as that case had held
that pleas so induced could not be voluntary under federal standards.4 3
It is submitted that the Third Circuit's continuing application of the
voluntariness standard is in keeping with the spirit of Brady and Machi-
broda, because, in addition to insuring that innocent defendants are not
induced to plead guilty by false promises of leniency, this line of cases
guards against unscrupulous tactics by prosecutors. The Third Circuit's
decisions in Moorhead and Valenciano place the judge in direct control
of plea bargaining in order to guarantee basic fairness for the defendant.
After deciding that Valenciano was entitled to a hearing, the court
considered the problem of how to avoid the necessity of holding section
2255 hearings in the future. The court implied that in the instant case
the sentencing judge had complied with the mandates of rule 11, 4 4 but
noted that compliance did not absolutely foreclose the possibility of later
hearings. 45  The court suggested that in order to obviate the necessity
Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(d), when only erroneous advice from counsel was
alleged. Id. at 1059. Compare Castro v. United States, 396 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1968),
wherein the court ordered a hearing when the defendant's counsel swore in an affidavit
that he had incorrectly predicted sentence, id. at 347, and the record of the plea
proceedings did not establish that the defendant understood the consequences of his
plea. Id. at 349.
38. 368 U.S. 487 (1962).
39. Id. at 493. In Machibroda, the petitioner also alleged that he had been cau-
tiond by the prosecutor not to tell his own attorney about the conversation, thus
rendering his counsel's assistance ineffective. Id. at 489. For a discussion of Machi-
broda, see Note, supra 23, at 872.
40. 456 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1972).
41. Id. at 995. Accord, Motley v. United States, 230 F.2d 110, 112 (5th Cir.
1956) (hearing granted despite United States Attorney's denial of allegation by
affidavit). See also Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963) (unless motion and
files conclusively show petitioner entitled to no relief, hearing is necessary).
42. 495 F.2d at 586.
43. 456 F.2d at 995.
44. 495 F.2d at 586. The assertion that such an implication was intended is based
upon the court's reliance upon Moorhead, a case where the requirements of rule 11
had been met. Id.
45. Id. at 588. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), the Supreme
Court held that a defendant was entitled to plead anew if a district court accepted his
guilty plea without fully adhering to the rule 11 procedure. Id. at 463-64.
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of holding section 2255 hearings, records of future rule 11 proceedings
should disclose that (1) the defendant stated that no promise, representa-
tion, agreement, or understanding other than those disclosed in open
court had been made before his plea was entered, (2) that he had not
been required to respond untruthfully in court, and (3) that he under-
stood that he could not contend later that any other agreement had been
made.40 The court, quoting from Paradiso, also suggested that the de-
fendant be informed that plea bargaining is specifically approved by the
court and that he might negotiate a plea "without the slightest fear of
incurring disapproval of the court. '47
It is submitted that Judge Rosenn was correct in his concurring
opinion that the suggestions made by the court will "not significantly aid
the courts in avoiding attacks on pleas of guilty allegedly improperly
induced,1 48 because the court did not provide an adequate solution for the
problem of alleged promises made by the prosecutor. Most significantly,
the court did not suggest that either the defendant's counsel or the prose-
cutor be questioned by the court about the existence and terms of any
possible plea bargain. This failure conflicts with Judge Rosenn's sugges-
tion in Paradiso that all of the parties involved should be questioned as
to the existence of any plea agreement.49 Such questioning of the attor-
neys has also been recommended by numerous American Bar Association
proposals50 and by recent decisions in other circuits.5 '
It is submitted that such direct questioning of the attorneys should
be implemented in all rule 11 proceedings. A defendant may be hesitant
to admit in open court to having made any out-of-court agreement although
he may be instructed by the court that plea bargaining is an approved
practice. The procedure suggested by the Valenciano Court 2 adds little
to the actual procedure followed by the judge who passed sentence on
the petitioner.53 The only significant addition was the suggested second
46. 495 F.2d at 587-88.
47. Id. at 588, quoting Paradiso v. United States, 482 F.2d 409, 413 (3d Cir. 1973).
48. 495 F.2d at 589 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
49. The Paradiso Court suggested:
Inquiry should also be made of counsel for the parties as to any plea negotiations.
Should inquiry reveal the presence of plea negotiations, counsel for the parties
should be required to state plainly the terms of record and the defendant should
state of record whether he understands them and concurs.
482 F.2d at 413.
50. ABA STANDARDS, PLEAS OF GUILTY § 1.5 (Approved Draft, 1968) states:
By inquiry of the prosecuting attorney and defense counsel, the court should
determine whether the tendered plea is the result of prior plea discussions and a
plea agreement, and, if it is what agreement has been reached.
Id. See also ABA STANDARDS, SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES §§
5.3(d) (iii), (f) (iv) (Approved Draft, 1968).
51. Hilliard v. Beto, 465 F.2d 829, 832-33 n.11 (5th Cir. 1972), vacated and
remanded for factual hearing, 494 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1974); Walters v. Harris, 460
F.2d 988, 993 (4th Cir. 1972).
52. See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
53. See notes 16 & 17 and accompanying text supra. It appears from the record
that the sentencing judge asked the first suggested question. 495 F.2d at 587.
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question relating to any possible agreement requiring the defendant to
respond untruthfully in court.5 4 It is difficult to understand how asking
the defendant if he was instructed to deny any plea bargaining could be
determinative. The court conceded that the petitioner in the instant case
faced a "herculean" burden at an evidentiary hearing because of his nega-
tive responses to questions concerning plea bargaining, but also recognized
that an inherent part of any plea agreement might have been that the
defendant would agree to respond in such a manner.5 5 If, as the court
noted, a defendant can be told to lie in response to the first question, he
can also be instructed to answer negatively to the second. Even if not so
instructed, few defendants would admit to having been untruthful in court.5 6
Moreover, it is submitted that taking a moment to place statements
of both attorneys about any plea bargain into the record would do much
to obviate the necessity for any post-sentencing hearings. These state-
ments might well be the major evidence sought in such hearings, and it
would seem prudent to take them while memories are fresh. Avoidance of
these hearings with their consequential administrative burdens, the danger
of prisoner escape if the defendant is allowed to appear,5 7 and a possibly
antagonistic attorney-client confrontation is highly desirable. Unfortu-
nately, the instant court seems to have failed to provide an effective
means to accomplish this objective.
In addition to the issue of the aborted plea agreement, there existed
another ground upon which this case could have been decided. In his
concurring opinion, Judge Rosenn stated that the case should have been
remanded to the district court with instructions to vacate the judgment
and to allow the petitioner to plead anew to the indictments.58 In reach-
ing this conclusion, Judge Rosenn relied upon Roberts v. United States5 9
wherein the Third Circuit had held that under rule 11, a special parole
term is a consequence of a guilty plea which must be explained to the
54. See note 46 and accompanying text supra. Suggested question number three
would not be binding, as the court admitted that the "disclaimers may not obviate
the necessity of subsequent ... hearings in all cases . . . ." 495 F.2d at 588.
55. 495 F.2d at 587. The court quoted Moorhead:
"In the posture of the case before us there are several possibilities. Moorhead
may be lying about what his attorneys told him. His attorneys may have told
him what he alleges, and they may have been lying. His attorneys may have told
him what he alleges and may in fact have had some arrangement with the prosecut-
ing authorities .... [N]one of . .. [these] possibilities are conclusively negated
by the files and records of the case. They depend upon matters outside the record."
Id., quoting Moorhead v. United States, 456 F.2d 992, 995 (3d Cir. 1972).
56. Of course, this latter problem can be mitigated by the court's asking the
second question before the first. However, a defendant might still be unwilling to be
truthful if he thought he might thereby antagonize the attorney who instructed him
to lie, especially if that attorney is the prosecutor.
57. A prisoner's presence is not required at the hearing. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
58. 495 F.2d at 588 (Rosenn, J., concurring).
59. 491 F.2d 1236 (3d Cir. 1974). Roberts, a heroin distributor had been indicted
and sentenced under the same statute as Valenciano. Id. at 1237. See notes 1 & 6 supra.
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defendant before his plea may be accepted. 60 The sentencing judge had
failed to warn Valenciano of the special parole term required by his plea, 61
and the Government did not contend that he had been warned of this
possibility at any other time.6 2 Therefore, Roberts appears to be con-
trolling, and the majority need never have reached the plea bargain issue
because under Roberts, Valenciano's guilty plea should have been set
aside without an evidentiary hearing to determine its voluntariness. 63
The Valenciano court was upon safe ground in reaffirming the dis-
tinction between an erroneous prediction of sentence by the defendant's
own counsel which cannot form the basis for the withdrawal of a guilty
plea, and an allegation of a misrepresentation made by the prosecution
which, if true, would render the defendant's plea involuntary under
federal standards. However, its additional suggestions for avoiding the
evidentiary hearings required by section 2255, it is submitted, may not
produce the ends which the court desired. The court should have stressed
the need to question defendant's counsel and the prosecution directly
concerning any possible plea bargain. However, the mere fact that the
court required an evidentiary hearing in this case may make district
courts more careful in future rule 11 proceedings to ensure that the record
discloses that the defendant's plea was made with full and accurate aware-
ness of its consequences.
Patricia Mattern
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - INSANITY DEFENSE - JURY INSTRUCTION
ALLOWING JURY TO DETERMINE WHETHER DEFENDANT'S EVIDENCE
WAS SUFFICIENT TO RAISE ISSUE OF MENTAL CAPACITY CONSTITUTES
REVERSIBLE ERROR.
Virgin Islands v. Bellott (1974)
At defendant's trial for first degree murder he offered the expert
testimony of a clinical psychologist and a psychiatrist' to demonstrate that
the offense for which he was indicted was a consequence of a mental
illness from which he was suffering at the time of the offense.2 To rebut
60. 491 F.2d at 1236. A special parole term, as distinguished from ordinary parole,
imposes restrictions upon freedom in excess of the full term of sentence, and carries
with it the possibility of additional imprisonment for its violation. Id. at 1238.
61. See notes 6 & 16 supra.
62. 495 F.2d at 588.
63. Id. Interestingly enough, the majority also suggested that the district court
"consider the possible application of Roberts." Id.
1. Virgin Islands v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393, 1394 (3d Cir. 1974).
2. Id. In United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961), the Third
Circuit rejected the M'Naghten Rules for criminal responsibility and adopted a modi-
fied version of the American Law Institute's test for criminal responsibility. Compare
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) with the Currens test, 290 F.2d
at 774 & n.32.
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this evidence, the prosecution relied upon the testimony of lay witnesses
who had observed the defendant shortly before and after the offense,
3
and upon damaging cross-examination of defendant's experts which
raised doubts as to the validity of their testimony. 4 The defendant
requested that the jury be instructed that the issue of mental capacity had
been sufficiently raised by the evidence to cause the burden of proving
defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt to shift5 to the prosecution
as a matter of law.6 The district court rejected this charge and instructed
the jury that it was within their province as finders of fact to determine
whether the evidence adduced at trial sufficiently raised the issue of de-
fendant's mental capacity, and if the jury so found then the prosecution
would have the burden of proving defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. 7 The jury found the defendant guilty of first degree murder and he
appealed. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial,
hdlding that the trial court, and not the jury, must determine as a matter
of law whether the evidence presented was sufficient to raise the issue of
3. 495 F.2d at 1394.
4. Id. at 1397-98.
5. The term "burden of proof" is often loosely used to refer to either the burden
of establishing the existence of a given proposition (the risk-of nonpersuasion) or the
burden of going forward with the evidence in order to raise an issue or rebut an adverse
presumption (the risk of nonproduction). See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2485, 2487 (3d ed. 1940).
When the term is used in the first sense it can never properly be said to shift
between the parties to a criminal litigation because the prosecution must bear the
burden of proving all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. How-
ever, when used in the second sense, the burden of proof may shift, at various times,
between the parties, especially when a presumption such as the one in the instant caso
places upon one party the initial burden of going forward with evidence in rebuttal,
and that evidence is introduced. See notes 37-39 and accompanying text infra. It is
to this second sense which courts refer when they state that the burden of proof
shifts to the prosecution upon defendant's introduction of evidence tending to rebut
the initial presumption of sanity. See note 11 and accompanying text infra.
6. 495 F.2d at 1394-95.
7. Id. The district court's charge, in pertinent part, was as follows:
Now, Dr. Hogan has testified that ... the man is mentally ill and that
the man was mentally ill [at the time of the offense] and that . . . the acts with
which this man is charged were done by him in consequence or as a consequence
of that mental [sic] illness. This is for you to determine. Without encroaching
on your province as finders of fact and without suggesting that you find that to
be the fact, I do suggest only that this is a sufficient quantum of evidence which
you might regard as causing the burden of proof to shift to the Government.
It may or may not be enough to warrant a verdict of not guilty by reason of
mental illness. It may or may not be enough even to cause the burden to ,hift
when you assess it, but in commenting on the evidence, as is my right to do and
as I have said you may reject, but by way of suggestion to you I think it at lea:;t
satisfies the requirement that the burden should shift.
... To sum up then that charge .. . if you find that the testimony of the
experts called by the defense sufficiently raises the question of the defendant's
soundness, then the burden shifts to the prosecution and you must then search
the evidence to see whether the prosecution has satisfied you beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant had the mental capacity to commit the offense charged
Id. at 1395 (emphasis added). 86
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defendant's mental capacity, and if it was so, the jury must then be in-
structed that the prosecution must bear the burden of proving defendant's
sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, the district court's jury
charge regarding mental capacity was reversible error because it placed
upon the defendant the threshold burden of persuading the jury that he had
raised the issue of mental capacity. -Virgin Islands v. Bellott, 495 F.2d 1393
(3d Cir. 1974).
The primary question raised by the appeals was one of first impression
in the Third Circuit.9 In all United States jurisdictions every person is
initially presumed to be sane.10 Thus, there is no burden upon the prosecu-
tion to adduce any evidence of sanity unless this presumption is rebutted
and the issue of defendant's sanity thereby raised by evidence to the con-
trary. Once this presumption ,of sanity is rebutted, there remains the
question of which party should bear the burden of proof of mental capacity.
The resolution of this issue, in turn, is often dependent upon the difficult
question of whether sanity is necessary to the formation of criminal intent,
the traditional mens rea required for criminal culpability. If it is, then
sanity, in effect, becomes an element of the crime which the prosecution
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. If it is not, insanity is an affirmative
defense or avoidance and the defendant must bear the burden of its proof."
8. In addition to the primary issue addressed in this note, the court disposed
of two collateral issues at the conclusion of its opinion. First, the court rejected the
defendant's contention that he was entitled to a directed verdict of acquittal because
he had produced expert testimony on mental capacity whereas the Government had
not. The court noted that there had been both considerable lay testimony suggesting
sanity at the time of the offense, and damaging cross-examination of defendant's
experts which cast doubt upon the basis of their testimony. Hence the court implied
that a jury could have concluded reasonably that the defendant was sane beyond a
reasonable doubt. 495 F.2d at 1397-98. Compare Brown v. United States, 351 F.2d
473 (5th Cir. 1965), and Duskey v. United States, 295 F.2d 743 (8th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 998 (1962), with Brock v. United States, 387 F.2d 254 (5th Cir.
1967) ; United States v. Westerhausen, 283 F.2d 844 (7th Cir. 1960) ; and McKenzie
v. United States, 266 F.2d 524 (10th Cir. 1959).
Second, the court declined to address the issue of whether the insanity test an-
nounced in United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961), had any effect
upon the rule that lay testimony on the issue of mental capacity offered by the
prosecution may satisfy its burden of proof when weighed against contrary expert
testimony. 495 F.2d at 1397.
9. See note 25 infra.
10. H. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 214 (1954) [here-
inafter cited as WEIHOFEN].
11. In approximately half of the state courts the prosecution is required to prove
the defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt once the issue of mental capacity
has been sufficiently raised, while the remainder require that the defendant prove his
alleged insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. See WEIHOFEN, supra note 10,
at 241. See generally Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 146 (1968). The former position adopts the
view that sanity is a prerequisite to the formation of the required mens rea. See, e.g.,
Bradford v. State, 234 Md. 505, 512, 200 A.2d 150, 154 (1964) ; Commonwealth v. Vogel,
440 Pa. 1, 14-17, 268 A.2d 89, 90-91 (1970) (Roberts J., opinion in support of order).
The latter position is generally predicated upon the notion that insanity is not itself
an element of mens rea, but rather is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded
and proved by the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 269-76, 58 A.
905, 907-09 (1905); Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 5-14, 268 A.2d 89, 91-96 87
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Since 1895, when the Supreme Court of the United States decided
Davis v. United States,i2 federal courts have been bound by the rule that
upon a showing by either party of some evidence of defendant's insanity,
the prosecution must assume the burden of proving defendant's sanity be-
yond a reasonable doubt. 13 The Supreme Court has, upon several occa-
sions, 14 recognized and reaffirmed this position, at least insofar as it applies
to federal courts. 1 All of the circuit courts which have faced the broad issue
of which party must bear the burden of proof on mental capacity have
applied the Davis rule without much discussion.' 6 Actually, the basic
(1970) (Jones, J., opinion in support of order). This latter view apparently had its
origin in the famous Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), where Lord
Chief Justice Tindal, responding to questions of law put to the English Judges by the
House of Lords, said that every man is presumed sane until the contrary is proved
and that to establish the defense of insanity it must be "clearly proved" that at the
time of the offense the defendant was insane. Id. at 722 (emphasis added).
For a critical analysis of state decisions holding that the burden of proving
mental capacity is the defendant's, see Comment, Insanity - The Burden of Proof,
30 LA. L. REV. 117 (1969); Comment, Some Evidentiary Aspects of the Insanity
Defense in Pennsylvania, 45 TEMP. L.Q. 63 (1971) ; Note, The Insanity Defense in
Missouri - Guilt by a Preponderance of Evidence, 40 U. Mo. K.C. L. REv. 240
(1971) ; 75 DICK. L. REV. 503 (1971) ; 9 DuQ. L. REv. 320 (1970) ; 15 MD. L. REV. 157
(1955).
12. 160 U.S. 469 (1895).
13. In Davis, the Supreme Court considered the following jury charge:
[T]he law presumes every person . . . to be of sane mind, and this presumption
continues until the contrary is shown. So that when, as in this case, insanity is
interposed as a defense, the fact of the existence of such insanity at the time of
the commission of the offense charged must be established by the evidence to
the reasonable satisfaction of a jury, and the burden of proof of the insanity rests
with the defendant....
When you start into a trial of a case, as I have already told you, you
start in with the presumption of sanity. Then comes in the responsibility resting
upon the defendant to show his condition; to show his irresponsibility under the
law. He is required to show that - to your reasonable satisfaction, I say, to
your reasonable satisfaction - that it is a state of case where he is excusable
for the act.
Id. at 477-78 (emphasis added).
Reversing the conviction, a unanimous Court held that, in federal prosecutions,
the burden of proof of mental capacity never rests with the defendant but rather, where
the issue is raised, the prosecution must prove defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id. The real basis of the decision was the Court's view that sanity is a neces-
sary element of criminal intent - mens rea - and must be proven beyond a reasonable
doubt, as must all other elements of a particular offense. Id. at 484-85. See note 11
and accompanying text supra.
14. E.g., Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 713 (1962); Matheson v. United
States, 227 U.S. 540, 543 (1913); Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. Z6, 38 (1908);
Hotema v. United States, 186 U.S. 413, 417-18 (1902).
15. Davis did not involve the Court's formulation of a constitutionally mandated
rule and is not, therefore, applicable to state prosecutions. See Leland v. Oregon,
343 U.S. 790, 797 (1952) (Oregon statute requiring defendant to prove his insanity
beyond reasonable doubt held constitutional).
16. E.g., Isaac v. United States, 284 F.2d 168, 169-70 (D.C. Cir. 1960) ; Rivers
v. United States, 270 F.2d 435, 439-40 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 920
(1960); Howard v. United States, 232 F.2d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 1956). For a more
extensive compilation of cases which generally support the Davis rule, see Annot.,
17 A.L.R.3d 146, 158 (1968). 88
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meaning of Davis has never been seriously questioned by the federal courts;
rather, the sub-issues of (1) what quantum of evidence of insanity is
necessary to raise the issue for the jury's consideration ;17 (2) the relation-
ship of opposing lay and expert testimony upon insanity, and their respec-
tive evidential weights as to the issue of mental capacity ;18 and (3) the
treatment of the presumption of sanity as evidence once it has been re-
butted, 19 have been the subjects of repeated consideration by the circuit
courts.
Other federal cases, similar to Bellott, wherein the trial judge allowed
the jury to determine whether the defendant had adduced sufficient
evidence to raise the issue of mental capacity when it was clear that the
defendant had, as a matter of law, adduced the quantum of evidence re-
17. In Davis the Court said, "Where the defense is insanity, and where the case
made by the prosecution discloses nothing whatever in excuse or extenuation of the
crime charged, the accused is bound to produce some evidence that will impair or
weaken the force of the legal presumption in favor of sanity." 160 U.S. at 486-87
(emphasis added).
Although the lower federal courts have differed in translating "some evidence"
into more specific standards, it is unclear whether the application of these differing
standard would produce differing results, given the same facts. See, e.g., United States
v. Currier, 405 F.2d 1039, 1042 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 914 (1969) (some
evidence sufficient to raise a doubt of sanity) ; Evalt v. United States, 382 F.2d 424,
428 (9th Cir. 1967) (slight evidence) ; McDonald v. United States, 312 F.2d 847, 849
(D.C. Cir. 1962) (more than a scintilla, yet not so substantial as to require a directed
verdict of acquittal if left uncontroverted) ; Phillips v. United States, 311 F.2d 204,
206 (10th Cir. 1962) (any relevant evidence) ; Hall v. United States, 295 F.2d 20, 28
(4th Cir. 1961) (slight evidence but not enough to create a reasonable doubt) ; United
States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751, 761 (3d Cir. 1961) (enough to provoke inquiry into
mental capacity) ; Pollard v. United States, 282 F.2d 450, 457 (6th Cir. 1960) (evidence
sufficient to create reasonable doubt).
The difficulty inherent in establishing a standard to measure the sufficiency of
evidence necessary to raise the issue of mental capacity has been recognized in the
various circuits. Moreover, a reading of the cases attempting to apply such standards
reveals their dubious face value. In Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir.
1951), the court said, with reference to the issue of mental capacity, "Any attempt
to formulate a quantitative measure of the amount of evidence necessary to raise
an issue can produce no more than an illusory definiteness." Id. at 615.
This does not mean that the circuit courts should abandon these attempts to give
the district courts some direction as to when the issue of mental capacity is sufficiently
raised to allow jury consideration. It is merely suggested that the standards can be
only vague at best, and that the district courts' assessment of the evidence tending to
show the defendant's insanity is very much open to review. Because of the negligible
face value of the articulated standards, it is necessary to examine carefully the cases
applying these criteria in order to understand their meanings.
18. See note 8 supra, and Brock v. United States, 387 F.2d 254, 257 n.6-8
(5th Cir. 1967), for cases dealing with this issue, which is raised when the defendant
has introduced expert testimony tending to show his insanity at the time of the
offense, while the prosecution has relied upon lay testimony in order to prove de-
fendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.
19. Compare United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971), with Keys v.
United States, 346 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965). For a
discussion of this issue in the Third Circuit see notes 33-44 and accompanying text
infra.
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quired to raise the issue,20 have also resulted in convictions being reversed.2 '
There appear to be no opinions reaching a contrary result. In Doyle v.
United States,22 the Ninth Circuit considered a jury instruction which, in
effect, allowed the jury to determine whether the issue of mental capacity
had been raised.23 The Doyle court expressed the rationale behind its
holding and other federal decisions on this issue, when it stated:
The vice in the instruction given here is that it is impossible to ascer-
tain what the jury did pursuant to it. The jury may well have decided
that the defendant had not fulfilled the burden of "making some show-
ing of insanity or mental irresponsibility." Hence the jury under that
instruction may well have concluded that the defendant's insanity did
not become an "element of the crime," and that there was therefore no
burden on the Government to prove sanity.2 4
Operating with the foregoing material as background and in the ab-
sence of its own precedent upon the precise issue before it,25 the Bellott
20. See note 17 and accompanying text supra. Note that the district court's jury
charge in the instant case, in commenting upon the evidence, expressly found that,
in its opinion, the defendant's evidence on mental capacity was sufficient to raise
that issue. 495 F.2d at 1395. See note 7 supra.
21. United States v. Arroyave, 465 F.2d 962 (9th Cir. 1972); Doyle v. United
States, 366 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1966) ; Davis v. United States, 364 F.2d 572 (10th
Cir. 1966) ; Otney v. United States, 340 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1965) ; Fitts v. United
States, 284 F.2d 108 (10th Cir. 1960). Cf. United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th
Cir. 1971) ; Tatum v. United States, 190 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1951). It is not clear
why the instant court failed to rely upon or, indeed, discuss any of these cases but
Otney in reaching its decision. The court read Otney - perhaps too broadly - as
holding that a district court in charging the jury may not so much as refer to the
presumption of sanity. The court said this holding went beyond what was required
by Davis. 495 F.2d at 1397.
22. 366 F.2d 394 (9th Cir. 1966).
23. The Doyle court considered a jury charge which provided:
Under the law applicable to the defendant's plea of insanity and mental
irresponsibility every man is presumed to be sane and mentally responsible, and
to intend the natural and usual consequences of his own acts. The government
need not prove insanity [sic] in the first instance. The defendant has the burden,
in the first instance, of making some showing of insanity or mental irrespon-
sibility. However, when the defendant introduces some evidence to raise the
issue of insanity his sanity at the time of the commission of the offense becomes
an element of the crime which, like all other elements of the crime, must be
proved by the government beyond a reasonable doubt. The rule is that if, from
the whole evidence, the jury has a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's mental
competency or mental responsibility the accused is entitled to an acquittal on
the grounds of such insanity or mental irresponsibility.
Id. at 400.
24. Id. (quoting trial court's charge).
25. In United States v. Currens, 290 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1961), the Davis rule,
with respect to the burden of proof on mental capacity, was acknowledged but not
passed upon on appeal. Id. at 761. It is important to note that the Currens court
did not view Davis as either approving or disapproving the M'Naghten Rules for
insanity. Id. at 767-68. Therefore, as the Bellott court pointed out, "[Currens cast]
no doubt whatever upon the continued validity of Davis insofar as that case dealt
with the burden of proof." 495 F.2d at 1396.
Likewise, in United States v. Lutz, 420 F.2d 414 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 911 (1970), the Third Circuit again embraced the Davis rule, but noted that
the applicability of the rule was not challenged by the appeal. Id. at 415. Hence, in 90
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court relied heavily upon Davis. The court stated that the district court's
jury instructions placed upon the defendant a threshold burden of per-
suading the jury that he had produced sufficient evidence of insanity to
raise the issue, before the jury could decide whether the prosecution had
met its burden of proving defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt.26
Affording Davis its broadest reading, the court concluded that it was
error for a trial court's charge as to mental capacity to place any burden
of proof upon the defendant.27 Therefore, the court found that the district
court had erred in concluding that the general presumption of sanity itself
imposed a burden of persuasion upon the defendant after evidence sufficient
to raise the issue of mental capacity had been presented.2 8
It is submitted that a more apt description of the district court's error
is that it held that the jury was to determine whether the evidence presented
was sufficient to create a jury question as to mental capacity, instead of
making the sufficiency of the evidence a question of law for the court's
determination. 29 It seems apparent that the district court understood that
initially the prosecution had no burden of proof regarding the defendant's
mental capacity, and that if the evidence sufficiently raised that issue, the
prosecution would have to prove defendant's sanity at the time of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt.30 The district court erred in not
assuming the responsibility for determining when the issue arose and
thereafter instructing the jury in accordance with this determination.
The Bellott court found additional support for its decision in a trilogy
of prior Third Circuit opinions dealing with jury instructions allocating
its instant opinion, the court conceded that the Third Circuit had never "considered
the precise issue here presented." 495 F.2d at 1396. However, the court failed to state
precisely what it perceived the issue to be. Broadly speaking, the issue would appear
to have been whether the district court's charge relating to insanity may place any
part of the burden of proof upon the defendant. Alternatively, the issue may have been
more narrowly framed in terms of whether it is a function of the court, or of thejury, to determine if the evidence of defendant's insanity is sufficient to raise the issue
of mental capacity. The instant court seems to have adopted the former view. See
note 29 and accompanying text infra.
26. 495 F.2d at 1397.
27. Id. at 1395. Although there is no burden of persuasion upon a defendant
who pleads the defense of insanity, there is a burden of initially producing evidence
of insanity, where no other evidence of insanity has been presented. 160 U.S. at 486.
See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 2487, 2501, and note 5 supra.
28. 495 F.2d at 1396. See note 5 supra.
29. These differing views of the district court's error are actually two sides of
the same coin. As noted earlier, there is a presumption of sanity, which does place
a burden upon the defendant in the absence of any evidence of insanity. See note 27
supra. However, it is a production burden and not a persuasion burden. The latter
addresses itself to the jury, while the former involves determinations by the trial court
of whether as a matter of law there is sufficient evidence upon a particular factual
issue as to require the jury's consideration. Hence it is error to allow a jury to
determine whether sufficient evidence has been produced to raise an issue, since this is
the proper function of the court. See generally 9 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 2487,
2549.
30. See note 7 supra.
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the burden of proof in what the court considered analogous situations.3'
It is evident from its citation of these cases that the Bellott court was
focusing primarily upon the prejudicial effect of a jury charge which
potentially placed the burden of persuasion upon a criminal defendant.
With respect to mental capacity, Davis clearly proscribed any such instruc-
tion.3 2 While it concluded that the district court's charge upon mental
capacity was error which required a new trial, the instant court also relied
upon Davis3 3 to support its suggestion that a trial court
should also instruct the jury that there is a presumption of sanity
which it may take into account along with all the evidence in the case
in determining whether the Government has proved beyond a reason-
able doubt that the offense was not the consequence of a mental ill-
ness.
3 4
It is true that there is language in Davis within which would fall a
jury instruction that the presumption of sanity still retains some evidentiary
weight after it has been rebutted.3 5 Yet some circuits which have considered
31. 495 F.2d 1396-97. In the first of these cases, United States v. Allegrucci,
258 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1958), the Third Circuit held that a jury instruction to the effect
that unexplained possession of recently stolen goods placed a burden upon those holding
the goods to explain their possession, constituted reversible error. Id. at 73. The
Allegrucci court emphasized that the effect of such a charge was to impose upon a
defendant the burden of proving his innocence. Put another way, the defendant was
being called upon to disprove an element of the offense of possession of stolen goods,
to wit, knowledge of theft. Id. at 74. The Allegrucci court cited cases from other
circuits in which similar instructions about the raising of a presumption of guilty
knowledge were held to be prejudicial error. Id. The court posited that the burden
instructions in question were more onerous to a defendant than the presumption in-
structions other circuits had held invalid, and thus were reversible error. Id.
In United States v. Marcus, 166 F.2d 497 (3d Cir. 1948), followed in, United
States v. Barrasso, 267 F.2d 908, 910-11 (3d Cir. 1959), the other cases cited in
Bellott, the Third Circuit embraced the general rule that once evidence of alibi is
offered, the jury must be instructed that the "government's burden of proof covers the
defense of alibi, as well as all other phases of the case." 166 F.2d at 504.
32. In Davis, the Supreme Court said:
Strictly speaking, the burden of proof, as those words are understood in
criminal law, is never upon the accused to establish his innocence or to disprove
the facts necessary to establish the crime for which he is indicted. It is on the
prosecution from the beginning to the end of the trial, and applies to every element
necessary to constitute the crime.
160 U.S. at 487.
33. 495 F.2d at 1397.
34. Id.
35. The Davis court stated:
Giving to the prosecution, where the defense is insanity, the benefit in the
way of proof of the presumption in favor of sanity, the vital question from the
time a plea of not guilty is entered until the return of the verdict, is whether
upon all the evidence, by whatever side adduced, guilt is established beyond a
reasonable doubt. If the whole evidence, including that supplied by the presumption
of sanity, does not exclude beyond reasonable doubt the hypothesis of insanity, of
which some proof is adduced, the accused is entitled to an acquittal of the specific
offense charged.
160 U.S. at 487-88 (emphasis added).
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this question have reached the opposite conclusion. 36 The presumption of
sanity is based upon the statistically verifiable fact that most people are
sane."7 Such a presumption is permitted largely, if not solely, because of
the procedural convenience it affords in the great majority of criminal
trials where mental capacity is not at issue. 8  The presumption, if unchal-
lenged, "thus supplies in the first instance the required proof of capacity
to commit crime." 9 If this were not so, the government would be put to
the unnecessarily burdensome task of proving a defendant's sanity by af-
firmative evidence at every trial, regardless of whether the defendant ever
considered pleading insanity as a defense.
However, once the presumption of sanity is rebutted by sufficient
evidence to the contrary, it does not follow that it should retain any pro-
bative weight. 40 The Supreme Court in Davis expressly stated that it was
36. United States v. Lawrance, 480 F.2d 688, 693 (5th Cir. 1973) ; United States
v. Skinner, 437 F.2d 164, 166 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54,
70 (7th Cir. 1971). Contra, Keys v. United States, 346 F.2d 824, 826 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 869 (1965). See generally J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE
ON EVIDENCE §§ 314, 336 (1898) ; WEIHOFEN, supra note 10, at 216 et seq.; 9 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 5, § 2491; Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 19 (1966).
37. See 160 U.S. at 486; WEIHOFEN, supra note 10, at 214.
38. See 160 U.S. at 486; C. McCoRMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE § 309 (1st ed. 1954);
Morgan, Further Observations On Presumptions, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245, 251 (1943).
39. 160 U.S. at 486.
40. Although there are cases approving instructions that the presumption of
sanity continues as evidence of sanity even after it has been controverted, and thus
may be considered by the jury along with the other evidence on mental capacity (see
note 36 and accompanying text supra), there are compelling reasons to hold otherwise:
First, as noted earlier, the predominant basis for the presumption of sanity in
criminal actions is the procedural convenience it affords. See notes 38-39 and ac-
companying text supra. The presumption, in effect, operates to compel the defendant
to introduce evidence of insanity if he wants the issue to be considered by the jury.
Once the defendant has done this, the presumption has served its purpose and should
be considered irrelevant to the case. A presumption may be constructed by law to
accomplish the purpose of eliciting evidence, but it does not follow that the controverted
presumption should thereafter be treated as evidence.
Second, the presumption of sanity is based upon the statistically verifiable fact
that most people are sane, and therefore it loses this justification for its presence when
the focus shifts from the general populace to one particular defendant whose sanity is
then, by definition, at issue. As soon as there is evidence of the particular individual's
mental condition, it becomes illogical to speak of such evidence being outweighed or
negated in part by a statistical generalization. Evidence of insanity should be negated
by affirmatively adduced, contradictory evidence. A contrary conclusion would create
the possibility that a defendant's offer of evidence could be rejected by the jury upon
the basis of the statistical generalization alone, should the prosecution choose to rely
upon that as its evidence and the trial court hold the jury's decision based, therefore,
upon some evidence.
Third, instructing a jury that they may take into consideration as probative evi-
dence the presumption of sanity is tantamount to asking them to weigh a rule of law
against factual evidence. It is impossible to discern how much evidentiary weight a
jury may allocate to this presumption. It is, therefore, quite possible for a jury to
give it great weight, and it might lead them to evaluate the defendant's evidence in
terms of whether or not this presumption has been overcome. The notion that the
presumption of sanity controls until it is overcome by the defendant's evidence is
precisely what was sought to be eliminated in Davis, relied upon so heavily by the
Bellott court. In this respect, the Bellott court, arguably, is internally inconsistent.
On the one hand it purported to protect the defendant from any burden of persuasion
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unwilling to allow a jury to convict where there was equally balanced
evidence regarding mental capacity.41 A rule which allowed a jury to tip
the scales of equally balanced evidence by using a debilitated presumption
would vitiate the spirit, if not the letter, of Davis. It is submitted that the
Davis language which lends support to the notion that the presumption
of sanity retains some evidentiary weight after it has been rebutted should
not be treated as binding, because the specific issue was not raised in
Davis and did not receive that Court's full consideration. 42 Affording evi-
dentiary weight to the presumption of sanity once it has been rebutted
places a burden of proof regarding this issue upon the defendant after he
has already sufficiently raised the issue of his sanity by extrinsic evidence. 43
As the Bellott court made clear, this is precisely what Davis proscribed.44
The absence of any in-depth analysis of the primary issue by the
Bellott court, induced by the relative simplicity of that issue and a strong
Supreme Court mandate, makes it difficult to assess the breadth of the
instant decision. A narrow reading of Bellott compels district courts in
criminal actions to make a preliminary decision as to whether the evidence
adduced has sufficiently raised the issue of mental capacity to require the
upon the issue of mental capacity by positively placing that burden upon the prosecu-
tion, once the issue was raised. However, the benefits of that protection are, potentially,
withdrawn by allowing an instruction to the jury that the presumption of sanity con-
tinues as evidence of sanity even after its rebuttal.
Moreover, when the case goes to the jury, after the presumption of sanity has
been rebutted, the jury is at liberty to give any probative force they think fit to the
fact that this defendant is human and that most humans are sane. While this may be
an inevitable consideration of the jury it should not be given additional weight because
of an instruction by the court to consider the presumption of sanity as evidence. In
other words, it is not necessary and, indeed, is possibly prejudicial to bring to the
jury's attention in any way the existence of a legal presumption of sanity.
For cases and commentary dealing generally with the effect of presumptions as
evidence where controverting proof is introduced, see Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 19 (1966).
41. 160 U.S. at 484. It is assumed that Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the
Davis Court, in alluding to equally balanced evidence, was referred to evidence as it
is traditionally perceived - the presentation of testimony and exhibits to a jury in an
attempt to persuade them that a fact exists or does not exist - and not as something
which is the result, in part, of a legal presumption.
42. See note 13 supra. The concept that the language relied upon by the Bellott
court is gratuitous is buttressed by the fact that the Supreme Court placed emphasis
upon the theory that the presumption operated merely as a procedural convenience.
160 U.S. at 486. Additionally, the Court rejected the doctrine that where the evidence
of mental capacity is equally balanced the jury can convict. Id. at 484. The Court
stated that the presumption of sanity "is liable to be overcome, or to be so far impaired,
in a particular case that it cannot be safely or properly made the basis of action in that
case, especially if the inquiry involves human life." Id. at 486 (emphasis added). The
conclusion that the presumption of sanity cannot operate as sufficient evidence for
a jury's verdict, where the evidence is equally balanced, would seem to indicate that
its premise was that such a presumption can never be evidence. Thus, the language
in Davis supporting the notion that the presumption of sanity continues as evidence
after its rebuttal, is not only dicta but is also inconsistent with the Davis holding.
43. See note 40 supra.
44. 495 F.2d at 1396.
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jury's consideration. 45 A broader reading could warn the district courts
that, on appeal, their jury instructions will be closely scrutinized for lan-
guage which might be interpreted as placing a burden of persuasion upon
a criminal defendant.
It is submitted that the court's advice as to instructions on the pre-
sumption of sanity as evidence was premature, if not injudicious, as the
issue was one which did not have to be resolved. It is further submitted
that despite the language of Davis and the Bellott court's dictum, a district
court which, having preliminarily determined that the issue of mental
capacity is a proper subject for the jury's consideration, proceeds to in-
struct the jury that the presumption of sanity may be afforded evidentiary
weight, will run a significant risk of reversal upon appeal and full argument
of the issue.46
The court sought to protect criminal defendants from instructions
which potentially placed upon them a burden of proof, and made it clear
that where the issue of mental capacity is raised as a matter of law, the
prosecution must prove defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. This
is an extremely difficult burden of proof for the prosecution successfully to
shoulder as it entails proving, to a high degree of certainty, the existence of
a particular mental state at a date in the past. It is suggested that the
Bellott court attempted to lighten this onerous burden by allowing the
prosecution to rely, in part, upon the presumption of sanity as evidence,
even after its rebuttal. This allowance is arguably gratuitous because the
presumption of sanity was not mentioned in the district court's jury in-
structions, and the issue of the proper role of the presumption of sanity was
not raised on appeal. Thus, there appears to have been no need for the
court to make prophylactic suggestions to the district courts on such an
important issue.
The Third Circuit has forcefully addressed itself to the interrelation-
ship of the judge and jury with respect to the burden of proof of mental
capacity in criminal actions. Although the court engaged in no searching
analysis of its own, choosing rather to rely heavily upon the Davis case,
it is submitted that its result reflects the functional balance which must be
effected to fairly assess a criminal defendant's mental capacity.
Philip G. Kircher
45. The Bellott court did not address itself specifically to the issue of what
quantum of evidence is necessary to raise the issue of mental capacity for the jury's
consideration since that question was not posed on appeal. It appears that defendant's
substantial expert testimony at trial, tending to show defendant's insanity as defined
in Currens, would have passed muster under any of the tests employed by the various
circuit courts, had the evidence been challenged by the government as insufficient to
raise the issue. See note 17 and accompanying text supra. Additionally, the district
court, in its charge, specifically stated that defendant's evidence of insanity, in its
opinion, was sufficient to raise the issue of mental capacity - although it allowed the
jury to make this determination. 495 F.2d at 1395.
46. See note 40 and accompanying text supra.
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